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This dissertation seeks to recover a notion of agency for those who are caught in 
the interstices of transnational relationships, which are generally determined by practices 
of globalization. I examine notions of travel and home as corollary concepts that have 
been used metaphorically to describe the nature of the multicultural subject. Travel and 
home both highlight the sense of displacement caused by global capitalist markets as well 
as the capacity to remake and envision a new community. In this light, travel and home 
are understood as interpretive processes that guide social transformation in an 
increasingly multicultural world. 
I first consider philosophical conceptions of the cosmopolitan self proposed by 
theorists who work on travel and diaspora. I then use this critical examination as a 
springboard for thinking about transnational identities, emphasizing themes of home and 
community as fundamental components for "developing a conception of a multicultural 
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self. These themes also set the stage for a further consideration of multicultural selves in 
the context of feminist care ethics and a metaphysics of belonging. In a discussion of 
feminist care ethics, I examine care by highlighting the transnational relationships that 
connect one's concrete caring practice to a global context. In order to articulate a 
metaphysics of belonging, I turn to the work of Josiah Royce and his notion of the 
"betweenness" relation as it emerges in his theories of provincialism, loyalty and 
community. This relation becomes the framework for a new understanding of 
multicultural selves in a transnational context. 
In extending this analysis to the political context, I consider how a "betweenness" 
framework emerges through corollary processes of "world-traveling" conceived by Maria 
Lugones and "home-making" as theorized by Yen Li Espiritu in establishing 
transnational feminist communities. I end this dissertation by pointing out new directions 
in conceiving how a transnational framework might address the political challenges 
posed by indigenous claims to sovereignty against Asian American practices of 
settlement. Ultimately, I intend to show how a transnational framework can be a fruitful 
resource in conceptualizing the multicultural self who can respond to colonialism and 
oppression in an increasingly globalized world. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION:
 
NEGOTIATING THE SPACE-BETWEEN: TRAVEL, HOME AND
 
TRANSNATIONALISM
 
Growing up in Los Angeles, CA, my neighborhood could be characterized as 
"transnational." Although the families my brothers and I played with in the "concrete 
playgrounds" surrounding our neighborhood were Mexican and Filipino, there were also 
" 
a few German and Italian families and one African American family. Living in Los 
Angeles, it was a norm that while people lived and loved living (some, in fact, were 
dutifully patriotic) in my neighborhood, there rem~ined a sense of nostalgia or an 
emotional yearning for another place that was not here within the confines ofmy 
neighborhood or even within the bounded territories ofthe United States. My family, for 
example, maintained connections with the Philippines by offering our home (and 
sometimes my bed) to relatives and friends who were coming to or leaving the US bound 
to the Philippines or by sending huge cardboard packages, known as balakbayans, to the 
Philippines filled with clothes, shoes, candy, first aid supplies, and hospital equipment. 
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This sort of transnational migrant experience may lead to an alternative way of 
understanding the nature of the cross-cultural or multicultural self in discussions of 
multiculturalism and cultural diversity. I understand transnationalism as both the 
practices that are defined by global economic markets and the technologies of 
globalization, including practices of travel and border crossing, as well as the experience 
of those who are caught within these transnational interstices of exchange and travel. 
Understanding the multicultural subject within a transnational perspective emphasizes 
how agency is negotiated and created within the power differentials inherent in 
transnational practices. 
In her book Cultivating Humanity, Martha Nussbaum argues, "The present-day 
world is inescapably multicultural and multinational" (1997,8). This claim becomes 
sociologically evident when we consider the material conditions contemporary 
globalization has created on an interpenetrating and massive scale. Vertovec and Cohen 
in their anthology Conceiving Cosmopolitanism point out some of these conditions: 
The relative ease and cheapness of transportation across long distances, mass 
tourism, large-scale migration, visible multiculturalism in 'world-cities', the flow 
of commodities to and from all points of the compass and the rapid development 
of telecommunications (including cheap telephone calls, satellite television, email 
and the Internet) have all wrought a socially and culturally interpenetrated planet, 
on a scale and intensity hitherto unseen (2002, 9). 
The "intensity" of these material conditions brought on by current globalization practices 
seem to motivate theorists to think about how these practices affect who we are. If the 
changing world is insistently globalized due to migration patterns, capitalistic ventures, 
technological advances and political upheavals, how are we supposed to think about the 
cross-cultural conditions inescapably constituting our lived experience? 
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The rise in thinking about transnational and diasporic identities has been richly 
explored in disciplines such as cultural studies, ethnic studies, postcolonial studies, and 
women's studies. However, there has been scant attention in philosophy to utilizing this 
perspective in discussions of the multicultural subject or cosmopolitanism. In some 
cases, transnational identities and histories are referred to, but never quite developed, as 
in Kwame Appiah's treatment of cosmopolitanism (2006). While Appiah refers to his 
diasporic history and his social location as being in between two countries, his resulting 
theory of cosmopolitanism leaves out an analysis of transnational identities and instead 
seeks a more universal understanding of a world citizen. I believe that a transnational 
perspective has much to offer in thinking about the multicultural subject. 
Travel, border crossing, and movement are practices, the analysis of which can 
play an important role in thinking about the formation of transnational identities. As 
travel becomes an activity that interpenetrates our lives in the context of globalization, it 
becomes impossible to remove ourselves from these very practices, particularly when we 
have become so dependent on goods and resources from outside our borders. However, in 
thinking about travel, what becomes of our sense ofhome? Is home merely a place to 
depart from, or can we see travel as leading us to think about how homes must also be 
cultivated through movement? James Clifford argues that "Cultural centers, discrete 
regions and territories, do not exist prior to contacts, but are sustained through them, 
appropriating and disciplining the restless movements of people and things" (1999, 3). 
In this sense, travel plays a fundamental role in establishing cross-cultural contacts and 
encounters for cultural centers, thereby providing the context in which homes become 
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fluid and open for transformation. Travel challenges assumptions of home as rigid and 
fixed and reveals how homes are fluid and constantly changing through multiple 
encounters with culturally different communities. As a practical activity, travel mediates 
between multiple homes and hence changes the nature of cultural centers by introducing 
new ways of relating to culturally different others. Transnational identities articulate . 
these ways ofbelonging through notions of travel and home. It is my intent in this 
dissertation to examine the relationships between travel and home as it fosters an 
understanding of transnational identities. 
According to Eric Leed, the modem conception of travel, usually associated with 
leisure and escape, seems to be divorced from an ancient conception of travel that is more 
tied to pain, personal test, and effort. Leed understands the ancient conception of travel 
as tied more to one's suffering, which greatly informs the traveler's actions.' Leed 
argues that, in this sense, the ancient conception of travel is related to notions of 
necessity, where one's movement is determined by the situation, such as war, economic 
destitution, or by a god, rather than determined by an independent subject. However, the 
transformation ofthe subject begins at the moment the traveler loses a sense ofher 
identity, her sense of self. This loss, according to Leed, "brings a gain of stature and 
certainty of self." The traveler, "reduced to its essentials," engages in a self-reflective 
activity, which allows "one to see what those essentials are" (2001,6). Emphasizing this 
transformation within the context of the journey, which is laden with suffering and loss, 
1 Leed compares the writings of Odyssey and Gilgamesh as representative of the ancient conception of 
travel. For Leed, the ancients "valued travel as an explication of human fate and necessity." Travel was 
seen as "a suffering, a penance." In contrast, the modems viewed travel "as an expression of freedom and 
an escape from necessity and purpose... and a means to pleasure" (2001, 5). 
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reveals a sense of travel that locates the subject between states of consciousness, moving 
from the old familiar self towards a new revitalized sense of self that emerges from self-
reflection. The pain and suffering of travel marks a reflective space that provides for the 
transformation of the self. 
The modem conception of travel is an escape from necessity or from the pains 
and trials of one's situation and hence escapes self-reflection. Leed argues: 
These factors - the voluntariness ofdeparture, the freedom implicit in the 
indeterminacies of mobility, the pleasure of travel free from necessity, the notion 
that travel signifies autonomy and is a means for demonstrating what one "really" 
is independent of one context or set of defining associations - remain the 
characteristics of the modem conception of travel (2001,11). 
An unbridled sense ofmovement becomes possible, avoiding any experiences of 
suffering due to the exigencies of one's situation and context. When one travels, one 
need not suffer the messiness of situations. The individual traveler's experiences develop 
into the perspective of a spectator, one who is distinct from the daily social interactions of 
the people and landscapes the traveler presumably visits. This romanticized version of 
travelled to the development of the culture of travel in 19th Century Europe starting from 
the Grand Tour to current practices of tourism (MacCannellI999). These practices have 
directly affected our ways of interacting with cultural difference by forming what John 
Drry calls "the Tourist Gaze" (1990). This gaze organizes our conceptions ofhow 
movement should and should not be conducted. This gaze has saturated our concept of 
travel and has led many theorists, such as Caren Kaplan, to question the use of the term 
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since it is usually associated with a history of exploitation, imperialism, and unchecked 
freedom ofmobility.2 
Moreover, bell hooks has questioned the viability of travel as a liberatory concept 
that speaks to the oppressed because she also sees the term as saturated with modem 
concepts of pleasure, leisure, and independence. In fact, travel cannot be an adequate 
way of describing the "Trail of Tears, Chinese immigrants, forced relocation of Japanese 
Americans, or the homeless" (hooks 1992, 173). Travel, from the perspective of the 
oppressed, is laced with terror and pain. Travel is rendered unintelligible as a concept in 
articulating the experiences of those whose movements are policed and regulated at the 
margins of society. 
Rather than limiting our understanding of travel to the modem conception of 
travel, I would like to restore the self-reflective activity suggested by the ancient 
conception of travel. The process of self-reflection fosters an interactive dimension in the 
nature of travel, which involves staking ourselves in the journey, understanding the 
process of our own self-transformation through encounters with others, the environment 
and the conditions that determine the journey, rather than becoming isolated from the 
interactive process. The interactive component that refers to our lived experiences of 
travel also refers to an actual relationship that is formed when we travel. A traveling 
relation highlights a space between that connects what is foreign and what is familiar. 
2 Kaplan, like hooks, is suspicious of focusing too much on the term travel because the term is saturated 
with modem conceptions of pleasure, leisure and exploration, which have legitimated practices of 
exploitation. However, her project focuses on the term "displacement" as a way of working out the 
"historical taintedness of travel." Thus, the "displacement" read in relation to travel will uncover the 
modem imperial assumptions regarding the movement and identity that produce our cultural 
representations, or the tourist gaze. Kaplan wants to maintain a notion of travel, but only in relation to 
notions of displacement. Kaplan understands travel as part of a modem legacy that prevents other 
perspectives from being recognized within a history of movement and travel (1996, 2). 
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Given the complicated and diverse backgrounds from which we as humans come, it is 
important to understand how travel underscores a relationship of interaction between 
differently situated subjects, rather than individual pursuits devoid of social interaction. 
By attending to the interactive character oftrave1, the realities of the marginalized will be 
part of the construction of the concept and recognized as part of the experience of travel 
itself. While the concept of displacement is important in thinking about how our travels 
can be involuntary and forced, it need not saturate our concept of travel as a kind of 
agency. While there is an involuntary component in travel, particularly in cases of 
displacement, it is important to see how travel cultivates a sense of the self who works 
out and creates her sense of agency within conditions of restraint. The traveler is not 
wholly determined by involuntary displacement, but can be seen as an agent creating her 
sense of the self within embedded and confining relationships. We see that travel 
underscores the relationships that both sustain us as human beings dependent upon the 
cultural influences of others and enables us to creatively design the nature of the 
interaction such that it resists exploitation and domination. 
This notion oftravel expands on Maria Lugones' concept of "world-traveling." 
Lugones understands her notion of "world-travel" within the experiences ofthose "that 
have been subordinated, exploited, and enslaved, [who] have been forced to travel to 
'worlds' in which they animate subordinate beings" (2002, 17). In other words, the 
notion of travel Lugones works with involves those who are displaced and live in their 
host communities as subordinated and oppressed beings. According to Lugones, 
oppressed peoples live in a tension between being a subject to oppression and resisting 
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oppression. Thus, their subjectivity is "placed" in between the different worlds and 
realities they have to negotiate. Lugones acknowledges similarities ofher notion of 
world-travel with Kaplan's notion of displacement. The practice of world-travel involves 
multiple placements and displacements and acknowledges that multiple locations are not 
easily "assimilable or equivalent" (Kaplan 1994, 150).3 However, rather than ending 
with these barriers that displacement acknowledges, Lugones seeks to "[free] this practice 
[world-travel] from its connection with subordination, shifting the directionality and 
intentionality of travel" (2002, 18). In other words, Lugones understands travel more 
interactively as a possible route for liberation and a creation ofwhat she understands as 
an "active subjectivity,,,4 one that is more attentive to the intricate relationships of 
domination because one is "placed" within them. In Lugones' view, it is important to 
understand travel as a practice that embraces our sensibilities of resistance as subjects 
negotiating the oppressiveness and necessity of our relationships. Recognizing this 
tension "enables us to see the social" (2003, 7) and enables us to create our own 
subjectivities in a relational manner with others who are culturally different from us. 
Those who don't pay attention to the traveling relation or to the ways in which we are 
social, do not travel, according to Lugones. 
3 As cited in (Lugones 2003, 18). 
4 According to Lugones, "active subjectivity" is an attenuated form of the modem understanding of 
subjectivity, which presupposes the "individual subject" or presupposes "collective intentionalities of the 
same" (2003, 6). Nonetheless, what I would like to highlight is her commitment to a kind of subjectivity 
related to the concept of travel. 
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Following Lugones, I understand travel as a praxica15 activity that deeply informs 
the ways in which we are social. Travel is a social relationship that not only demands our 
attention to these relationships, but also understands how our subjectivities are 
constructed within these spaces of interaction with culturally different others. This 
notion of travel acknowledges the underside of history, which involves the narratives and 
experiences of travel by those who are regarded as subordinate, particularly immigrants. 
According to Oscar Campomanes, immigration and imperialism are intimately 
connected. Attention to this relationship exposes how immigrants have "muted that 
national question" (1997, 539) and has forced the question of national identities to 
address international concerns because of their growing numbers in societies such as the 
US. From this perspective, a transnational framework is not only concerned with 
practices oftravel, but also understands a corollary concept of home. A transnational 
framework recognizes the ways in which social relationships are informed by practices of 
imperialism, as well as how the immigrant transforms the very makeup of domestic 
identities. One's home is up for contestation once travel is tied to an interactive model 
that highlights encounters with culturally different others. 
Following the insights of Campomanes and others theorizing Filipino American 
identities, the process of settlement is also included and seen as a corollary concept to 
travel. 6 In her work surrounding Filipino American lives, Yen Li Espiritu begins 
5 I borrow this notion from Lugones who developed a theoretical maxim "so as to not be persuaded by the 
flights of fancy offered to me in the US academy: I won't think what I won't practice" (2003, 5). In this 
way, I see travel as a theoretical concept that is deeply informed by practices of travel, engagement with 
others rather than as individual pursuits of freedom. I assume a relationship between metaphor and lived 
experience. 
6 For a sustained treatment of the role of home understood as a process of travel among Filipino Americans, 
see Espiritu 1995,2003 and Okamura 1999. I will take up the notion of home in Chapter 5. 
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thinking about notions of home, belonging and community in what she terms "the space 
between" (2003, 10). Thinking within the space-between involves charting the lives of 
immigrants between languages, the old and the new, and between homes. Immigrants 
"do not merely insert or incorporate themselves into existing spaces in the US, they also 
transform these spaces and create new ones" (2003, 10). The space-between captures the 
contradictions, tensions, and realities of immigrant lives. Thinking about identities 
within the space-between admits to the ways in which the self is being made and remade 
by a wider community or nation. In this way, the space-between highlights the 
relationships of dependency that connect us to the wider international community. 
Espiritu argues that for immigrants, the return to home is not simply physical but also 
emotional and imaginative. Home is never a place that one leaves behind either literally 
or symbolically. Home functions as a geographical point of reference insofar as a sense 
ofplace becomes an important feature in the process ofmaking a home. It serves as an 
anchor for our travels beyond our community as we interact with culturally different 
persons. Thus, Espiritu understands the space-between as a project ofhome-making for 
many immigrants. Home for Espiritu is understood not as an unproblematic 
geographical location, but a space between that challenges us to reassess our notions of 
community and our sense of belonging in a growing multicultural world. 
Reconceiving travel and home as a process that generates agency is important 
because there needs to be a way in which we can open this terrain to the realities and 
lived experiences ofthe historically and philosophically forgotten travelers, including 
immigrants. Understanding travel and home as the space-between offers a rich resource 
11 
in conceiving the multicultural subject who must negotiate their journeys and their notion 
of home. A transnational perspective offers a theoretical approach to the space-between 
that envisions the realities and possibilities for maintaining relationships and connections 
between differently situated subjects. Our very mobility is in need of agency-oriented 
models of subjectivity that incorporate not just our bodies, but the social dimensions of 
the self. A transnational framework opens up the social boundaries that exist between 
selves and culturally different others when we do, in fact, travel. This approach 
highlights the boundaries of our social life that invite agency-oriented models of 
interaction, thus avoiding an isolated model of individual experience or "collectivities of 
the same" (Lugones 2003, 19). As concepts that constitute an understanding of the 
space-between, travel and home create new ways of thinking about our complicated sense 
of belonging in an increasingly multicultural world. The space-between cultivates a 
notion of agency within the lived tension of the social processes that constitute one's 
movement and settlement within multiple communities. 
In this dissertation, I argue that concepts of travel and home characterize our lived 
experience and matter in discussions of identity for four reasons. First, processes of 
travel and settlement offer concrete ways to think about how relationships with culturally 
different others are formed. These processes guide our ways of interacting with 
culturally different others. In this sense, travel and home must be conceived ofnot 
simply as an activity of movement or a physical location, but as a social experience that 
emphasizes the establishment and maintenance of relationships between differently 
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situated others. In fact, one might argue that without practices of travel, cross-cultural 
relationships could not exist. 
Second, insofar as travel establishes cross-cultural contact, it consequently plays a 
fundamental role in constituting the meaning of one's home and community through the 
complicated ways in which communities and home integrate these cross-cultural 
elements of social experience. Thus, travel disrupts the assumptions of home as fixed, 
closed, and static. Travel cannot be viewed as a benign activity of cultural transfers 
between destination points, but must be seen as an integral process that disrupts the rigid 
boundaries of communities. By connecting the community's identity with others beyond 
their borders, the disruption marks the possibility for social transformation of the 
community. For example, European expansion would not merely be viewed as 
movement inspired by capitalism, industry, and science. As Clifford argues, regional 
identities such as "Europe" are not confined and bound to a fixed cultural category, but 
instead these identities are flexible, porous, and are constantly being remade "by 
influences beyond [the regional identities'] border" (1999,3). 
Third, travel generates a critical reflection of one's home community in relation to 
a culturally different one. I argue that travel involves a comparative dimension in how 
we come to know and understand the multicultural self. When we do engage with 
culturally different others through practices of travel, a reflective tendency emerges 
whereby, depending on where we travel, we either celebrate or criticize aspects of our 
social community. For example, the rigid mamlerisms of some European countries might 
help us appreciate our more relaxed styles of engagement in the US. Alternatively, we 
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might come into contact with those whose social realities exist outside of capitalistic 
structures and thus engage us to think about the problems of US imperialism and 
hegemony. Understanding travel as a process that connects different cultural 
communities through social interaction and encourages comparative self-reflection 
establishes a way of thinking about the formation of the multicultural self. The social 
dimensions of a multicultural selfmust go beyond a narrow domestic narrative of social 
experience and must involve a cross-cultural perspective initiated by practices oftravel in 
order to reconceive one's home. 
Fourth, travel and home are conditioned by social categories including but not 
limited to gender, race, and ethnicity.7 The transnational space determining circuits of 
travel between nations occupies women of color in very specific ways, either 
emphasizing their exoticized sexualities, such as mail order brides, or their industrious 
bodies, working in sweat shops for multinational corporations. Travel is restricted and 
highly defined for those at the margins ofmainstream society. Likewise, if travel is 
restricted for women of color, one's home is also up for contestation. The work done at 
First World homes becomes a prominent setting for many transnational dependency 
workers who are mostly women of color. In this case, travel and home become limiting 
activities that render the agency ofthese women invisible. It is important to understand 
how travel and home can be reconceived as a process ofbelonging that might be able to 
address the agency of these women in this transnational context. 
7 For the purposes of this dissertation, I consider only issues in race, ethnicity and gender, while only 
highlighting instances where class, age and ability intersect. My motivation for restricting this sort of 
analysis is not to suggest that class, age and ability are unimportant factors in articulating the multicultural 
self. Race, ethnicity and gender offer a good starting point in thinking about transnationalism and identity 
as seen in current scholarship (Grewal 1996, Kaplan 1996, Mohanty 2003). 
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Travel and home are integral concepts in thinking about identity not only because 
these concepts are grounded in concrete practical activities that shape human experience, 
but also because these concepts envision possibilities for larger international 
communities. Activities of travel and settlement have often negatively affected women 
by placing their subjectivities within subordinated positions. Power relations tend to 
determine gender norms, particularly when women of color are utilized as cheap labor in 
the global market. However, it is important to understand how these gendered norms can 
be resisted and re-organized such that a relationship is recognized between different 
cultural communities. In this way, home can be recovered for women of color within 
activities of travel that acknowledge a transnational relationship. Understanding the 
space-between as a theoretical space that envisions how larger communities are formed 
makes feminist pragmatism a good candidate in discussing the metaphysics ofbelonging. 
A Feminist Pragmatist Perspective ofTravel and Home: Feminist Dependency Theory 
and Roycean Pragmatism 
Feminism and pragmatism offer important resources for thinking about the 
multicultural subject by articulating a model of interaction in understanding the formation 
of the self. Rather than appealing to abstract conceptions ofhumanity and ignoring the 
situated character of experience, feminism and pragmatism conceive of the self engaged 
in social interactions with others. Many theorists have considered the ways in which 
pragmatism and feminism can co-mingle as forming a distinct feminist and pragmatist 
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methodology.8 While I will not go into their specific arguments in detail, I would like to 
highlight three main commitments of feminist pragmatists. The first commitment 
underscores the importance of context and experience. According to Charlene Haddock 
Seigfried, pragmatists do share with feminists a disdain for the abstract, transcendent 
individual who is capable of obtaining a "God's eye" view without any appeal to 
experience. Feminists share with pragmatists the importance of social philosophy within 
philosophical theorizing (Seigfried 1996, 20). Attention to situated experience becomes a 
product ofthe mingling ofboth traditions. 
The second commitment focuses on the relationship of politics and values, and 
the production of knowledge and metaphysics. Feminists can learn from pragmatists in 
part because of the pragmatist's attention to context that reveals the spatial and temporal 
backgrounds of which we are not conscious. This is where meaning and values arise. 
Feminists can teach pragmatists the "hidden assumptions" or "blind spots" (Sullivan 
2001) in their analysis of context and experience. Ifwe uncritically accept values, such· 
as the subordination of women or other social groups, we acquiesce to these operative 
power structures and become passive participants in the formation of our lives. In this 
sense, pragmatism and feminism reveal how the lived experiences ofwomen and other 
differently situated social groups are important factors within philosophical theorizing. 
The third commitment emphasizes the need for diversity and thus dialogue among 
differently situated social groups. Pragmatists assume a fallibilism inherent in our 
processes of inquiry, that is, any theory utilized is never certain and thus requires us to be 
8 See Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social Fabric (Seigfried1996), Living Across and 
Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, Pragmatism and Feminism (Sullivan 2001), and McKenna (2001), 
The Task ofUtopia. A Pragmatist and Feminist Perspective (McKenna 2001). 
16 
open to other experiences. According to Kathleen Abowitz, pragmatists value pluralism 
because diversity contributes to the growth ofhuman beings within a social environment 
(1999). Feminists have enlarged pragmatist insights on pluralism through their important 
criticisms that relate hierarchy and power to difference and examine how these forces 
concomitantly influence the nature of our social relationships. The merger of both 
traditions results in a methodology that is more "inquiry-based" than "unified joining of 
identical philosophical perspectives" (Abowitz 1999, 7). In other words, while feminism 
and pragmatism may begin with similar assumptions about their approach to 
philosophical theorizing, feminist pragmatism highlights the dialectical and 
transforrnative power of philosophical theorizing within both traditions. Feminist 
pragmatists, through their commitment to diversity and modification of theories, allow 
for more hybrid (interdisciplinary) methodologies within philosophy. 
However, for the most part, recent feminist pragmatism lacks an analysis of the 
experiential dimensions of interaction comprising our social relationships9 as I highlight 
them in my analysis oftravel and horne. I tum to care ethics as a starting point in 
thinking about how feminist pragmatism might expand the notion of social interaction. 
Additionally, I tum to Rocycean pragmatism to further develop the metaphysics ofthe 
space between as it ties closer to our lived experience. This particular methodology 
under a feminist pragmatist framework offers a unique account of how the social self 
9 In Feminism and Pragmatism (1996), Siegfried considers the history of feminism and pragmatism and is 
an attempt to recover the lost feminists in American Philosophy, such as Jane Addams and Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman. Within a feminist pragmatist framework, McKenna in The Task ofUtopia (2001) seeks to 
reconstruct the idea of utopia from a static and debilitating view to a more workable and liberating 
possibility in social thought. While Sullivan in Living Across and Through Skins (2001) argues for a notion 
of transaction within Dewey's thought in thinking about the body, she lacks an analysis of the social 
dimension of interaction between differently situated groups. She merely argues that transactions take 
place between people, but does not account for the specific ways in which the transactions take place. 
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relates to questions ofmulticulturalism and diversity. Linking a feminist pragmatist 
approach of care ethics to Royce's metaphysics ofthe space-between offers important 
insights into the nature of the social dimensions of travel I highlighted earlier with an 
incisive perspective ofhow selves emerge within the context of colonization and 
imperialism. 
My feminist pragmatist reconstruction oftravel and home offers ways of 
understanding the theoretical space-between as being closely related to lived experience, 
specifically to concrete practices of travel and settlement. Understanding travel as sites 
of contact and exchange or boundary spaces, rather than a touristic activity that merely 
spectates from a comfortable and detached resort, underscores the process of interaction 
and mutual exchange necessary to the activity of travel itself. The space-between 
highlights an interactive dimension when we do encounter culturally different others. 
This interactive dimension inherent in the space-between does not suggest we leave our 
homes or our specific loyalties and commitments to our communities. We do leave home, 
but in a way we carry the roots ofhome, i.e. our loyalties and commitments, with us; 
these commitments guide our interpretations. Through travel, we enter into a state of 
"betweenness" where new relationships emerge and new connections are realized. In this 
sense, transnational subjects and immigrants can be seen from a more philosophical 
perspective. While these subjects live abroad from their country of origin, they are still 
connected to their original "home." In the context ofthe transnational migrant, identities 
are indeed bound up with practices of travel and settlement where contact and exchange 
is sustained in transit. 
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Overview 
In carving out a transnational philosophical framework for understanding the 
issues ofmulticulturalism, it is important to clarify our understanding ofwho the 
multicultural subject is and how international communities are formed in our current state 
of globalization. Chapter 2 examines two ways of thinking about the multicultural 
subject in the age of globalization: Martha Nussbaum's philosophical exile and Rossi 
Braidotti's nomadic subject. I argue that both views evade one's particular social context 
and embedded relationships with culturally different others. These two strategies 
resonate with modern desires for travel based on pleasure and leisure rather than 
understanding travel as a form of social interaction, where commitments to culturally 
different others are made relative to the specific interaction. I argue that a transnational 
philosophical framework, which adheres to an interactive model oftravel, provides an 
alternative model of the multicultural subject by highlighting the agency of culturally 
different others. An interactive model understands the self as constituted through social 
interaction and underscores the porosity of our identities, thereby exposing certain 
relationships of dependency we have with culturally different others. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I articulate a model of interaction, one that generates a notion 
of agency that is embedded within a specific context rather than one that appeals to 
abstract concepts ofhumanity. In Chapter 3, I turn to Eva Kittay's work on dependency 
and Jane Addams' work with immigrants. I argue that dependency and care can be 
expanded to a more cosmopolitan dimension through the philosophy and social work of 
Jane Addams. Kittay's basic argument is that dependency is an inescapable fact of our 
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humanity, and thus a public ethos of care is important to address the inevitable 
consequences ofhuman dependency. Addams provides resources in thinking about how 
a public ethos of care can extend to a transnational ethos of care, one that highlights the 
experiences of immigrants in the US in order to articulate an alternative model of social 
interaction. I argue that dependency not only underscores our embeddedness with other 
persons and greater communities, but also establishes a moral claim that guides our moral 
judgments to act in a responsive manner relative to these relationships. Addams exposes 
our transnational dependencies through her work with immigrants. Understanding the 
traveling relation as one of dependence emphasizes the connections and relations that 
necessarily manifest themselves when one travels to other countries or foreign 
communities. In this sense, dependency exposes the intimate relationships that connect 
us with culturally different persons. Thus, we are able to act in a responsive manner 
relative to these relationships of dependency. 10 
In Chapter 4, I show how Josiah Royce's notion ofprovincialism not only 
discloses the genuine loyalties we have with our specific communities, but also 
establishes a sense of connection with other communities outside our national boundaries. 
Royce offers a logical argument for the "space-between," highlighting a rich application 
to the area of international relations. While care is emphasized as the ethical response to 
individuals understood as beings connected with others, Royce develops a notion of 
10 Many globalization theorists have argued that US hegemony has made underdeveloped nations 
dependent on American goods and services (in the forms of loans and aid) and this dependence has 
hindered these nations' flourishing and has perpetuated US colonialist domination. My argument, 
however, understands dependency as a necessary feature of the human condition and applies to every 
human being, not just those who are members of underdeveloped nations. Furthermore, dependency, 
conceived within feminist care ethics emphasizes an ethical component that criticizes acts of exploitation. 
My argument expands this notion of dependency to articulate the nature of cross-cultural relationships. 
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loyalty that serves as a logical and ethical principle in addressing the individual's 
relationship to a community. Royce ultimately understands the self ensconced within a 
community of interpreters who actively engage with one another in the pursuit of 
meaning. For Royce, loyalty is the thoroughgoing commitment of a person to a cause 
that one genuinely accepts as one's own. In the case of provincialism, loyalty is the 
mortar that binds individuals to a province that one genuinely embraces as one's own 
community. His notion of provincialism not only emphasizes how we, as individuals, are 
connected with our own provincial communities, but affinns that our provincial 
communities are necessarily connected with a national identity, which is also necessarily 
connected to something larger still. Royce does not see our national identity solely as a 
sum of many provincial communities (more specifically, within a domestic perspective), 
but sees our provincial identities in relation to foreign and international communities, 
countries, and regions. Thus, for Royce, travel is an important activity in defining 
notions of ourselves insofar as people do occasionally leave their homes and come into 
contact with culturally and socially different others. A traveling relation emerges that 
ultimately connects our provincial and national identities to an international citizenry. In 
this sense, provincialism defines a way of understanding how our loyalties to our 
communities require responsiveness inside as well as outside the traditional nonns and 
customs of our respective communities. The question my project lays out, inspired by 
Royce, is how do we travel in a way that is consistent with our loyalties to our 
communities? 
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Following this ontological analysis of community, I show in Chapter 5 how 
notions of travel and home work together to articulate the sense of interaction that defines 
the space-between, particularly in the case of feminist coalitional politics. I show how 
Lugones' notion of "world-traveling" and Espiritu's notion of "home making" are 
corollary concepts that address the importance of social interaction in the process of 
building transnational feminist coalitional communities. In feminist theory, the concepts 
of travel and home have been individually utilized to understand differences between 
women. I bring these two concepts together to articulate the possibility of envisioning 
meaningful coalitional communities that can guide the future of feminist politics. 
In my concluding remarks, I examine an important challenge to transnational 
identities offered by Native perspectives. One of the problems of transnational identities 
is the process of settlement. Asian American identities are bound up with an insistent 
need to make a home in the US, as weB as maintaining one's connections to the 
homeland. Rather than viewing travel, including immigrant travel, as "predatory" and 
unconnected to any sense of place as argued by Native Hawaiians (Trask 1994 & 2000), 
understanding travel through a transnational framework suggests how home is re-situated 
to a sense of place or, more aptly, to specific interactions with culturally different others 
and landscapes. Viewing practices of travel as an activity that anchors us to a sense of 
place might aid in establishing coalitions between different cultural groups, potentially 
addressing the politics oflocation between Native and immigrant groups. 
Understanding the space-between as an interactive dimension inspired by feminist 
concerns with subordination and exploitation, and by pragmatists' commitment to a 
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social ontology that characterizes an individual's relationship to community, becomes a 
viable resource in reconceiving travel and home as practices that address the complicated 
nature ofbelonging in discussions of cosmopolitanism and cultural diversity. It is 
important to see how notions of travel and home understood as corollary concepts inform 
the theoretical space-between, which emphasizes the importance of social interaction. 
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CHAPTER II 
RE-ROUTING COSMOPOLITAN THOUGHT IN
 
MULTICULTURALISM: TOWARDS A CRITICAL TRANSNATIONAL
 
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK
 
In philosophy, much of how we think about travel rests on the modem view of 
travel, which is associated with leisure, pleasure, and freedom ofmobility. Travel is 
usually associated with individual choice and is considered to be an activity one does 
alone to achieve self-transformation. Immanuel Kant, in his essay "Perpetual Peace," 
views travel as a "temporary sojourn" to which everyone has a right. Mobility within 
space is understood within Kant's assumption that the earth is "the common possession" 
we all share. Thus, it is our right to embark on journeys to other geographical places. 
While Kant does not specify any obligations of the traveler while visiting other 
geographical places, Kant details specifically the obligations of the host country. The 
right of travel is guaranteed and universalized through the duty ofhospitality. 
"Hospitality means the right of the stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives 
in the land of another" (Kant 1983, 118). While travel is not necessarily understood as a 
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social activity in which one engages and interacts with culturally different others, Kant's 
notion of hospitality (understood in a negative sense of freedom) emphasizes the social 
activity (albeit on the part of the host country and not the traveler) in determining the 
ethical and moral nature ofthe cross-cultural interaction. As early as Kant, we see how 
travel is theorized as a way of thinking about international communities. 
In an age of globalization and growing multicultural communities in societies 
such as the US, travel as a concept continually perSists in cosmopolitan literature (Tully 
1995, Appiah 2006). Travel becomes a useful way of thinking about how the cross­
cultural dimensions inescapably determining our lives constitute notions ofthe self. 
However, what we need are better ways ofthinking about travel that highlight the space­
between emergent in our social relationships with culturally different others. Having a 
better concept of travel enables us to think about the nature ofmulticultural subjects 
without assenting to modem touristic-assumptions about travel. Following Clifford, once 
travel is understood as a cultural practice, the notion ofhome also becomes subject to 
revision. Understanding how travel and home are mutually informing concepts 
emphasizing relationships within the space-between changes the nature of philosophical 
discussions of the selfby emphasizing the ways in which selves are contextualized and 
situated within processes of globalization and transnationalism. A transnational approach 
assumes multiple perspectives and points of view rather than a narrow perspective on 
travel, which is often associated with individual forms of leisure and pleasure and the 
avoidance of social interaction. 
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In this chapter, I will locate my understanding ofthe multicultural or cross­
cultural selfby critically examining two philosophical perspectives that address the 
nature of the multicultural subject in the context of contemporary globalization: Martha 
Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism and Rossi Braidotti's figuration of the nomad. Nussbaum 
describes the cosmopolitan self as one in exile, while Braidotti celebrates the virtue of 
nomadism in order to escape the constraining and often limiting theoretical constructions 
of the self in identity politics or in cases of ethnic separatism. Travel, for both theorists, 
allows us to find commonalities (for Nussbaum) or sustain difference (for Braidotti) 
when encountering culturally different others. I find both projects important in 
responding to the growing international forces impinging on our notions of the self. 
However, I think that we need to understand the cross-cultural or multicultural self in a 
way that highlights the specific and entangled relationships we have with the 
communities in which we live in and are a part of. Ultimately, any understanding of 
travel, especially when discussing a cross-cultural notion of the self, must focus on 
particular engagements with particular communities or specific individuals rather than a 
categorical identity based on singular master narratives of belonging or non-belonging. 
The first two sections of the chapter criticize both Nussbaum's construction of a 
liberal universal notion of the self based on the ideal ofhumanity and Braidotti's 
postmodern self, which attempts to break free of any universal conceptions of the self. 
Both ultimately posit a view of the self that eschews group identifications, including any 
specific loyalties and commitments one may have to a particular cultural community, 
although they arrive at different conclusions. Moreover, this view of the self, which 
26 
resists certain loyalties and commitments to a specific community, reinstantiates a 
"homogenous" multiculturalism, which employs a single master narrative of identity and 
ignores the multiple and entangled experience of cross-cultural interaction. Given the 
lack of attention to the lived experiences of certain travelers in a multicultural world, I 
argue that both authors engage in what Caren Kaplan describes as "theoretical tourism." 
Similar to the mass-based tourist industry, which involves the tourist consuming cultural 
experiences within an environmental bubble crafted and mystified by capitalistic 
structures, theoretical tourism engages and defends social prescriptions on multicultural 
issues in an ahistorical and romanticized fashion that escapes any analysis of the material 
realities determining the lives ofmany travelers, including transnational migrants. In 
response to these views, I show in the last section of the chapter how an understanding of 
a cross-cultural self, based within a transnational perspective, emphasizes the social 
dimension of travel and offers an alternative perspective by thinking about the nature of 
international communities as a socially embedded process, rather than viewing thes~ 
social relationships from a detached distance. 
In my criticisms of Nussbaum and Braidotti, I rely upon theorists such as Gloria 
Anzaldua, Vine Deloria Jr., Jamaica Kincaid, Jane Addams, and Caren Kaplan to 
articulate the role of social engagement that usually is ignored in discussions of travel and 
the cross-cultural self These criticisms of the individual abstract subject anticipate my 
reconstruction of an understanding of travel as transnational practices of care in Chapter 
3, which emphasizes the embedded social relations of dependency and care that situate 
the social, political, and moral dimensions of our social lives. 
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Traveling Identities: The Cosmopolitan and Nomadic Self 
The Cosmopolitan Exile 
Nussbaum's project in her book Cultivating Humanity offers a liberal, universal 
account of the self in response to the growing need in liberal education to address 
concerns of multiculturalism or diversity. The purpose of a liberal education today is to 
prepare students to become more "cosmopolitan," "world citizens" in the face of a 
globalized market economy. While I find her project compelling and important, I think 
her rendition of the cosmopolitan self fails to address the concerns raised in identity 
politics, namely that one's identity is inescapably bound up in specific commitments and 
loyalties to particular or multiple communities. As a result, Nussbaum's cosmopolitan 
self ultimately avoids finding commonalities in specific encounters with culturally 
different others and, instead, transcends cross-cultural interactions to an abstract ideal of 
humanity. 
Inspired by Diogenes, Nussbaum defends a notion of the multicultural self as a 
"world citizen." Cultivating one's humanity assumes that citizens' primary loyalty is to 
human beings and not their specific loyalties to their national, cultural, or group 
affiliations. A weaker version of this world citizenship, the one that Nussbaum tries to 
defend in her book, recognizes the importance of our specific loyalties to our particular 
group affiliations and also recognizes over and against these specific loyalties that we are 
"bound by common human abilities and problems to people who lie at a great distance 
from us" (1997, 9). Nussbaum suggests that it is important for citizens who cultivate 
their humanity to identify themselves beyond specific group affiliations and to appeal to a 
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wider category of humanity, which requires us to "venture beyond narrow group loyalties 
and to consider the reality of distant lives" (1997, 10). Ultimately, Nussbaum attempts to 
make sense of the distance from culturally different others that is manifest in our 
experience. This distance, however, not only seems to create an impassable barrier 
between groups, it also requires that our interactions with culturally different others must 
occur from a distance, mediated by a vertical relationship to a transcendental ideal of 
humanity, rather than by a horizontal relationship that engages the specific cultural 
differences of the interaction. 
Nussbaum's epistemological position underscores the movement of the 
philosophical exile, which seeks a disconnected perspective to find commonalities 
between culturally different others. She argues: 
Set in this context, the invitation to consider ourselves citizens of the world is the 
invitation to become, to a certain extent, philosophical exiles from our own ways 
of life, seeing them from the vantage point of the outsider and asking the 
questions an outsider is likely to ask about their meaning and function (1997, 58). 
This enterprise as a philosophical exile celebrates a Socratic ideal that challenges the "old 
education" and establishes a "new education" based on critical examination of accepted 
truths. Unfortunately, according to Nussbaum, the philosophical exile is often a lonely 
figure standing apart from her own cultural norms and practices. However, it is unclear 
how she understands her solitude as a philosophical exile. Is she lonely because her self-
identification is with a universal and transcendent community ofhumanity, which is in 
conflict with her specific loyalties and commitments to her local community, or is she 
lonely because of split loyalties and commitments she has with multiple communities? 
The difference between these experiences of loneliness is that the former transcends lived 
29 
social engagements, while the latter emphasizes conflicts and tensions that are felt in 
actual cross-cultural interaction. 
I believe Nussbaum's loneliness stems from an analytical and ahistorical category 
of exclusion, not one based on the inclusive and conflicting tensions one often faces 
when one is caught in the middle of multiple communities of the sort Gloria Anzaldua 
describes in her notion of the borderlands (1999,3). For those who occupy the 
borderlands of cultures, like Anzaldua, loneliness is experienced as a sense of alienation 
from un choque, or the cultural collision of "two self-consistent but habitually 
incompatible frames of reference" (Anzaldua 1999, 100). Rather than responding to this 
experience of cultural collision with flights to distant abstract communities or through 
exclusive thinking, the mestiza consciousness moves "toward a more whole perspective, 
one that includes rather than excludes" (Anzaldua 1999, 101). Nussbaum posits an 
ahistorical account of exile whose experience of loneliness participates in exclusive 
thinking and functions above social interactions, unlike those at the borderlands who live 
in between conflicting loyalties and commitments. 
Moreover, Nussbaum's vision of exile exudes a romanticism indicative of 
modernity's conception of the individual self and reveals touristic tendencies rather than 
liberatory possibilities, Caren Kaplan argues that twentieth century Euro-American 
expatriation, and I would include Nussbaum's version of the philosophical exile as part of 
this tradition, has legitimated "aesthetic" dimensions of detachment and statelessness. 
This modem version of exile is not usually theorized from the experiences of those who 
are in exile and thus, as Kaplan argues, this aesthetic form of exilic displacement 
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"occupies a privileged position" (1996, 36). Kaplan further associates this place of 
privilege with touristic movement, in which one collects experiences of "otherness" 
rather than commercial products (1996, 46). The privileged aesthetic spectator of 
experience retains a similar detached perspective to Nussbaum's flight to the ideal of 
humanity where specific differences are naturalized [all humans -read rational and moral 
- are equal]. In this position ofprivilege, there is no need to understand culturally 
different others in terms of their own perspective, since the ideal of humanity is what 
binds us all together. 
Jamaica Kincaid offers a powerful critique against the touristic perspective, which 
functions apart from the place and the people the tourist visits. In Antigua, Kincaid 
describes the tourist perspective as one who watches from a distance the banalities of the 
life of culturally different others. This perspective ultimately sees the tourist as 
an ugly thing, that is what you are when you become a tourist, an ugly, empty 
thing, a stupid thing, a piece of rubbish pausing here and there to gaze at this and 
taste that, and it will never occur to you that the people who inhabit the place in 
which you have just paused cannot stand you, that behind their closed doors they 
laugh at your strangeness (you do not look the way they look) (Kincaid 1988, 17). 
The consequences ofthis detached perspective, usually masked within a language of 
equality-such as the ideal of humanity-are the tourist's unfamiliarity with the real 
living conditions ofAntiguans: the bad roads, poor health care and education facilities, 
and the history of oppression in Antigua. Because the realities ofthe experiences of 
culturally different others are concealed within a language of escape and privilege, 
cultural difference becomes a touristic product to be consumed, rather than understood as 
subjects of social interaction. To visit Antigua would be to engage the local inhabitants 
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in order to understand their lives, rather than appealing to an ideal human community, an 
appeal that often masks a position of privilege and is not attentive to the power 
differentials that exist in social life. Ultimately, the philosophic exile establishes a 
vertical relationship to an abstract ideal ofhumanity, creating a kind ofhistorical amnesia 
of particular cultural traditions, including her own. 
The verticality in which we are supposed to identify ourselves becomes a theme 
in Nussbaum's notion of cosmopolitanism. Diogenes, her cosmopolitan exemplar, posits 
a self-image that goes beyond his specific group identity as a Greek male. Rather, he 
identifies himself "in terms ofmore universal aspirations and concerns" (Nussbaum 
1997,52). The more universal community ofhumanity is where one is to be common 
with other culturally different persons and where differences do not exist or are 
epiphenomenal. Thus, our loyalties and moral obligations truly lie in this community. 
But what are the conditions for understanding this universal human community? What 
makes a person human? Nussbaum identifies two elements necessarily constituting 
humanity: reason and moral capacity (1997,59). Humanity is not recognized in our place 
ofbirth, since this is an accidental feature ofhuman experience. It is recognized only in 
the rational and moral capacities that allow us to resist an uncritical assimilation of 
dogmatic truths or the narrow localism of our cultural community's customs and 
traditions. In fact, loyalty to one's community is thought of as an uncritical enterprise 
and one must, as Diogenes suggests, maintain detachment, for it is through detachment 
that we are to become more critical and thus rational and moral, and hence human. 
According to the Stoics, who expand Diogenes' notion of a world citizen, the capacity of 
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reasoning endures longer, although it is less colorful than local tradition, and 
characterizes the fundamental or essential aspect of who we are as humans. 
Treating culturally different persons with respect as humans is a noble project and 
appeals to one's common sense. Borrowing Kantian intuitions, one should not degrade 
another because humans are ends in themselves. From an international perspective, one 
has a duty to respect humanity even those considered "aliens on our soil" (1997, 59). 
One mustn't, the sentiment goes, treat foreigners badly; out of respect for their humanity, 
it is our duty to see that they are treated hospitably and respectfully. The Stoics insist that 
our local problems within our specific communities can be solved once we see how our 
traditions and ways of life relate to the traditions and ways of life of other reasonably 
minded people. In other words, our specific local problems can be solved once our 
"imaginations are unconstrained by our narrow partisanship" (1997,60). Again, it is this 
vertical relationship that characterizes cross-cultural relationships. One appeals to 
common-sense intuitions of humanity, that is, to our rational and moral capacities, as if 
these human capacities functioned apart and above our situated cultural and social 
communities and relationships. 
While Nussbaum highlights the shared and universal quality of rationality as a 
defining feature of humanity, she does not indicate how one resolves communicative 
differences between culturally different persons who have radically different ontologies 
or conceptions ofhow the world is ordered. In other words, how might an understanding 
of us as rational beings resolve the anomalous cultural experiences that impinge on our 
field of experience? It seems that the problem of the translation of languages and cultural 
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assumptions remains as a barrier to any rational solutions of respect towards others 
simply because they are human. For example, Vine Deloria Jr. in Power and Place 
exposes the difference between Native ontologies, which assume a person model that 
ultimately rejects Western-inspired theories of causation, and Western ontologies, which 
assume a machine model that adheres to such theories. How might the fact that we share 
rational qualities resolve deep differences in ontology? James Sterba in Three 
Challenges to Ethics also recognizes the difference in ontologies, highlighting how 
Mayans understood themselves not in terms of rationality, as beings separate from nature, 
but as integral participants in the unfolding process of nature (2001,82). If the self-world 
relation is ordered in a way that views humans as part of nature rather than in terms of a 
shared common capacity of rationality, how might we resolve differences in what we 
mean by 'humanity''? In fact, Nussbaum's notion ofa universal humanity is a conception 
grounded in a specific location. Who determines what constitutes humanity? These 
different ways of thinking about the world often result in miscommunication, the inability 
to resolve conflict, and finally violence. There is a risk that the communication process 
between disparate groups will result in assimilation, where the experience of cultural 
difference is entirely understood in terms of a single culture. Resolving different group 
ontologies is not a simple procedure that can be easily addressed by assenting to an ideal 
of humanity. 
Nussbaum continues her appeal to a universal notion ofhumanity in her defense 
ofDiogenes' notion of concentric circles. Each circle surrounding the self consists of 
one's familial, provincial, and national group identifications. The last circle 
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encompassing all these particular circles is the community of humanity, in which the goal 
of a world citizen is to "draw the circles somehow toward the center" (1997, 60). In this 
sense, one's city, provincial, and familial relationships are subsumed under a common 
ideal ofhumanity. In this way, one does not need to give up specific group 
identifications; rather, the community of humanity is widened to incorporate all such 
affiliations. It is important to note that the way in which specific group identities are 
subsumed under the universal human community is through shared rational and moral 
qualities, not through intimate interactions with culturally different others. 
As argued earlier, the move to subsume group differences under a common ideal 
ofhumanity risks assimilation. Moreover, this assimilative strategy fails to encourage 
interaction insofar as Nussbaum's recommendation for a multicultural liberal education 
and often adheres to a scholastic ideal ofknowledge accumulation, i.e. collecting 
information from varied cultural sources, rather than actually interacting with diverse 
cultural communities. Marilyn Fischer challenges Nussbaum's recommendation of 
intellectual study with Jane Addams' lived interactions with diverse immigrant 
populations at Hull House. Fischer argues that Nussbaum's "citizen of the world" 
resembles the idea of cultivating an international mind forwarded by Nicholas Murray 
Butler, who was president of Columbia University and a long-time peace activist before 
W'orld War 1. Fisher comments that both Braidotti's and Nussbaum's sense of 
international citizenship assumes a "well-educated and traveled" person (2006,8). 
Unlike this model, Fischer argues for a sense of cosmopolitanism that is attentive to one's 
specific interactions with those that are culturally different. Through Addams' work with 
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the immigrant population in Chicago (more ofAddams' work here will be explicated in 
Chapter 3), Fischer argues that if the motivation for thinking about cosmopolitanism is to 
lead to discussions of peace and social justice, then it is important to consider real 
interactions with culturally different people who are "planted in the mud: fully embodied, 
loving, hating, sometimes rational, sometimes not, strongly attached to their habits and 
conventions" (2005, 10). While studying other cultures is important, the day-to-day 
experience of living with culturally different others offers a different horizontal approach 
to cosmopolitanism. What Fischer is highlighting and what I am suggesting here is that 
Nussbaum's cosmopolitan ideal avoids any specific interaction with the day-to-day lives 
of culturally different persons. 
To clarify this point, I want to contrast the "psychic restlessness" Anzaldua 
describes at the borderlands with Nussbaum's restless philosophical exile. The psychic 
restlessness ofAnzaldua is brought on by the cultural collision, the lived experience of 
conflict, and tension between different cultures. FurthemlOre, Fischer's description of 
cosmopolitanism, which incorporates the works of Jane Addams, and Anzaldua's model 
of the blending of cultures creating a new culture both highlight the interactive 
dimensions comprising our experiences. A philosophical exile functions much like a 
tourist cloaked in romanticizing and demystifying images of detachment and 
home1essness. The result is that one's rootedness in specific cultural communities, 
including one's own, is supplanted by a vertical relationship to an abstract and mystified 
sense of identity. 
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The Feminist Nomad 
While Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism disregards one's specific cultural loyalties 
and commitments in defining one's identity, Rossi Braidotti offers a different image of 
the self as a nomad in order to address the state of multiculturalism in Europe. Rather 
than referring to the actual experiences of nomads, she presents this image as a political 
figuration that enables her to forge a new way of thinking about feminist subjectivity in 
resistance to hegemonic, phallocentric ways of thinking. Drawing from Deleuze and 
Guatarri's ideas ofthe nomad, this fictitious epistemological position is related to a 
"critical consciousness that resists settling into socially coded modes ofthought and 
behavior" (Braidotti 1994,5). Opposed to a perspective that assents to an abstract ideal 
ofhumanity, Braidotti views nomadic subjectivity as highlighting "intensive 
interconnectedness" in describing the "flow from one set of experiences to another" 
(1994, 5). In contrast to Nussbaum, Braidotti attempts to establish a horizontal 
relationship with culturally different others. However, like Nussbaum, she views group 
identifications with one's specific cultural loyalties and commitments as problematic in 
effecting communication and interaction between disparate groups. While her intentions 
for creating an interconnected feminist subjectivity is a laudable and important project, I 
think that her understanding of nomadic subjectivity often relies on totalizing notions of 
escape and adheres to a master narrative ofnon-belonging. I argue that while Braidotti's 
notion of the nomad frees us from dogmatism and narrow localism and explores a kind of 
travel very different from the traditional tourist, this way ofthinking about the self 
nonetheless ignores specific encounters with culturally different others. Utilizing 
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analysis from anthropologists ll studying the global nomad in the fonn ofthe backpacker, 
I show how Braidotti's notion oftravel in her version of the nomad resembles a place of 
privilege by creating a romanticized place of critique against the dominant fonn of tourist 
travel. I argue that Braidotti's nomadic subject assumes a notion of travel that transcends 
cross-cultural interaction and ultimately engagesin another fonn of "theoretical tourism." 
Braidotti uses Deleuze and Guatarri's theory of nomadology in A Thousand 
Plateaus and Anti-Oedipus, which highlights lines of escape against modernity's 
universal and totalizing methods and assumptions. Caren Kaplan argues that their 
version of the nomad appeals to romantic and mystified notions of cultures at the 
periphery of dominant European society, rather than underscoring the "transnational 
circuits of capital and power in postmodernity" (1996, 89). She argues specifically that 
Deleuze and Guatarri's strategy of "becoming minor" requires an "emulation" of other 
less privileged identities, while forgoing one's own privileged location in dominant 
society. Kaplan identifies this move, despite its attempt to decolonize spaces for the 
colonized, as a kind of "theoretical tourism," collecting cultural experiences as if they 
were consumer products (1996, 88). Following Kaplan's insights, I also think that 
Braidotti's figuration ofthe nomad begins at a privileged location, while simultaneously 
positing a non-romantic, non-mystified view of the subject by critiquing the very material 
structures that engender hegemonic phallocentrism. Hence, her notion of the nomad 
resists a fonn of romanticization and idealization and thus is not touristic in this sense. I 
i1 For a detailed treatment of this view, see The Global Nomad: Backpacker Travel in Theory and Practice 
(Richards & Wilson 2004). 
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will take up this claim later in the chapter. For now, I would like to highlight a few 
characteristics of Braidotti's political figuration of the nomad subject. 
First, her theoretical position is an "anti-essentialist position" because her 
description ofwoman seeks to empower women by activating "sociosymbo1ic changes in 
their condition" (1994,4) within physical and social categories defining woman. The 
nomadic subject refers to the simultaneous occurrences of the many different axes of 
differentiation, such as "class, race, ethnicity, gender, age, and others" (1994, 4). The 
nomad, however, ultimately resists these "socially coded modes of thought and behavior" 
(1994,5) and seems to transcend specific cultural affiliations and group identifications. 
Second, the nomad as a polyglot (one who can speak many languages) provides 
another way ofunderstanding the fluidity ofmovement the nomad embodies. The 
polyglot demonstrates the critical perspective within horizonta11inguistic relationships. 
She argues, "The polyglot surveys this situation with the greatest critical distance; a 
person who is in transit between the languages, neither here nor there, is capable of some 
healthy skepticism about steady identities and mother tongues" (1994, 12). In between 
languages, the nomad as polyglot maintains a critical distance of any accepted socially 
and culturally inscribed truths. 
While this description of the nomad as polyglot is inspiring since it challenges 
dogmatism and fixed assumptions and also offers a heterogeneous way of thinking 
through ontological differences sometimes coded in specific cultura11anguage rules, I 
think her version of the nomadic polyglot runs into moments ofnostalgia and primitive 
romanticism that Kaplan identifies in Deleuze's and Guatarri's notion of the nomad. 
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Braidotti argues that "the best gift to give anyone, but especially a polyglot is: a new 
word, a word slhe does not know yet" (1994, 13). Not only does this desire and aesthetic 
enjoyment ofbeing "given" a new word represent a romanticized notion of spaces of the 
periphery reminiscent of imperialist discourses, but there also remains a capitalistic sense 
of theoretical tourism, where one does not purchase products but rather fetishizes cultural 
experiences of "uncolonized" or "undiscovered" topographies. 
Nomad aesthetic, according to Braidotti, ultimately functions as a singular master 
narrative ofnon-belonging as opposed to Nussbaum's master narrative ofbelonging. 
Nomadic writing, according to Braidotti, "longs for the desert: areas of silence, in 
between the official cacophonies, in a flirt with radical non-belonging and outsideness" 
(1994, 16). One might think that a radical state ofnon-belonging and outsideness would 
mean that one is perpetually homeless. However, Braidotti argues that the nomad is 
capable of inhabiting any space and recreating a home in any cultural environment, 
stating: 
As an intellectual style, nomadism consists not so much in being homeless, as in 
being capable of recreating your home everywhere. The nomad carries herlhis 
essential belongings with herlhim wherever slhe goes and can recreate a home 
base anywhere (1994, 16). (My italics.) 
In fact, the nomad subject is one who possesses many passports (1994,33). In virtue of 
this fluid mobility, it appears that Braidotti's nomadic movement occurs above specific 
cross-cultural interactions. The nomad participates in modes of totality within an 
aesthetic that seeks and freely moves within multiple places and destination points. 
Meaningful cross-cultural exchanges are limited since the nomadis always leaving and 
going somewhere else. Moreover, identities, according to Braidotti, are not permanent 
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for the nomad, but rather are transitory; connections made with specific cultural 
communities are only partial acceptances of that particular national or cultural identity. 
A nomadic self is a varied subject unconstrained by the history and traditions of 
any cultural community, including her own originating community, and is thus capable of 
"recreating a home base" with any community in which she finds herself "adjusted." In 
Custer Died/or Your Sins, Vine Deloria, Jr. worries about the attitude developed by 
anthropologists who think they can become "Indian experts" in Native communities. The 
nomad also develops this sort of attitude through her travels. The assumption that one 
can understand Native problems fosters a paternalizing attitude and leads to the 
misrepresentation of Indian concerns (1988, 27). While Braidotti argues that the nomad 
does not fully accept the particular national and cultural identity of the community in 
which she temporarily resides, it is unclear to what extent she is then able to "recreate a 
home base" in a particular cultural community. Deloria underscores an attitude of respect 
to cultural boundaries and argues for a "leave us alone law" where "in spirit and in fact" 
one respects the limits and boundaries for a cultural group (1988, 27). He observes the 
freedom of travel exhibited by whites who claim specious lines of ancestry to Native 
cultures and thus legitimate their sympathies with Native concerns. This privileged sort 
of travel must be tempered by prudent travel advice: "There are some places you just 
can't go." It is important to understand the limiting conditions oftravel. While 
boundaries mark differences between cultures, it need not be understood as un-crossable. 
Deloria is concerned with the colonial attitude that ignores the awareness of certain 
cultural boundaries. For Deloria, the ease of travel assumed by whites to Native 
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communities is conditioned by race and social privilege. The consequences when these 
boundaries are not respected involve an annihilation ofthe cultural group's autonomy 
through policies ofpaternalism. 
Moreover, Braidotti' s nomadic ahistorical master narrative of non-belonging 
ultimately conflicts with the lived experiences of transnational migrants. Braidotti 
opposes nomadic identity with immigrant communities, describing this sort of travel 
experience, which might be thought of as nomadic, as narrow, closed, and separatist. 
While I agree with Braidotti that women play an important role "as loyal keepers of the 
original home culture" (1994, 22), I fully disagree with Braidotti's description of migrant 
experience as "compulsive displacement" (22). The problem with migrant communities, 
according to Braidotti, is that the migrant maintains commitments and loyalties to their 
country of origin. This has "the effect of destabilizing the present" (Braidotti 1994, 24). 
In other words, Braidotti assumes that one's connection to one's country of origin is a 
"past experience," and this past experience destabilizes present ways of interacting with 
one's host community. In fact, because the nostalgia migrants feel is temporalized as a 
past experience, it acts as a "burden" and a "blocked horizon," bearing a "fossilized 
definition of language," where the present can never fully emerge. Thus, according to 
Braidotti, migrant communities have emerged in an isolated state in European cities. She 
further diagnoses her inability as a white privileged European feminist to interact with 
foreign female domestic workers living in these migrant communities as indicative of the 
migrant's frozen and fossilized identity with their country of origin. This frozen and 
isolated state identifies dominant society as a "permanent object of longing and fear," 
42 
thus encouraging "hybridization without joyful creative relief' (1994, 25). A nomadic 
subjectivity would not have this burden of past experience of belonging to one's country 
of origin and would be capable of "hybridizing with joyful creative relief." A nomadic 
subject is transient and is committed to living in the present, unconstrained by past 
commitments and loyalties to one's country of origin. 
One of the main problems of Braidotti's rendition of the migrant and celebration 
ofthe nomadic subject is that she continually assents to romantic and mystified 
descriptions of placelessness and non-belonging. While she claims that she is not 
mystifying this particular subjectivity, she resorts to romanticized language of escape 
when describing identities, lived and felt by migrant communities, as frozen, past tense, 
and fossilized. She again colonizes the spaces of the other by describing a more 
adventurous and fashionable version of the nomad. What she fails to recognize is the 
complexity of the transnational connections transpiring between the female domestic 
worker in Europe and her country of origin as a present experience. The balakbayan 
packages, the frequency of visitors immigrating to a host country, the constant cultural 
translation that occurs within these spaces, even ifthey appear in communities where 
language and customs are maintained, should not be regarded as fossilized or separatist 
given the context and history in which these communities emerged. 
While Braidotti understands immigrant communities as separatist or blocked, it is 
important to keep in mind Lisa Lowe's argument in Immigrant Acts that it is impossible 
for any immigrant to remain separate from mainstream society. The insistence by 
countries such as the US on maintaining monolingual cultural values prevents immigrants 
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from being "closed" to dominant society. In Europe, where monolingual values may not 
be upheld, the economic structure also prevents immigrants from being "closed" to 
dominant society, since their very work is determined by the needs of privileged society 
(Lowe 1996). Interaction, translation, and negotiation are constant themes in the lives of 
many people of color. Maria Lugones has argued that "world-traveling" is a skill that 
many people of color develop because of their position in society. Braidotti, like other 
white feminists, seem to forget this fact. 
Finally, I would like to suggest that Braidotti's notion of the nomad participates in 
"theoretical tourism," defined by Kaplan as an intellectual move reminiscent of 
imperialist discourses of travel.' The nomad might be thought of as opposite to 
conceptions of the large group consumer-based tourist. In fact, the nomad "despises 
mainstream communication; the traffic jam ofmeanings waiting for admission at the city 
gates" (Braidotti 1994, 16). Rather than utilizing the routes ofmainstream accounts of 
culture, the nomad travels with her own "theoretical tent." Braidotti describes her own 
writing as cartographic. The spatial metaphor "expresses the simultaneity of the nomadic 
status and of the need to draw maps; each text is like a camping site: it traces places 
where I have been, in the shifting landscape ofmy singularity" (1994, 17). The nomad 
carries her belongings and moves to different campsites setting up her own theoretical 
tent in places untreaded by other more "mainstream" tourists. Linda Alcoff criticizes the 
transitory nature of identity in Braidotti' s nomad subject, arguing that this subject 
resembles a CEO or multinational business executive (2006, 277). Alcoff suggests that 
the nomad's tendency towards a celebrated state of homelessness is likened to an overt 
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sense of privilege, economic power, and jet-setting flexibility, possibly much like 
Nussbaum's philosophical exile. However, I think Braidotti's figuration of the nomad 
functions more like a backpacker, trotting around the globe in the least expensive way, 
striving for the more "authentic" experience by avoiding mass tourist routes and 
destinations. I tum to this backpacker theory to articulate the social context from which 
Braidotti's notion of nomadic travel might stern, thus giving us further insight into the 
problems with her notion ofnomadic subjectivity. 
Recent work in anthropology highlights backpacking as a growing touristic mode 
oftravel impacting the contemporary tourist industry. As Richards and Wilson argue, 
with the rise ofLonely Planet, also known as the "backpacker's bible," hostels and tour 
organizations are forging a new touristic market, and "the global nomad is also being 
incorporated in the 'McDonaldized' system of conventional tourism" (2004,3). I would 
like to highlight a few of the global nomad's characteristics as they resemble Braidotti's 
notion ofher theoretical nomad. I find this important because, while the nomad is 
inspired by the lives of nomadic peoples, her fictional nomad functions more like the 
idealistic backpacker, who avoids conventional routes of mainstream tourists/theorists. 
One defining characteristic of the backpacker nomad is that this identity is posited 
against tourist identity (Welk 2004). Braidotti also continually highlights her desire to 
dis-identify with mainstream culture. However, because of these already scripted routes 
of "shoestring" travel, many places are catering to the backpacking subculture. With the 
rise in interest in backpacker travel, there are more places that cater to the guidebooks 
that attract the "offthe beaten track" travelers. There is a sense in which the popularity 
-- --------------------
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of this form of travel assumes that the backpacker gains more of an authentic experience 
than the mainstream tourist. 
The rise of these subculture places that cater to shoestring guidebooks is often 
accompanied by stories and lore from other backpackers. It is interesting to note that 
Braidotti celebrates the unwritten maps the nomad can read "in the wind, on the sand and 
stones, in the flora" and that "the nomad's identity consists in memorizing oral poetry" 
(1994, 17). Similarly, Cohen, an anthropologist who studies backpacking culture, argues 
that backpackers tend to share "mental maps" of destinations outside of the tourist 
purview (2004, 47). Unfortunately, most of the destinations backpackers frequent are 
also attractive to other backpackers, and the people one meets in these places are usually 
other backpackers. Cohen argues, "Though friendly local staff are appreciated by 
backpackers ...relations with the locals in the enclaves are of secondary importance in 
comparison to those with other backpackers" (2004, 47). These similarities between 
Braidotti's nomad and the backpacker display another kind of privileged traveler other 
than the CEO or mainstream tourist. There is a sense in which nomadic social 
interactions only take place among globe-trotting nomads, thus avoiding any kind of 
meaningful interaction with the "locals" they visit. 
Furthermore, I want to highlight that while backpacking can be a rite of passage 
for many youths, the sense of freedom most backpackers seek is to pursue hedonistic 
pleasures, such as the Full Moon parties usually found within backpacking enclaves, 
under affordable circumstances (Cohen 2004,51). I am not suggesting that Braidotti's 
nomad participates in hedonistic practices of freedom; however, the transitory nature of 
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nomad identity, the possession ofmany passports, and the fleeting and superficial 
interactions the nomad has with the locals seem to lay the groundwork for individual 
pursuits of freedom associated with the modem version oftravel. The theoretical tourism 
Braidotti engages in resembles a backpacker's movement, which intentionally avoids 
dominant tourist travel, but ultimately recreates touristic structures, in which the 
"undiscovered" place becomes a fetishized product for the nomad's enjoyment. 
Towards a Transnational View of the Self: Diasporic Identities and Communities 
Both Nussbaum and Braidotti utilize master narratives of belonging or non­
belonging, which exclude the experiences of culturally different others in contexts of 
cross-cultural interaction. In order to cultivate a commonality among differences, 
Nussbaum introduces the philosophical exile that establishes a vertical relationship to an 
ideal of humanity. Braidotti, on the other hand, attempts to maintain a sense of radical 
difference by envisioning the subject as a nomad and consequently establishes a 
horizontal relationship with varied cultural communities. Both authors avoid theoretical 
analysis of the space-between and thus lack the resources for thinking of travel as a 
socially interactive process that is fundamental in understanding the cross-cultural nature 
of the self. 
I would like to articulate a sense of travel that avoids the pitfalls ofNussbaum's 
philosophical exile and Braidotii's nomadic subject and carve out a way of understanding 
cross-cultural interactions as socially enmeshed relationships rather than escaping them. 
Understanding the multiple engagements that occur within specific encounters dislodges 
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the possibility for any master narrative of belonging or nonbelonging to emerge. I tum to 
diasporic or transnational communities as a way of articulating the space-between, which 
views travel as a social process linked to the development of one's home. In this way, I 
hope to remain consistent with Lugones' understanding of travel as a social process of 
interaction rather than a modem view of escape. Diasporic narratives are multiple and 
are often wrought with conflict, tension, and miscommunication. The processes of 
negotiation, yearning, and the continual commitment to maintaining multiple loyalties in 
different locations underscore how one can be entangled and have split loyalties, but also 
have a way ofmaintaining connections with multiple communities. These experiences, I 
argue, suggest new ways of thinking about the construction of community, both national 
and international, within spaces in between. 
Both Nussbaum and Braidotti utilize different traveling metaphors in order to 
articulate the multicultural subject. However, as argued earlier in the essay, these 
metaphors of travel contain assumptions of touristic travel, which prevent any embedded 
and socially enmeshed cross-cultural relationships from emerging. Travel, as understood 
by both theorists, is of a specific type and does not consider the historical lineage in 
which touristic travel participates. The work ofNussbaum and Braidotti ultimately, for 
James Clifford, "appear to be ideologies of one (very powerful) traveling culture" (1999, 
36). Clifford's theory of travel displays some salient qualities of the space-between that 
characterizes the interactive model I propose in my feminist pragmatist approach in 
articulating the multicultural subject. 
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One important implication of Clifford's understanding of travel is its constitutive 
force for identity, which he describes as the phenomenon of "dwelling-in-traveling." 
Travel ultimately becomes constitutive of cultural centers and constructs the very 
meaning of our homes. The cross-cultural or "border" experiences oftravel, according to 
Clifford, should not be viewed as acculturation, where there is a linear progression from 
culture A to culture B, nor as syncretism, where two systems overlap one another. 
Rather, Clifford understands these cross-cultural or "border" experiences as instances of 
historical contact, "with entanglement at intersecting regional, national, and transnational 
levels" (1999,7). A contact approach, inspired by Mary Louise Pratt's "contact-zones," 
emphasizes the intercultural interaction that takes place within these spaces of interaction 
and exchange. These spaces, according to Pratt, are highly contentious and 
improvisational. A contact approach, according to Clifford, views cultures already 
relationally constituted with different cultures, and new forms of relationships emerge 
through processes of travel and displacement (1999, 7). 
If travel provides us with a way of articulating our international connections by 
emphasizing how our identities and our dwelling are already constituted by the 
transnational circuits of capital flow and the exigencies of colonial history, it is important 
to understand how diasporic or transnational identities create a new sense of community. 
According to Clifford, diasporas are distinct and should be thought of as distinct from the 
concept ofborders or borderlands (1999, 246). Borders are defined by specific 
geopolitical boundaries, such as the US/Mexican border Of the US/Canadian border, 
which also involve multiple crossings. Diasporas presuppose longer distances and time of 
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separation from the homeland, opposed to the proximate geography between two 
countries characteristic ofborderlands. The spaces that diasporic or transnational 
communities inhabit are similar to the experiences of the borderlands, where one exhibits 
split commitments and loyalties to more than one country, invoking experiences of 
psychic restlessness. 
Nonetheless, Clifford articulates some very basic characteristics of diasporic 
communities. First, Clifford observes that all communities, even local ones, retain 
organized travel circuits, "linking members 'at home' and 'away" (1997, 253). Thus, 
there is a strong sense in maintaining connections between members of the host country 
and the country of origin. This connection, Clifford argues, must be able to resist the 
normalizing powers of assimilation, forgetting, and distancing. Secondly, diasporic 
communities maintain a richer sense of difference compared to the nationalist ideological 
trope of pluralism understood as a "melting pot." Because diasporic communities live in 
tension between cultures, they are able to mediate cultural differences. Diasporic 
communities avoid a description ofpluralism as simply the sum ofmixed cultures. 
Finally, the transnational connections emphasized in diasporic communities break down 
binaries ofminority and majority discourse, which structures projects of assimilation and 
resistance. If anything, the transnational context draws out the spatial/historical content 
ofW.E.B. DuBois' notion of a double consciousness. 12 
In Asian American Studies, the discourse of diaspora and displacements has 
gained much currency in articulating the complex experiences of Asian identity in 
America. In the anthology Displacements and Diasporas: Asians in America, the editors 
12 See Souls ofBlack Folks. 1989. Bantam Classic Edition. 
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argue that diasporic and transnational concerns emerged when the Pan-Asian identities, 
such as Taiwanese-American, Korean-American, and Filipino-American, prominent in 
the Civil Rights era, became insufficient in defining one's specific cultural identity. 13 
This reconsideration of self-identification among many Asians in America prompted 
theorists to begin thinking about how one understands this "ethno-national self-
definition" (Anderson & Lee 2005, 9). Historian Robin Cohen, cited in this anthology, 
describes this "nostalgic trope": 
Diaspora signified a collective trauma, a banishment, where one dreamed of horne 
but lived in exile... all diasporic communities settled outside their natal (or 
imagined natal) territories, acknowledging the 'old country' - a notion often 
buried deep in language, religion, custom and folklore - always has some claim 
on their loyalty and emotion (2005, 9). 
This sense ofyeaming and attachment to one's originating distant community must be 
understood within specific transnational practices, such as maintaining kinship 
relationships, political and economic networks, and the establishment ofmultiple homes 
(Anderson & Lee 2005, 9). Ultimately, because displacement becomes an important 
aspect in the lives ofmany transnationals, questions of place playa prominent role in 
understanding one's identity. The concept of "horne" and the "homeland" become 
contested terrains, particularly if one is excluded because of one's sexuality, race, or 
class. 
There are a few advantages in thinking about identity in a transnational or 
diasporic framework given my criticisms ofNussbaum and Braidotti. A transnational 
critical analysis situates our notions of the cross-cultural selfin between international 
13 For a different response to the use of Pan-Asian identities in the US, see Eric Liu's The Accidental Asian: 
Notes ofa Native Speaker. New York: Random House. 1998. Liu's understanding of identity as individual 
choice ungrounded by any cultural community posits an opposing view to Asian identities as diasporic. 
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relationships. First, transnational identities do not ignore group identities as Nussbaum 
and Braidotti do. In fact, maintaining one's specific cultural history in context of one's 
residence in a host country constitutes the transnational situation for many immigrant 
communities. In these communities, one cannot transcend one's cultural history or 
commitments in large part because ofthese emotional attachments and one's sense of 
loyalty to multiple communities. Second, transnational experience emphasizes an 
emotional yearning for connection with one's originating community. This sense of 
loyalty and emotional yearning seem to reveal an important relationship of dependency, 
which inevitably marks human experience. This sense of dependency is opposed to a 
negative political sense of dependency characterizing the economic relationship of First 
and Third worlds. Revealed in one's yearning and emotional attachment, it signifies the 
ways in which we are interrelated with each other on an international scale. These 
yearnings and desires are not experienced as past memories, but as present desires, 
reinterpreting the barrage of cross-cultural elements in dislocation. Thus, there is a 
creative element within this sense of yearning that ultimately opens up the possibility of 
making a horne in one's state of dislocatedness. On the one hand, the currency of 
transnational discourses makes the case for envisioning America as dispensing with a 
domestic narrative ofbelonging. On the other hand, it also makes the case for 
incorporating the rebellious nature of individuals who fear a sense of belonging to a 
particular community. Moreover, transnationals respond to this sense of cross-cultural 
dependency with a caring response, which attempts to maintain and cultivate cross­
cultural relationships, such as sending balakbayan packages, filled with food, clothes, 
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and hospital supplies. Finally, transnational experience emphasizes multiple cross­
cultural relationships, thereby undermining any singular master narrative ofbelonging or 
non-belonging. 
Drawing from feminist dependency theory and American pragmatism, in Chapters 
3 and 4, I develop two ways of theorizing the space between that articulates the 
interactive model of travel I propose. Chapter 3 mingles Kittay's feminist dependency 
theory and Jane Addams notion of "affective interpretation" in the context ofher work 
with immigrants, then applies this analysis to transnational relationships of dependency in 
the case of the foreign dependency worker in order to expose our obligations to culturally 
different others. Chapter 4 charts Royce's notion of the "betweenness relation" 
throughout his works in metaphysics, his ethics ofloyalty and his social and political 
commentary on provincialism. I show how Royce's betweenness relation relates to a 
transnational framework that generates an alternative model in understanding the nature 
of international communities grounded within our notions ofhome, the nature of one's 
sense of belonging, and travel. 
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CHAPTER III 
TOWARDS A TRANSNATIONAL DOULIA SYSTEM: KITTAY, ADDAMS AND 
A TRANSNATIONAL ETHIC OF CARE 
Since the subject of care has developed into a prolific area of study, I want to 
focus primarily in this chapter on how notions of dependency and care might extend into 
a larger international social framework. Rather than appealing to the type of abstract or 
romantic notion ofthe multicultural subject that I argued against in Chapter 2, I want to 
focus on how dependency and care situate notions of the cross-cultural selfwithin 
embedded transnational relationships. These relationships, as I argued in Chapter 1, offer 
more concrete ways in thinking about the nature of the multicultural subject. 
As the world becomes more related and connected through transnational global 
markets, more attention needs to be paid to how these relationships are fundamentally 
relationships of dependency. An ethics of care provides an important resource both for 
critically examining the ways in which social life is predicated on relationships of 
dependency, and for articulating how the role of care responds to the claims of 
relationships of dependency. An ethics of care provides an important contribution 
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towards understanding questions of obligation and responsibility within transnational 
relationships of dependency. One example that has not received much attention in care 
ethics is the case of transnational dependency workers, 14 including many women from the 
Philippines, who leave their country of origin to work in First World households, such as 
in the United States. In my view, attending to the nested dependencies of transnational 
dependency workers reveals a more concrete and embedded perspective in care ethics, 
which can then be used to address the concerns of globalization and international 
relationships. 
The need for dependency workers in First World countries has taken a toll in 
countries such as the Philippines. This need has generated the largest foreign currency in 
the Philippines totaling approximately 7 billion US dollars, mostly coming from migrant 
domestic workers. Care work in the Philippines is considered to be the country's largest 
export to other countries. In fact, the Philippine government has identified a care crisis in 
the Philippines as more and more Filipinas leave home seeking better wages in order to 
care for their families back in the Philippines (Parrefias 2002). It is important to 
understand how dependency work has entered into a global context. 
Many theorists studying this situation, such as Barbara Ehrenriech and Arlie 
Hochschild, identify a few challenges transnational Filipina mothers face. First, constant 
contradictory emotions besiege the transnational mother. She cares for her First World 
14 I understand dependency worker and care worker in the same way. However, following Kittay's 
terminology in Love's Labor, I use dependency worker to emphasize the fundamental character of human 
social relationships marked by one's inevitable dependencies. A dependency worker is attentive to the 
dependency relation through acts of care. In characterizing the foreign care worker as a dependency 
worker, I want to emphasize the work these women do attend to the claims of transnational relationships of 
dependency, which becomes more visible in a growing transnational context. 
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charge while her own children are left with family members in the Philippines. The 
complex experiences of loneliness and yearning for her own children at home inform the 
kind of care the First World charge receives. In many cases, Filipina dependency 
workers develop a closer relationship to their First World charge than to their own 
children because of this experience of loss. This, of course, has disastrous effects on the 
children oftransnational mothers, who also continually yearn to be with their mothers. IS 
Arlie Hochschild characterizes this social reality as "globalization's pound of flesh" 
(2002, 26). The emotional experience ofloss, felt by both mother and child, is an effect 
of the global market economy. 
Second, while it is clear that transnational dependency workers are dependent on 
the employment of First World countries, the reciprocating dependency of the First 
World on this dependency work largely remains invisible. As Ofelia Schutte has argued, 
on a macro level, global market economies directed by neo-liberal policies do not 
incorporate dependency work in the gross national product ofthe country (2002). 
Dependency work is often seen as a service that is paid for, in which the employee's 
obligation to the employer is limited to an economic relationship, thereby masking the 
nature ofthe relationship. Since this dependency is not recognized among many First 
World employers, their responsibility to their workers is also concealed. 
Third, care work paid or unpaid, is continually undermined and further devalued. 
The invisibility of the work and of the care workers themselves underscores the modes of 
valuation of reproductive labor in our society. This labor does not produce products, but 
15 For an excellent discussion on the effects of transnational children whose parents work outside of the 
Philippines, see Rhacel Parrefias' Children o/Global Migration (2005). 
56 
instead sustains people. In a market-driven economy, however, it is difficult to assess the 
value of this kind of work, and thus it is valued much lower than work that produces 
products. Hochschild argues "that the low value of care keeps the status of women and 
those who do it, and ultimately all women, low" (2002, 29). 
Care theorists have analyzed the globalization of care (Robinson 1999) or the 
global context of care (Held 2006) in order to understand how care can be expanded to 
public and international domains rather than limited to familiar and proximate 
relationships. However, understanding our global situation as fundamentally 
characterized by transnational relationships of dependency demands that an ethics of care 
pay closer attention to concrete moral responses to those who are culturally different and, 
despite appearing foreign and distant, are living and working close at hand. My basic 
strategy in this chapter is to examine first the areas in care ethics that address the problem 
of caring for distant others, and then to offer a model of care ethics inspired by an 
expansion of Eva Kittay's notion of the doulia principle to transnational relationships of 
dependency through Jane Addam's conception of care and dependency within the context 
of her social work with immigrant communities. Thinking about care ethics within 
transnational relationships of dependency recognizes concretely our moral obligations to 
others who are distant from us by looking more closely at our particular relationships 
with culturally different others who live close to us, such as transnational dependency 
workers. Nel Noddings has recognized this move in care ethics as "starting at home" 
(2002). However, it is important to understand one's home as occupied by culturally 
different others, making one's caring response less parochial and more transnational. 
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This allows us to understand our responsibilities to more distant others by recognizing 
transnational relationships of dependency that fundamentally characterize the human 
global experience. 
Caring About vs. Caring For: The Problem of Caring for Distant Others 
Nel Noddings conceives the problem of caring for distant others through a 
distinction between "caring-for" and "caring-about." Caring-for entails 
face-to-face occasions in which one person, as carer, cares directly for another, 
the cared-for. There are many circumstances, however, in which we care about 
others even though we cannot care directly for them; that is, we are somehow 
touched by their plight and want to do something to improve it (Noddings 2002, 
22). 
Noddings seeks to rehabilitate the idea of caring-about; however, she recognizes that its 
success is dependent on ensuring that caring-for is practiced and maintained. This, of 
course, becomes difficult to assess in an international context when physical distance 
might hinder the more face-to-face or physical practice of "caring-for." Moreover, 
caring-about might result in a kind of caring imperialism if not grounded within specific 
"caring-for" practices. This concern is drawn out by Joan Tronto's work in recognizing 
certain harms that arise due to the nature of care. 
Tronto identifies two problems that an ethics of care faces when addressing the 
problem of caring for distant others. The first is the problem ofpaternalism/maternalism. 
Tronto argues that often care-receivers are infantilized by the care-givers. This can be 
heightened "when the care-givers' sense of importance, duty, career, etc., are tied to their 
caring role." In this case, "we can well imagine the development of relationships of 
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profound inequality" (Tronto 1993, 170). In the case ofthe Filipina dependency worker, 
employers (who are often privileged women) understand their caring role by viewing the 
gainful emploYment (and citizenship benefits) they are providing for the transnational 
dependency worker as an instantiation oftheir caring responsibility. This attitude treats 
the transnational dependency worker as an infantilized other. Moreover, this type of 
paternalism/maternalism might translate into a form of imperialism, particularly in the 
form of structural adjustment policies that developed nations might demand from 
developing countries. It is not a coincidence that First World employers of transnational 
dependency workers may mirror the same imperialistic attitudes of concern embodied by 
global structural adjustment policies. Imperialistic caring may result in racializing the 
transnational dependency worker's capacities to care. Race and gender playa role in 
cultivating an assocIation that women of color are more naturally inclined to care than 
even oneself. Just as calling the maquiladores' fingers "nimble," the capacity to care is 
racialized and gendered in ways that treat women of color as more suitable for this type 
ofwork. The First World employer's charity, framed by neo-liberal economic policies, is 
justified by an infantilizing rationale that is constructed by racism and sexism. 
A second problem faced by an ethics of care is that care work is by nature 
parochial. Tronto describes this problem: "Those who are enmeshed in ongoing, 
continuing, relationships of care are likely to see the caring relationships that they are 
engaged in, and which they know best, as the most important" (1993, 170). As Tronto 
argues, if the paradigmatic relation of care is a mother-child relationship, how might a 
mother be more willing to care for a child starving in Somalia, when there are starving 
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children closer to home? Care might be too limited to care for distant others, particularly 
since practices of care occur within more proximate relationships. Furthermore, Tronto 
argues that there is a risk that "care's parochialism" might mean "that there will be no 
reason why the privileged need to look beyond how their own caring needs are met in 
order to believe that they are caring" (146). Tronto refers to this attitude as "privileged 
irresponsibility." Privileged irresponsibility might take the form of a universal doctrine 
of individualism, which assumes that one "makes it" on one's own. This can contribute 
to the paternalism/maternalism of the employer of the transnational dependency worker. 
However, this detached perspective, or what Tronto calls the parochialism of care, may 
conceal the moral response ofthe privileged to those outside of their personal and private 
relationships. In transnational dependency work, the care received by the privileged is 
understood within an economic framework and hence not considered part of one's 
personal or private obligation of care. 
According to Fiona Robinson, care theorists, such as Tronto and, I would add, 
Noddings, who have conceived an ethics of care as extending out of its private contexts 
to more public domains still believe that the only viable solution to address the global 
context would be to insist that care is necessary for justice (Robinson 1999,43). 
However, for Robinson, distance need not be a problem once we understand the realities 
of the "shrinking world." She argues: 
The notion ofthe 'shrinking world' suggests that, in some important way, 
distances are effectively being reduced, and that this shrinking, in tum, has a 
disembedding effect on places - the physical settings of social activity as situated 
geographically (1999, 45). 
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One of the results of the "shrinking world" view is that the nature of social relationships 
changes, thus fostering new fonns of interaction that could be considered "face-to-face," 
such as internet or phone relationships. Distance and closeness are reinterpreted once we 
take into account the technologies of globalization. 
Robinson cautions, however, that globalization need not imply a unified 
humanity. It consists of boundaries in the fonns of exclusions, nationalism, and state 
sovereignties. How we think about these differences must stem from specific 
relationships in concrete situations. For Robinson, the relational moral character of an 
ethics of care makes it possible to understand the specific concerns and needs of 
culturally different others in an international context. An ethics of care does not view 
individuals as possessing "rights," but rather views them within interpersonal 
relationships. In a global context, a moral orientation towards particular others allows us 
to view our global responsibilities more connectedly. For example, in the case of global 
North-South relations, strategies to eradicate poverty would not assent to any conception 
of fonnal equality among the disparate parties under an ethics of care. This often results 
in cases of paternalism or a fonn of unwanted charity. Rather, an ethics of care would 
focus on our moral capacities to recognize the culturally different other as concretely real, 
rather than as an idealized version ofhumanity. 
What Robinson seems to be suggesting, but not specifically addressing, is the 
presence of boundary conditions that infonn our relationships with foreign and distant 
others. Some of these boundary conditions16 involve transnational practices and 
16 I understand boundary conditions as emerging within the global context of care. Boundaries emerge 
once exploitation and power hierarchies determine rules of inclusions and exclusions. I understand these 
61 
relationships that intimately connect us with those who are distant or outside our nation-
state borders. These boundary conditions function and are policed within specific 
transnational practices that involve capitalist and imperialist hegemony as well as 
mutually engaged solidarity. It is within this tension between nation-states that our moral 
orientation of care should operate in order to address global concerns. Robinson notes, 
"Any approach to ethics which claims to address the moral problems of international 
relations cannot overlook the structural causes ofpatterns of moral inclusion and 
exclusion on a global scale" (1999, 47). The question ofmoral inclusions and exclusions, 
however, emerges within specific practices that concretely relate us to distant others. 
In thinking about the "shrinking world," we mustn't shrink the boundary 
conditions in our analysis of international relations. For example, in the case ofpoverty, 
Robinson argues that an ethics of care should pay attention to the "lives, relations, and 
communities ofpeople in developing countries" (1999, 47). It is important to see how 
the boundary condition motivates our attention to the ways in which the "lives, relations, 
and communities in developing countries" are specifically related to our more familiar 
relationships, or more close to home. Following Inderpal Gerwal and Caren Kaplan 
(1994), the practices that connect us with distant others occur within the transnational 
boundary spaces determined by forces of globalization. It is in this third place that our 
moral orientation of care should operate: negotiating through the maze of economic 
markets, citizenship rules, language barriers, and the translation of cultural value systems. 
boundary conditions as an emerging ontological space of cross-cultural interaction that relates culturally 
different others by highlighting the common ground culturally different actors share. I will develop a more 
sustained treatment of the ontology of the space between in Chapter 4. In this chapter, I would like to 
highlight how these boundary spaces emerge in concrete practices of care. 
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Thinking about distant others requires attention to the boundaries that connect us to one 
another in an international context. It requires that we look closer to home in thinking 
about our responsibilities to others abroad. 
In the next section, I will articulate an ethics of care within transnational boundary 
conditions so as to address the concerns of the Filipina dependency worker. In effect, 
this analysis generates a transnational public ethos of care that will avoid the problems of 
caring for distant others. My basic strategy will be first to examine Eva Kittay's 
argument about dependency, and the way it generates a public ethos of care known as a 
doulia principle. Next, I will expand this notion of the doulia principle to a transnational 
context through Jane Addams' conception ofcare and dependency in her work with 
immigrant communities. 
Examining the Social Role of the Doulia Principle 
Kittay's work in dependency has generated much feminist scholarship in the areas 
oflaw, politics, subjectivity, ethics, and epistemology. Her work strikes me as an 
accurate portrayal ofhow the world works. Her practical wisdom, most notably 
formulated as "We are all- equally - some mother's child" (Kittay 1999,25), challenges 
individualistic models ofjustice, which emphasize rationality (that excludes emotional 
attachment) as central to human flourishing. Equality, for Kittay, is grounded in lived 
experience and is not a natural right based on "some common property we possess as 
individuals" (1999, 25). Moreover, her practical insight not only discloses the concrete 
realities we live in, but also underscores the varied relationships in which we are 
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"nested." 
Kittay argues that dependency is an "inescapable" reality that conditions the "life 
history of each individua1." She understands this reality as manifest in "early childhood, 
illness, disability and old age" (Kittay 1999, 29). By virtue of our biological reality, we 
are inevitably dependent on others for care and sustenance for our very survival and 
growth. Kittay maintains: 
The immaturity of infancy and early childhood, illness and disability that renders 
one nonfunctional even in the most accommodating surroundings, and the 
fragility of advanced old age, each serve as examples of such inescapable 
dependency. The incapacity here is determined neither by will nor desire, but by 
determinants of biology in combination with social circumstances (1999, 29). 
It is important to note that the "incapacity" that characterizes one's dependencies is 
established "neither by will nor desire." In other words, one is constrained by these 
relations of dependency in lived experience, and it is impossible to remove oneself 
physically and willfully from these relationships. It is also worth noting how these 
unavoidable dependencies are determined not only by biology or the physical facts of 
one's body, but also by the social circumstances that determine what counts as being old, 
frail, ill, or disabled. Ultimately, the cultural dimensions in combination with one's 
physiological constraints condition what can be thought of as dependent, shaping the very 
concept of dependency. 
In this sense, one's condition of dependency cannot be understood as an 
exceptional circumstance. For Kittay, to conceive of dependency in this manner 
"dismisses the importance of human interconnectedness," which is necessary for survival 
and "the development of culture itself' (1999, 29). Not only does dependency constitute 
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our physical lives, it also percolates into human social relations. To this extent, relations 
of dependency cross the lines of the pre-political or familial realities of our lived 
experience into the social and political institutions governing our public lives. In fact, 
dependency, "as a feature of the human condition, has crucial bearing on the ordering of 
social institutions and on the moral intuitions that serve to guarantee adherence to just 
institutions" (Kittay 1999,37). The way in which one envisions the order of social 
institutions and conceptualizes moral intuitions is founded in large part by relationships 
of dependency. According to Kittay, if we recognize that our social and physical lives 
function in nested relationships, responsibility can be viewed relative to these 
relationships. 
In fact, relations of dependency imply a responsibility to care for and have moral 
attachments with others within dependent relationships. This capacity to care is a mark 
of one's humanity (Kittay 1999, 38). The moral upshot of this claim is that one cannot 
thrive if this capacity is not cultivated within the moral and political practices of society. 
Nel Noddings views the notion of growth in care ethics as one that rejects rigidity. In the 
context of education, a child's growth must stem from her interests as an individual and 
must not be blocked by confining expectations (Noddings 2002, 185) from parents or the 
larger society. Following Dewey, Noddings argues that growth requires "time and care" 
of the individual. This notion of growth resonates with Kittay's claim that society cannot 
thrive if exploitation is a norm. Since the growth of the individual is tied to the growth of 
society, an exploitive society is one that blocks an individual's growth and in tum 
prevents society from achieving its own growth. Kittay seems to suggest the need for an 
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attitude of caring that ultimately cares for the process of caring itself if society is to thrive 
and grow. The growth of the individual and that of society are both dependent on the 
capacity to care. Thus, as Kittay argues, "at the nexus of these relationships of 
dependency is a moral responsibility" (1999, 50). In this sense, the moral responsibility 
involves an attitude of caring for caring in order to ensure that society continues towards 
growth. 
In this respect, Kittay emphasizes the relationship between the dependency 
worker and her charge as a paradigmatic case of a dependency relationship. In this 
relationship, there remains an obvious vulnerability that is experienced by both the 
dependency worker and her charge. Since the dependency worker is in a position to 
either harm or benefit her charge, for Kittay, the work she does for her charge is infused 
with a heavy moral load. She acts on the basis of a moral claim "on the part of her 
charge for her attention, good will, and sincere efforts" (Kittay 1999,49). Kittay argues 
that in most cases, moral claims can be made within relationships between individuals 
who are equal. Both parties can either accept or reject these moral claims to one another. 
However, the inequalities in the relationship between the dependency worker and her 
charge inhibit the dependency worker's ability to accept or reject these moral claims on 
her own behalf. Her care for her charge must not cease lest her charge suffer 
unreasonably. Because the nature of dependency work requires selfless acts on the part 
of the dependency worker, there is a potential for failure to provide the care needed to 
sustain this dependent relationship. The dependency workers' vulnerability exposes 
society's obligation in caring for the process of caring. Kittayargues: 
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A system that pays adequate attention to the dependency relation will be one 
seeking both to empower the dependency worker with respect to her own interests 
and whenever possible, to decrease the dependency ofthe dependent as well. By 
relegating dependency to the status of an afterthought, neither caregiver nor 
charge is well-served (1999,37). 
By focusing on the dependency relation, our responsibility is understood as one of 
responsiveness, care, and trust, which sediments our bonds to the human community and 
the wider environmental community with which we are in relationship. Viewing our 
responsibility as an activity of sustaining dependent relationships provides us with a 
picture of ethics congruent with the "unassailable fact" of our dependencies. 
Thus, Kittay offers a model of reciprocity, developing a dou1ia system in thinking 
about how social responsibility is viewed if the dependency relation is seen as 
foundational to the ordering ofjust social institutions. A dou1a is "a postpartum caregiver 
who assists the mother, and at times relieves her" (Kittay 1999, 106). Rather than 
understanding the dou1a as replacing the mother's role as caregiver to her infant, "the 
dou1a assists by caring for the mother as the mother attends to the child" (Kittay 1999, 
107). While the early Greek conception of the dou1a's service is related to the work done 
by slaves, which occurs within exp10itive relationships, Kittay wishes to redirect the 
dou1a's notion of service as one of interdependence "that recognizes a relation - not 
precisely of reciprocity but ofnested dependencies -linking those who help and those 
who require help to give aid to those who cannot help themselves" (1999, 107). 
Recognizing the "nested dependencies" that arise by virtue of our caring responsibilities 
orients our attention to the subject who cares as one who is also in need of care. 
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According to Kittay, a model of interdependence based on the doulia system 
recognizes our need for care as human beings, and this should be made available to 
everybody, including those who do the work of caring. This principle of the doulia as 
defined by Kittay implies an extension to the public domain. This extension emphasizes 
a public ethos of care. The larger society must playa role in ensuring the well-being of 
the dependency worker. The need for care of the dependency worker signals a moral 
response from the society of which she is a part. The doulia principle, understood as a 
principle of caring for caring, anticipates Royce's similar principle of loyalty to loyalty, 
which I will further develop in Chapter 4. Loyalty to loyalty is understood as a logical 
principle that is necessary to the existence ofmeaningful relationships. The doulia 
principle, or caring for caring, establishes a similar principle of connection and 
attentiveness to relationships that is essential for the growth and well-being of society. 
This principle characterizes the responsibility of society to its dependency workers. 
The principle of the doulia, understood as a public ethos of care according to 
Kittay, establishes two important tasks for society. First, it develops a specific "social 
responsibility (derived from political justice realized in social cooperation) for enabling 
dependency relations satisfactory to dependency worker and dependent alike" (1999, 
109). The principle of the doulia recognizes the value of relationships of dependency as 
necessary for the health of all human beings. Second, the principle of the doulia as a 
public ethos of care would encourage social institutions to "foster an attitude of caring 
and a respect for care by enabling caregivers to do the job of caretaking without 
becoming disadvantaged in the competition for the benefits of social cooperation" 
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(Kittay, 109). By respecting the dependency workers' well-being, society ensures that 
the work of care continues under more favorable conditions for the dependency worker. 
In caring for the dependency worker, society cultivates an attitude that values the work of 
caring. I? A public ethos of care, articulated through the doulia principle, would focus on 
the dependency worker's well-being in virtue because she represents an embodied 
version of the dependency relation. 
Kittay is committed in preserving the caring-for relation of the dependency 
worker by establishing a doulia principle that cares about the demands of dependency 
work. By establishing the requirements of care as fundamental in society, Kittay 
develops an ethics of care that allows one to care-about without falling into the pitfalls of 
abstraction or unwanted charity. However, how might we understand this doulia 
principle within transnational relationships of dependency, particularly in the case where 
the Filipina dependency worker is considered a foreigner, maintaining commitments to 
distant countries, yet nonetheless is proximate? Moreover, if we look at the transnational 
dependency worker as paradigmatic of international societies, what might global 
responsibilities look like? I seek to expand Kittay's doulia principle to address the 
invisibility of one's responsibility to Filipina dependency workers. Addressing the needs 
of the transnational dependency workers would reveal our inevitable transnational 
relationships of dependency and direct our associated global responses of care closer to 
17 Doula shares the same root as the word dulia, which refers to the attitude of reverence to the Virgin 
Mary. I thank Scott Pratt for pointing this out to me. It seems that Kittay's principle of the doulia as a 
public ethos of care implies a kind of reverence, not in a religious sense to the Virgin Mary (although it 
does seem that the Virgin Mary may have signified an idealized notion of the dependency and caring 
relation that inspired reverence to her followers) but as a reverence to the dependency and care relation the 
dependency worker embodies. 
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home. Caring-about must be tied to concrete practices of care, which involve more face­
to-face interactions. Rather than viewing caring-about as an attitude that can be applied 
in international contexts, such as giving money to starving children in Somalia without 
even realizing how we might directly relate to their experiences, it is best to view this 
moral orientation within one's familiar engagements with culturally different others. 
This will encourage a moral orientation of care to be more flexible (less parochial) and 
less prone to instances of caring imperialism or paternalism/maternalism. In the next 
section, I show how Jane Addams' notion of care and dependency is informed by her 
work with immigrant communities. Addams ultimately provides us with a flexible 
understanding of a moral orientation of care conceived within transnational relationships 
fostering interaction. This will lead my analysis to a formulation of a transnational doulia 
principle. 
Addams and the Social Ethics of Dependency 
Maurice Hamington understands Addams' work at Hull House as exhibiting a 
social habit of care. For Hamington, Addams "provides what care ethics has often been 
accused oflacking: a strong social-political element" (2004, 103). It is my contention 
that Addams provides a unique contribution to care ethics by offering a social ontology to 
the social and political concerns surrounding the global context of care and dependency. 
I will examine how Addam's notion of affectionate interpretation or sYmpathetic 
understanding implies a notion of the space-between that fosters social interaction. A 
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social ontology that emphasizes interaction can serve as a way of thinking about how 
Addam's relational model of ethics can extend into a public ethos of care. 
Affectionate Interpretation and Sympathetic Understanding as a Public Ethos ofCare 
The notion of sympathetic understanding has often been cited among Addams 
scholars as an important feature that links her philosophy and work at Hull House to 
feminist care ethics (Seigfried 1996, Fischer 2000, Hamington 2004). Sympathetic 
understanding is usually viewed as highlighting an epistemological or moral orientation 
that values care in moral judgments. Affectionate interpretation appears in Addams' 
essay "A Modem Lear" and is used to articulate the notion of sympathetic understanding. 
However, I focus on the terminology of affectionate interpretation because I think her use 
of this term in this essay highlights her social ontology, which can similarly be 
understood within her notion of sympathetic understanding. In this way, her notion of 
sympathetic understanding is broadened to include questions of ontology as well as 
epistemology and values. This has implications for thinking about transnational 
relationships of dependency. 
While the pragmatist and feminist traditions do not assume a rigid distinction 
between ontology, epistemology, and ethics, it is important to see how sympathetic 
understanding has usually been theorized as a moral orientation of care rather than as an 
explanation of the ontology ofrelationality. Hamington understands Addams' notion of 
sympathetic understanding related to questions of knowledge. He writes, "knowledge is 
a prerequisite for embodied care because one cannot care for something about which one 
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knows nothing" (Hamington 2004, 99). For Hamington, how we know has much to do 
with the body. Sympathetic understanding brings us into relation with the communal 
needs of society by sympathetically engaging the lives of others, rather than being limited 
to one's individual or parochial experiences. Sympathetic understanding is understood as 
an orientation of care that enables us to become more socially engaged, more related to 
others. 
Seigfried understands Addams' notion of sympathetic understanding as a social 
habit that we learn by directly engaging "on a day-to-day basis" with people who are 
culturally, politically, or ethnically diverse (1996, 217). It operates within the realm of 
action. In this way, our sympathies for one another break down rigid attitudes that 
suggest a singular access to morality. Morality, in this sense, necessarily seeks the 
diverse perspective that can only be attained by actually interacting with culturally 
different others, rather than assuming prior to the interaction a single principle of 
morality. Seigfried understands sympathetic understanding as a moral orientation that 
values care, important in thinking about what constitutes a just community. 
In this way, Seigfried suggests that a commitment to diversity is essential in 
cultivating a non-exploitive society. She argues: 
Through the mediation of sympathetic understanding, a space can be opened in 
which the viewpoint, values, and goals of others can become part of moral 
deliberation and social transformation. Only by letting them speak for themselves 
and not projecting our viewpoints on them or thinking we can unproblematically 
enter into their worlds through imagination can such collaboration take place 
without coercion or co-optation (2002, xxi). 
It is important to recognize that a boundary space emerges between people such that 
mutual recognition is possible. The space-between need not be limited to individuals 
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since it also affects the commitments of the communities of which individuals are a part. 
Social awareness begins with individuals, but the possibility of social transformation 
happens when communities are open to the influences of culturally different others. In 
this way, rather than viewing an ethics of care as an individual moral orientation that one 
can apply to distant others, Addams' notion of sympathetic understanding underscores a 
social orientation of care by underscoring communities' flexibility for social change 
through encounters with communities that are culturally different. This boundary space 
becomes an important feature in Addams' work in thinking about larger social 
relationships that extend beyond one's individual or parochial relationships. 
Sympathetic understanding, called "affectionate interpretation" here is introduced 
in Addams' discussion ofthe Pullman Strike of 1894. The Pullman Palace Car Company 
factory workers, working with the American Railway Union, led a strike against the 
Pullman Company seeking better wages. The strike ended unsuccessfully without 
arbitration for the factory workers and resulted in the federal government intervening in 
this conflict in order to open the railways. Furthermore, Pullman received broad public 
criticism regarding his paternalistic policies toward his workers, particularly his policy 
that required his employees to live, pay rent and buy food in the company town. In this 
case, the conflict was between the workers of the Pullman Company and the employer, 
who thought ofhimself as a benefactor to his employees who were ungrateful after he 
raised their rents in order to pay dividends to his investors. Addams compares the 
tragedies of the industrial relationship surrounding the workers' strike to the tragedies of 
the familial relationship in Shakespeare's King Lear. In the context of family 
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obligations, Addams is able to identify the problems of the Pullman strike by recognizing 
relationships of dependency between the employees and Pullman. 
Much like King Lear, the president ofthe Pullman Company felt that the workers' 
strike was a sign of ingratitude for his acts of generosity. However, Addams comments 
that Pullman lost the ability to attain "a simple human relationship with his employees" 
(1912,2). Addams identifies this faculty as affectionate interpretation and argues that it 
was lost to King Lear and Pullman as both succumbed to egoistic interpretations of the 
situation. This prevented both Lear and Pullman from affectively interpreting the 
concerns of Cordelia and the workers, respectively. Trapped in their own narrow 
perspectives, both Lear and Pullman lacked the means to understand how other people in 
the relationship can playa role in shaping their own experience. Moreover, Addams also 
felt the workers (and Cordelia) possessed a "narrow conception of emancipation" (1912, 
5), which prevented them from finding a meaningful relationship with their employer. 
Because both sides of the relationship lacked the capacity to interpret the situation 
affectionately, there was "no mutual interest in a common cause" (1912,3). 
Addams suggests that affectionate interpretation brings the individual out ofher 
narrow perspective and to seek a diversity of viewpoints. However, this move towards 
culturally and socially different others entails an element of suffering. Addams argues: 
It sometimes seems as if only hardship and sorrow could arouse our tenderness, 
whether in our personal or social relations; that the king, the prosperous man, was 
the last to receive the justice which can come only through affectionate 
interpretation (1912,5). 
Addams seems to suggest that a requirement of affectionate interpretation demands that 
one must undergo a sense of suffering or loss of one's familiar beliefs and customs. 
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Suffering opens one to the possibility of social transformation. It signals a departure 
from one's narrow or parochial conceptions and brings one into relation with other kinds 
of social experience. Consequently, affectionate interpretation not only suggests the 
embedded character of relationships of dependency, particularly in family relationships; 
but also underscores how the interaction is fraught with tension between one's individual 
desires and one's commitment to communal and social relationships. The departure 
prompts an inquiry into the meaning of one's social relationships. One's choices are 
dependent on how meaningfully and authentically one understands one's relationship to 
others. 
Placing oneself in between one's individual perspective and one's commitment to 
others requires that one must exhibit the virtue ofhumility (Addams 1912,33) in order to 
achieve a sense of social justice. Reflecting on the old Hebrew Prophets' three 
requirements, Addams reformulates the caring-for and caring-about distinction through 
an understanding the virtue of humility as the middle ground between the requirements of 
"loving mercy" and "doing justly." Solely fulfilling the requirement of loving mercy by 
giving indiscriminately without understanding the concerns of others would lead to a 
form of unwanted charity. One merely "cares-about" in an abstract manner, and how one 
cares-for others might lead to paternalism/maternalism or possibly a caring imperialism. 
Solely fulfilling the requirement of doing justice would lead to dogmatic rules and strict 
policies governing our relationships with others, lacking any sort of sympathy. In other 
words, one does not consider how care plays an important role in justice and in effect, 
does not care at all. 
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Between these two requirements, Addams suggests that we should 
"walk humbly with God," which may mean to walk for many dreary miles beside 
the lowliest of His creatures, not even in the peace of mind which the company of 
the humble is popularly supposed to afford, but rather with the pangs and throes 
to which the poor human understanding is subjected whenever it attempts to 
comprehend the meaning of life (1912,34). 
Walking humbly requires us to engage with others regardless of the diverse perspectives 
that constitute the larger society and one's more personal and familiar relationships. In 
other words, Addams views caring-about as grounded within the practices of caring-for. 
This requires work and effort. As Seigfried understands Addams' project of social ethics, 
"the transformation is personal, but the means are social" (2002, xx). Affectionate 
interpretation suggests that we find meaning in our moral orientation of care by traveling 
with others, by walking humbly for many miles and experiencing the pain ofmaintaining 
this social relationship. This can only be done by recognizing a third place or a boundary 
place of social experience that both displaces us from our narrow conceptions and opens 
us to the possibility of understanding others who come from different locations of social 
expenence. 
The need for a social morality in ethics is prompted by an anxiety among 
individuals seeking "their actual relations to the basic organization of society" (Addams 
2002,6). For Addams, a basic yearning for connection with others moves questions of 
ethics into social experience. Understood within a social realm, ethics is conceived 
relationally through the daily experience of living with one another. Addams writes, "We 
are learning that a standard of social ethics is not attained by traveling a sequestered 
byway, but by mixing on the thronged and common road where all must tum out for one 
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another, and at least see the size of one another's burdens" (2002, 7). The common road 
represents a boundary place constituted by travel, displacing the subjects from their 
familiar environments and thrusting them into a situation ready for transformation. It is 
the common road of experience that meaningfully brings us into relation with one 
another. This assumes that ethics is not about applying principles generated outside of 
specific interactions, but requires that moral guidelines emerge within actual day-to-day 
engagement with the lives of others within the boundaries of social experience 
characterized by our common efforts with one another. 
Interacting with culturally different others becomes a necessary requirement for 
Addams in order to generate meaningful social relationships. Care is situated within an 
experimental method in which one learns how to become open to the diverse perspectives 
that make up social life. In this way, affectionate interpretation proposes a relational 
moral attitude that emphasizes the need for reciprocity within social relationships. 
According to Seigfried in the introduction to Democracy and Social Ethics, Addams 
understands the social relation as reciprocal (2002, xxi). Addams thinks that one's 
personal transformation, which occurs within the boundaries of social experience with 
socially and culturally different others, fosters an attitude of care that cares for caring, 
much like Kittay's doulia principle. Once one is transformed through the process of 
affectionate interpretation, one develops, according to Addams, a public ethos of care, 
which seeks "the betterment of humanity" (2002, 79). As Nodding describes growth in 
the process of caring-about, Addams develops a notion of growth in social ethics 
requiring that communities be flexible and experiment with the diversity of experiences. 
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Being closed to experience and to others prevents one from engaging in social 
transformation. Addams argues: 
A man who takes the betterment ofhumanity for his aim and end must also take 
the daily experiences ofhumanity for the constant correction ofhis process. He 
must not only test and guide his achievement by human experience, but he must 
succeed or fail in proportion as he has incorporated that experience with his own 
(2002,79). 
Caring for caring, understood as a public ethos, is grounded upon the daily experiences of 
those who affectionately interpret the lives of others ill social experience. Addams' view 
of reciprocity extends to a larger public attitude that values the work of care in our day-
to-day interactions with others, so that the well-being of society is well served. Attending 
to relationships of dependency in our daily lives through an attitude of caring for caring 
becomes a way of achieving the "betterment ofhumanity." Addams' sense of reciprocity 
cultivates a public ethos of care by opening up for transformation one's own social ideals 
relative to the daily interactions with socially and culturally diverse others. 18 
In addition, Addams' argument for the subjective necessity for social settlements 
views the individual's well-being as tied to the well-being of society. She writes: 
It is always easy to make all philosophy point to one particular moral and all 
history adorn one particular tale; but I may be forgiven the reminder that the best 
speculative philosophy sets forth the solidarity ofthe human race; that the highest 
moralists have taught that without the advance and the improvement of the whole, 
no man can hope for any lasting improvement in his own moral or material 
individual condition; and that the subjective necessity for Social Settlements is 
therefore identical with that necessity, which urges us on toward social and 
individual salvation (1902, 68). 
18 Addams discusses an example of the charity visitor who visits tenement homes in Chicago. Addams 
identifies the charity visitor's failed attempts to help these families that the charity visitor as her not open to 
her own social transformation. The charity she gives becomes empty and abstract to the lives of the 
tenement families she visits. Addams argues, "the young woman who has succeeded in expressing her 
social compunction through charitable effort finds that the wider social activity, and the contact with the 
larger experience, not only increases her sense of social obligation but at the same time recasts her social 
ideals" (2002, 33). 
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Affectionate interpretation makes a necessary synthesis, understanding the concerns of 
the individual as related to a wider social process. Being attentive to connections and 
relationships of dependency secures the possibility for social transformations. 
Affectionate interpretation offers a relational method for understanding the continuity, or 
relationships of dependency between the individual and the wider society. 
Affectionate Interpretation as a Transnational Public Ethos ofCare 
Affectionate interpretation can be seen as a public ethos of care that pays particular 
attention to the ways in which the individual is connected to and ensconced in social 
activities and communities. Additionally, it serves as a way ofbringing this public ethos 
of care out of its parochial limitations within nation-state boundaries by recognizing that 
the individual's relationship to a social life necessarily percolates into international social 
activities. As a notable peace activist, Addams' view of social ethics extends beyond 
nationalisms. The features of affectionate interpretation that generate a public ethos of 
care can be extended to international social life. However, this transition is deeply rooted 
in the daily activities that we choose to engage in with culturally different others. 
For Addams, narrow perspectives lead to critical misunderstandings. The individual 
perspective prevents the possibility of seeing other points of view and how one can find 
meaning in social life. Social relationships imply the assumption that we are all 
dependent on each other, not only for sustenance and care, but also to understand ethical 
life. Without engaging with others, the individual perspective lacks moral meaning in the 
sense that the individual's views are not properly socialized. Hamington comments that 
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this feature in Addams' thought "is a demanding moral imperative" (2004, 105). In fact, 
Addams finds it a necessity to engage with others who are culturally different. Since our 
experiences are partial, it is ofutmost necessity that we engage others who are culturally 
different in the communities in which we live. Caring for distant others risks the inability 
to care-for others concretely and makes the moral orientation of caring-about seem 
abstract and empty. Addams views this problem of caring for distant others close to 
home. She sees the work of caring practiced within the crowded urban cities where the 
clash of cultural difference is lived and experienced every day through the lives of 
immigrants. The crowdedness of social experience suggests that the work of caring is 
done in a proximate context. Addams is attentive to the transnational social relationships 
located in the immigrant quarters ofChicago, which greatly influence her notion of 
cosmopolitanism. 
Immigrants become important in-Addams' conception ofwhat it means to be 
internationally minded. In Newer Ideals ofPeace, immigrants embody the faculty of 
affectionate interpretation due to their social position in society as newcomers facing the 
demands of the host country's processes for becoming a citizen. These insights into the 
lives of immigrants prompt Addams to develop what I take to be a transnational public 
ethos of care based on the experiences of immigrants as they emerge in her interactions. 
Immigrants are not distant others in the sense that one need not travel outside the US to 
meet Italians, Russians, or Poles. For Addams, one can travel quite locally to encounter 
Italian, Russian, or Polish culture. While Robinson characterizes the shrinking world as a 
"disembedding place" due to globalization, Addams directs our attention to concrete 
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embedded places that are transnational, such as cosmopolitan urban centers, particularly 
immigrant neighborhoods. 
Given the features of affectionate interpretation, it is important to understand the 
motivation behind Addams' emphasis on immigrants in relation to developing a more 
internationally-minded way of thinking that will lead towards international peace. First, 
Addams begins with the assumption that social morality has an "origin in social 
affections" (1907, 11). Affectionate interpretation demands that one be sympathetic to 
the concerns of others. King Lear lacked this capacity and failed to understand the plight 
of his daughter. Likewise, Pullman saw his role as being a benefactor to his employees, 
which prevented him from seeing their concerns. For Addams, social morality 
emphasizes emotion. In the context of international or cross-cultural experiences, this 
requires a cultivation ofmoral sentiment that is cosmopolitan in affection. Addams 
understands our international ethical relationships in the context of our more tribal or 
domestic relationships (1907, 11). She argues that a double conception of morality 
divides our ethical actions. The first conception is the relation within a "tribe" or social 
group. The second is the relation to "outsiders." However, these must be combined in 
order to develop an international model for peace. Otherwise, these divided sets of 
ethical actions will take on militarizing habits that will ultimately lead to war. 19 
19 Addams thinks that a morality built upon a rigid separation between our relations with our domestic 
polity and our relations with outsiders cultivates a militaristic attitude since there isn't a common ground 
that can be shared between the two social relationships. In "Democracy or Militarism," Addams makes the 
case that peace is the "unfolding of life processes which are making for a common development" (1). 
Without an understanding ofhow we, as a domestic polity, might relate to foreign others, a militaristic 
spirit develops. 
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In combining these two ethical postures, what we ought to do in our country and 
what we ought to do with "outsiders," Addams argues that we should "naturally seek for 
[the synthesis of the two ethical postures] in the poorer quarters of a cosmopolitan city" 
(1907, 12). In seeking the development of this cosmopolitan social sentiment, we should 
look to more concrete social experiences that address cross-cultural relationships, such as 
the life of immigrants. Addams recognizes that "emotional sentiment runs high among 
newly arrived immigrants" (1907, 13) due to their own displaced status in a new country. 
Displacement cultivates "an unusual mental alertness and power of perception" (1907, 
14). Immigrants have traveled, in the sense that they are willing to revise their cultural 
habits and renounce social customs they have practiced for many generations. In other 
words, they are willing to open themselves up for transformation. They are willing to 
participate in a larger social life that sometimes demands casting aside accepted customs 
and habits. Immigrants are also in a unique position to settle or "seek companionship in a 
new world" and thus "inevitably develop the power of association which comes from 
daily contact with those who are unlike each other" (1907, 14). Immigrants embody 
epistemic locations that can provide insight into the relationship between the domestic 
and the international. These epistemic locations take on the character of the space­
between, which inhabit the interactions of immigrants and their host community. 
Through these interactions, immigrants contribute to the very make-up of their host 
community. Addams argues that just as immigrants' hopes and dreams can be instructive 
in shaping city government, education, and charity work, "so their daily lives are a 
forecast of coming international relations" (1907,16). 
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Addams' commitment to experience can launch our inquiries into a cosmopolitan 
social morality in crowded cities. Crowded cities require a "deeper and more 
thoroughgoing unity" that only could be had among a "highly differentiated people" 
(1907, 16), rather than more stable and homogenous social collectivities. A 
"commingling" of many different kinds of people expresses a type of unity that 
negotiates a balance of opposing views and forces. The unity "gravitates" towards the 
common road or the daily interactions of people. Resolution of differences can only be 
accomplished through social means. Addams writes: 
It is natural that this synthesis of the varying nations should be made first at the 
points of the greatest congestion, quite as we find that selfishness is first curbed 
and social feeling created at the points where the conflict of individual interests is 
sharpest (1907,17). 
Addams believes that through these daily encounters, narrow nationalist perspectives can 
be challenged, providing us with important insights into the development of an 
international public ethos of care towards peace. 
At times, it is clear that Addams in these passages ofNewer Ideals ofPeace 
romanticizes the possibilities of cultivating a cosmopolitan sentiment for a social 
morality through the figure of the immigrant. She refers to them as "humble harbingers 
of the Newer Ideals of Peace" (1907,19) or the "kindly citizens of the world" (1907,18). 
In fact, one might argue that she places an unusual degree of responsibility on the 
immigrant, particularly in that the difficult task of living in a host country usually 
occupies their priorities, rather than becoming saints of cosmopolitanism, the bearers of 
international peace. More critically, Rivka Shpak Lissak argues that Addams' strategy of 
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incorporating immigrants has assimilationist motives, rather than making a place for their 
specific ethnic traditions to playa role in American life (1989,9).20 
Addams, however, is too entrenched in the daily lives of immigrants through her 
work in Hull House to make this idealistic and romanticized judgment. It is not their 
political positions regarding war and peace that make their situation promising. In fact, 
Addams suggests that many immigrants have advocated for war, rather than peace. The 
importance for Addams lies in the fact "that they are really attaining cosmopolitan 
relations through daily experience" (1907, 18). Through interactions with immigrants, 
Addams believes there is hope in uncovering the "vital relation - that of the individual to 
the race" (1907, 19). This is a task not only for immigrants. It is a mutual task that 
involves a caring attention, which involves utilizing the faculty of affectionate 
interpretation, and recognizing a transnational space of interaction that encompasses the 
realities of the immigrant's life. 
Addams employs a version of affectionate interpretation by highlighting the social 
interactions within transnational relationships that bring us into relation with culturally 
different others that extend outside our nation-state borders. Both the lives of immigrants 
and one's specific interactions with immigrants serve as transnational relationships where 
one's work of care is placed between social relationships that are not limited to the 
dichotomy of ethical postures, either focusing on relations within a domestic polity or 
with foreign others. By highlighting these social relationships with immigrants, Addams 
directs our analysis of cosmopolitanism to a realm of action and experience that pays 
20 Seigfried argues in a footnote in the introduction to Addams' Democracy and Social Ethics that Lissak 
misunderstands Addams' philosophical project and thus misreads Addams' analysis of immigrants (2002, 
xxxv). 
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particular attention to one's relationship with those who are considered both outside of 
and a part of a domestic polity. 
Addams calls upon our skills of affectionate interpretation towards immigrants in 
the areas of the "Americanization" of immigrants and the education of immigrant 
children. According to Addams, rather than assimilating immigrants in the US through 
abstract concepts, such as rights or mere memorization of phrases of the constitution, we 
need to listen to their experiences of living in their country of origin. She argues, "We 
believed that America could be best understood by the immigrants if we ourselves, 
Americans, made some sort of a connection with their past history and experiences" 
(2002,244). In this sense, Addams encourages us to stake ourselves and become open 
for transformation, as Americans, in our engagement with immigrants, thereby 
developing a new national narrative alongside the narrative of the immigrant. This would 
lead to widespread discussion of what it means to be an American in relation to the 
experiences of culturally different others. 
In the case of the education of immigrant children, Addams encourages teachers 
to learn about the cultures of their students. In "The Public School and the Immigrant 
Child," Addams redirects the destinations of travel to more local situations. For Addams, 
the shrinking world is apparent in our own communities. One must seek these 
interactions and help restore to immigrants the knowledge oftheir culture, rather than 
viewing knowledge of other cultures as to be found strictly outside of the nation-state 
boundary. In these two instances, Addams encourages social habits of cosmopolitanism 
and brings the public ethos of care to international contexts. These two processes in 
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understanding the immigrant highlight the transnational spaces that determine the 
immigrant's life, as well as invite new forms of international relationships to emerge in a 
domestic context, at home. In other words, the result of a social synthesis of the domestic 
and international relations occurs within transnational social relations between nations. 
What I take to be Addams' transnational social ethos of care encourages Americans to 
develop cosmopolitan affectionate interpretations by achieving the sense of a common 
ground between culturally different others. 
The common ground is a wider context of social experience that can facilitate 
mutual understanding between culturally different others. This notion of a common 
ground emerges in Addams' work with immigrants in understanding cosmopolitan 
artwork and the formation of the Labor Museum. In one scenario at Hull House, Addams 
recounts an encounter with an "old pioneer," who was "fiercely American" and thought 
the decline of the neighborhood was the fault of the rising numbers of "foreigners" 
settling into the cities. The old man complained to Addams of the many "foreign" 
artworks that decorated the walls of Hull House. Addams responds: 
I endeavored to set forth our hope that the pictures might afford a familiar island 
to the immigrants in a sea of new and strange impressions. The old settler guest, 
taken off his guard, replied, 'I see; they feel as we did when we saw a Yankee 
notion from Down East,' - thereby formulating the dim kinship between the 
pioneer and the immigrant, both 'buffeting the waves of a new development'" 
(1902,58). 
The Labor Museum, which featured many crafts from the immigrant's country of origin, 
facilitated presentations and workshops to help restore to the immigrants their past 
histories and traditions and bring them into relation with American cultural experiences. 
Addams thought the Labor Museum could be a model for that "educational enterprise 
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which should build a bridge between European and American experiences in such wise as 
to give them both more meaning and a sense of relation" (1902, 127). In this way, 
cultural misunderstanding could be mitigated once a larger relation or a common ground 
was established between the immigrant and American culture. Both instances strive to 
facilitate mutual understanding and synthesize the international and the domestic relation 
by providing the context, defined by certain practices and action such as artwork and the 
Labor Museum, in which citizens can be brought into relation with one another. This 
new relationship forges a new sense of what American life means. 
Ad.dams adds to an ethics of care a way of envisioning our relationships of 
dependency nested within transnational spaces of interaction, particularly in the case of 
immigrant neighborhoods. She understands the moral orientation of care to distant others 
closer to horne by emphasizing the ways in which we concretely relate to culturally 
different others through interactions with immigrants. By situating the problem of caring 
for distant others within the context of one's day-to-day encounters with culturally and 
ethnically diverse immigrants, one is able to develop a more cosmopolitan spirit based in 
concrete and embedded relationships with culturally different others, rather than 
abstractly caring-about geographically distant others. Addams emphasizes the 
transnational relationships that are conditioned by our choices to attend to these diverse 
perspectives, and which anchors our moral orientation to distant others within concrete 
and embedded social relationships within our specific interactions with immigrants. Her 
public ethos of care as characterized by her notion of affectionate interpretation is 
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transformed into a cosmopolitan sentiment as she seeks unity with other nations to further 
her activist goals of peace. 
In the following section, I would like to bring together Kittay's insights on the 
principle ofthe doulia and Addams' transnational public ethos of care in order to address 
the concerns oftransnational dependency workers. By looking at these workers' 
concerns, I argue a transnational doulia principle develops, which has implications for 
thinking about the nature of international communities. 
Towards a Transnational Doulia Principle: Making Visible Transnational 
Responsibilities 
In her important contribution to feminism and globalization, Ofelia Schutte argues 
in her essay, "Women, Dependency and the Global Economy," that neo-liberal policies 
are incapable of assessing dependency work as a type of productive labor in developing 
countries for two reasons. First, the unpaid care work is rendered invisible "and not 
considered productive itself' (2002, 143). Second, women are forced to go back home to 
offset the cuts in social services. According to Schutte, neoliberal policies fail in 
accounting for the time the woman would be engaging in had she been free from the 
demands of dependency work (2002, 143). This has serious effects on the "life projects" 
ofmany dependency workers. Schutte links the ability to form life projects for oneself, 
which requires time and energy, as essential for the health of the country. Policies should 
be geared in "raising the quality of people's lives (including women's lives), not 
undermining it" (2002, 144). 
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Developing this sentiment into transnational contexts, it is important to recognize 
the nested transnational dependencies of the Filipina dependency worker. The example 
of the Filipina dependency worker signals an opportunity to understand how caring-about 
distant others can be done in the context of caring-for the Filipina dependency worker in 
a transnational context. Given Addams' insights about immigrants, one's moral 
orientation of care to distant others should be predicated upon one's attention to the 
closer transnational relationships that establish further connections to international or 
global communities. In fact, the commitment to growth requires that individuals also 
need the time and care to develop one's own life projects. In the context of Filipina 
dependency workers' growth, a transnational relationship of dependency exposes our 
responsibility to others beyond the nation-state. Since the lives of Filipina dependency 
workers are connected to their country of origin, our resulting care for distant others is 
anchored to the more proximate relationship we have with the Filipina dependency 
worker. This might change how transnational relationships are conducted. 
Understanding our moral orientation of care to distant others within a 
transnational context recognizes the pervasiveness of transnational relationships in our 
global lives. One might argue that a more appropriate solution to the lives of care 
workers would be to abolish this practice altogether. First World nations must wean 
themselves from the labor ofThird World women. Rather, monetary aid should be 
directed to countries that are needy so as to prevent mothers and fathers leaving their 
children. While these solutions do address the structural problems that compel many 
Filipinas to work as overseas dependency workers, a transnational framework begins 
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within relationships that can often be oppressive to those that are marginalized. 
Beginning from this framework would envision solutions that recognize the Filipina 
dependency worker's agency rather than as subjects of oppression to be given aid. 
Solutions within a transnational doulia system would take into account the agency of all 
participants within these complicated and unequal relationships. 
By focusing on the dependency relation, First World responsibility is understood 
as one of responsiveness, care, and trust, which sediments social bonds to the human 
community and the wider global community. Some recommendations by Arlie 
Hochschild to address the "care crisis" among Filipina dependency workers in order to 
ensure the overall well-being of the dependency worker, her First VvTorld charge, and her 
own children in the Philippines include: provide paid visits to return home by the 
employer, create domestic violence shelters for women in their country of origin, find 
ways in which the children of dependency workers can also come and live in the host 
country, more men could also help in the household, and finally the basic solution would 
be that care is valued more in society (Hochschild 2002, 29). 
These recommendations highlight a transnational doulia principle, which seeks to 
address the human dependency claims of transnational dependency workers. There are 
three requirements the transnational doulia principle demands of ethics and international 
relationships. The first emphasizes the visibility of obligations beyond nation-state 
boundaries through attention to encounters with foreign dependency workers. In this 
sense, transnational relationships are experienced more close to home. The 
recommendation of creating domestic violence shelters in the country of origin of the 
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transnational dependency workers highlights one's ethical attention to politics in another 
country. However, this global awareness of domestic violence is predicated on more 
local interactions. 
The second requirement of a transnational doulia principle not only recognizes 
that the transnational Filipina dependency worker is constrained by the dependency work 
itself, but also recognizes that an emotional loss and suffering besiege the transnational 
dependency worker due to responsibilities in maintaining multiple homes and the pain of 
family separation. This experience ofloss, even though not directly experienced by the 
citizens of the host country, prompts an inquiry into sustaining transnational relationships 
of dependency. The work of care, in this sense, contains a sense of yearning and 
connection that exceeds geographical distance. Placing one's ethical obligations within 
this transnational context exposes one's responsibility towards developing a more 
meaningful internationally minded community. The transnational doulia principle would 
attend to the dependency relation between multiple international homes. The 
transnational ethos of care serves as a more grounded conception of caring for distant 
others by focusing on maintaining and sustaining homes across borders. 
Addams understands our social ethics to be narrow and isolated if we don't seek 
out a variety of diverse experiences. The experimental approach Addams practices in her 
work at Hull House demands a flexibility of one's individual and social lives in order for 
personal and social transformation to take place. Following Addams, a third requirement 
of the transnational doulia principle would direct everyone to seek out the diverse range 
of experiences that mark nested relationships of dependency. This would make visible a 
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large range of social experiences and ethical responsibilities currently made invisible by 
neo-liberal policies. The transnational doulia principle develops a caring-about attitude 
through a focus on local experiences with "strangers" living in one's neighborhood and 
doing dependency work in one's home. The transnational doulia principle requires that 
practices of care be more flexible and open to the transnational context pervading social 
life. It is these local interactions that bring one into relationship with an internationally 
minded community. 
My analysis in this chapter points out how care ethics can engage within 
transnational spaces of interaction in order to address a more global or international 
social context. However, in this chapter, I do not develop a metaphysical picture of the 
"space-between," or the boundary conditions of social experience. In this chapter, I have 
shown instances of caring practices between countries, particularly Addams' work at Hull 
House with immigrant neighborhoods, and I highlight the importance of recognizing 
these spaces as fruitful in developing a more flexible and nationally porous care ethics. 
What is needed next is a theory of the experience of "betweenness" that both logically 
connects various distinct communities and meaningfully brings them into relation as an 
international community. In general, what is needed is a metaphysics of transnational 
community. In the next chapter, I examine Josiah Royce's contribution in developing a 
transnational interpretation of community. 
92 
CHAPTER IV 
COMMUNITY AND TRANSNATIONAL PROVINCIALISM: UNCOVERING
 
THE "BETWEENNESS" RELATION IN ROYCE'S THOUGHT
 
Chapter 3 offered a concrete model for understanding the embedded nature of 
selves within an international context. A transnational doulia principle characterizes 
one's agency as a response of care to the inescapable relationships of dependency that 
mark human social life. Part of these relationships of dependency is situated within a 
transnational context that links foreign communities to one's own. In this chapter, I seek 
to understand the metaphysics oftransnational communities through the works of Josiah 
Royce. Royce, unlike other American philosophers, examined the notion of community 
as an integral concept in thinking about questions of metaphysics. Since his notion of 
community tackles questions of the experience ofbetweenness as a way ofthinking about 
unity, Royce offers an important contribution to thinking about the nature of transnational 
communities. 
Prior to examining Royce's works, it is important to highlight some thematic 
similarities Royce shares with feminist dependency theorists, including the feminist care 
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ethics of Jane Addams. Mary Mahowald comments that while many American 
pragmatists, including Royce, were not especially "feminist" in their approach to 
philosophy, their understanding of philosophy contained "feminine" elements (1986-7, 
411).21 Two "feminine" elements that bear a similarity to feminist dependency theorists 
are, first, a critique of rationalism and an emphasis on practical life, and second, an 
emphasis on community and relationships. First, Royce understands that knowledge is 
connected to social and practical life. In Sources ofReligious Insight, Royce attempts to 
recover a notion of reason that is not limited to abstract formulaic rules, but associated 
with practical experience. He argues that successful reasoning processes involve "sorts 
of experience, forms of intuition ... In brief, reason and experience are not in opposition" 
(1940, 91). Royce emphasizes the importance of experience in shaping universal ideas. 
He argues: 
Whoever is to be best able to survey the landscape from the mountain top must 
first have wandered in its paths and its byways, and must have grown familiar 
with its valleys and recesses (1940, 92). 
Royce's emphasis on the practical world bears a resemblance to the commitments of 
feminist dependency theorists, who argue against the detached individual subjectivity 
pervasive in traditional philosophy. 
Second, Royce is committed to the quality of relationships and connections. He 
isn't merely interested in the basic fact of relations or the fact that people were connected, 
21 According to Mahowald, the insights in American philosophy "are the very themes often invoked to 
describe the special traits of women, as different from men." She understands these elements to be 
"feminine". However, American philosophers did not explicitly take on projects that were "feminist," or "a 
critique of the overall subordination of the interests of women to those of men by society-at-Iarge" (l986-7, 
411). One implication of this argument is that American pragmatism offers many resources to feminists. 
Likewise, pragmatism has a potential to be modified by feminism. See Chapter 1 for a discussion of this 
relationship. 
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but is interested in thinking about the meaning and the quality of relationships. Much 
like care ethicists who view social relationships as characterized by dependency and 
sustained by care, Royce pays particular attention to how loyalty sustains social 
relationships. Throughout his career, Royce saw the quality of relationships as 
fundamental not only in a theory of ethics, but also in his metaphysical theory of 
community and his social and political analysis of provincialism. 
Royce's notion of provincialism analyzes the importance of local interactions in 
understanding more global relationships. This proves to be an important resource in 
thinking about how the multicultural subject is constituted within embedded international 
relationships. According to Royce, a province is something not defined by social, 
political, or legal boundaries. Rather, a province is "sufficiently unified to have a true 
consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own unique ideals and customs, and 
to possess a sense ofdistinction from other parts of the country" (Royce 1967, 61). 
Royce's notion of provincialism emphasizes the importance of local identities in relation 
to larger collectivities. A province's distinctive boundaries serve as a way of 
understanding how larger collectivities can be formed. In addition, Royce understands 
provincialism as having three requirements. The first is the "tendency for the province to 
possess its own customs and ideals" (1967, 61). In other words, there needs to be an 
actual community that shares common social habits, values, and future life goals. The 
second requirement is having a unified sense of "the totality ofthese customs and ideals" 
(1967,61). Understanding the totality of these customs and ideals as an additive sum 
lacks the sense ofmeaning in which these ideals come together and form a unified social 
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collective. For Royce, these customs and ideals represent the community's common 
interests, forming the unified identity of the community. However, that a community is 
unified through common interests is not enough for Royce. He is interested in the quality 
of the unification and emphasizes the third requirement: provincialism must include "the 
love and pride, which leads the inhabitants ofthe province to cherish as their own these 
traditions, beliefs and aspirations" (1967, 61). An individual's loyal devotion to her 
provincial community characterizes Royce's sense of provincialism. 
In this chapter, I examine two contemporary interpretations of Royce's theory of 
provincialism as it relates to understanding the nature of ethnic communities. One view 
offered by John Smith is cautious ofRoyce's provincialism as it might foster sectional 
interests among ethnic groups. However, another perspective offered by Griffin Trotter 
views Royce's notion of provincialism as overcoming sectional ethnic interests by 
subordinating ethnic commitments to the larger province. In other words, Trotter takes a 
reductionist approach to ethnic differences in his interpretation of provincialism. I argue 
that provincialism need not lead to the development of ethnic separatism, nor does it lead 
to a diminution of ethnic differences. I argue that Royce's notion of provincialism 
highlights the "in between" character of transnational identities that underscores the 
process of interaction emergent between ethnic communities. Both approaches leave out 
an understanding of the promise transnational or border communities embody for 
understanding the experience of "betweenness" in thinking about ethnic differences. 
Royce's work on community, loyalty, and provincialism offers important 
resources for thinking about how a transnational perspective transforms an understanding 
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of international communities. I will next examine the transnational scope of Royce's 
work through his analysis of the "betweenness" relation. "The problem of difference," 
sometimes understood as "the problem of incommensurability," in discussions of 
multiculturalism, frames cultural difference as anomalous and marginal to dominant 
society. Royce, however, does not reduce the problem of difference to the dichotomy of 
majority and minority communities, but emphasizes a third place, or space-between, 
which offers ways of sustaining difference without resulting in cultural separatism or 
reductionism. My basic strategy is to examine the two differing interpretations of 
provincialism, then discuss the "betweenness" relation emergent within Royce's work on 
loyalty and community. Lastly, I apply this interpretation to transnational identities by 
drawing out similar themes oftransnationalism in the work of Randolph Bourne, a 
contemporary of Royce, as a response to both Smith's and Trotter's interpretations of 
provincialism. By the end of this chapter, I hope to show how transnational identities can 
be thought of within Royce's work by emphasizing key themes of travel and home as 
they relate to understanding the relationship of the individual and the community. 
Provincialism and Ethnic Differences- Between Separatism and Reductionism 
Royce describes one of the dangers that his notion of a wise provincialism will 
correct as "false sectionalism - which always disunites" (1967,64). However, he argues 
that a wise provincialism need not lead to a "disloyalty to the nation" (1967, 64), or a 
"narrowness of spirit" (1967, 64), or "further the development ofjealousies between 
various communities" (1967, 64-65). In other words, a wise provincialism will promote 
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unity while remaining loyal to provincial uniqueness. Royce lists three evils an unwise 
form ofprovincialism might generate. The first is the problem of immigration. The 
newcomer poses problems to the community if she is not harmoniously incorporated 
within the host community. The second evil is the leveling tendency among communities 
that are not open to the influences of others. The third evil is the problem of the mob, in 
which uncritical narrow perspectives produce social damage and violence. I will focus 
on the first evil to contextualize Smith's and Trotter's concern of ethnic separatism and 
their respective interpretations ofprovincialism. 
Citing his own migration as a native Californian, born in a mining camp in 1855, 
moving to San Francisco and finally to Harvard, as representative of a global 
phenomenon of travel he sees happening during his time, Royce sees a problem with 
immigrants not integrating harmoniously in the host country. The individual is lost in a 
community insofar as she cannot share its customs and ideals. Royce cites the failure of 
the integration of the immigrant either from the host community, which lacks skills of 
hospitality or the newcomer who does not accept the community's ideals and social 
habits as her own. It is important to note that Royce's characterization of the problem of 
immigration and travel might appear as a problem that can be solved by social projects of 
assimilation. Assimilation, however, implies closed, homogenous communities in which 
the differences of the newcomer are subsumed under a larger abstract collective. For 
Royce, a province implies boundary conditions, which serve as the context for mutual 
exchange between different provinces. Rather than assume an abstract notion that 
defines larger collectivities, provinces situate the identities of larger collectivities within 
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specific locations at the boundaries of provinces. These boundaries emphasize the 
importance of interaction, enabling communities to become porous and open to other 
forms of difference. 
The danger of newcomers remaining loyal to their origins and not to the new 
place is that they are closed to and often times in direct conflict with others who are 
distinct from themselves. Smith understands Royce's concern with immigration and 
travel as a problem of "initiation and incorporation" (1992, 149) of the newcomers. 
According to Smith, Royce seeks a way in which newcomers are incorporated in small 
communities that are visible. Provincial loyalties serve as a way of establishing the 
visibility of small communities. A newcomer who is not readily incorporated into a 
visible community is an example of the detached individualism Royce seeks to remedy. 
According to Smith, large urban settings may not provide the immigrant with a sense of 
community in association with her host country, 
for it seems that newcomers to these areas, especially those who belong to 
minority groups, are apt to find there no community apart from that provided by 
the segregated groups of their fellows, a fact which does nothing to establish faith 
in the openness of a democratic society (1992, 149). 
Smith sees immigrant communities as ill adjusted to the host country's social customs 
and values due to a lack ofhospitality on the part of the host country, which does not 
make these values present for the immigrant. Asa result of the lack of visibility of 
community, immigrants tend to become part of the segregated groups that constitute their 
ethnic community. Thus, Smith admits that it is unclear whether Royce's provincial 
loyalties "do not in the end express themselves in the form of sectional interests ­
political and economic - so powerful that they work against the general welfare" (1992, 
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150). In other words, it is not clear whether Royce's wise provincialism might reproduce 
pernicious forms of sectionalism in the form of "closed immigrant communities." 
One important drawback to Smith's understanding of immigrant communities and 
hence Royce's notion of provincialism is the idea that immigrant communities are 
"closed" and separatist. Smith implies that an immigrant's sense ofbelonging tied to her 
ethnic community in the host country is immediately considered separatist. Following 
Lugones, immigrant communities can never be understood as closed and separatist given 
the fact that their very lives are consistently interacting with the dominant society. 
Moreover, following Espiritu, immigrants are constantly engaging in the process of 
"home-making" as a means of settlement into a new community. This process involves 
intimate interactions with the customs and ideals of the host community.22 Smith 
unfortunately does not recognize the transnational space that marks the lives of many 
immigrants, which understands the notion of community as open and porous to other 
different influences. A closed and separatist understanding of immigrant communities 
leaves Smith worrying about the possibility that provincial loyalties may lead to sectional 
divisions of segregated groups. However, Smith does not recognize the in-between 
character in Royce's notion of provincialism, which consequently avoids any type of 
pernicious separatism. 
Similar to Smith, Trotter finds that ethnic communities enact separatist habits 
towards their host country and other ethnic communities. However, unlike Smith, who 
views this problem in light of the failures of the host country, Trotter views this problem 
in light of the value of incommensurability, which values cultural differences. This 
22 See my discussion of this subject in Chapter 1. 
---- --- ------------------------
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position most notably comes from the nationalism expressed by Molefi Kete Asante in 
The Afrocentric Idea. But Trotter doesn't limit his analysis to African American ethnic 
communities. His interpretation of provincialism also applies "to all ethnic communities" 
(1994, 233) and thus seeks to address the problems of ethnic separatism, what he terms as 
"toxic nationalism," (1994, 260) in areas such as the Middle East, Bosnia, and Germany 
and the ethnic tensions that led to the riots in Los Angeles, CA. The point that appears to 
emerge from Trotter's analysis of "toxic nationalism" is that the individual is too devoted 
to her ethnic community, which leads to disunity and hinders meaningful cross-cultural 
interaction. According to Trotter, "proponents of incommensurability," again mostly 
focusing on Asante's work, "are quick to use newly-developed ethnocentric concepts to 
effect a thorough criticism of the cultures whose influence they seek to escape, as if, 
finally, they have discovered a truly neutral metatheory that can be used for transcultural 
analysis" (1994, 232). Ultimately, Trotter seeks a way of understanding how to resolve 
difference without invoking "an ethnic notion ofthe self' (1994, 233). To put it more 
bluntly, in order to resolve ethnic difference, one must put aside any notion of oneself as 
being part of an ethnic community. In effect, one reduces the "ethnic notion of the self' 
to a cultural anomaly. 
While Smith is suspicious ofRoyce's notion of provincialism in the context of 
ethnic or immigrant communities, Trotter finds provincialism helpful in combating the 
leveling and mob-like tendencies to those who hold a toxic nationalism. Let me say that I 
do think Trotter is correct in holding the view that toxic nationalism is a risk and a reality 
that we face in our contemporary world. As stated earlier, Royce, too, was concerned 
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with the dangers of false sectionalism and sought to combat this ever-present risk to 
international politics through his notion of provincialism. However, in Trotter's attempts 
to attenuate the importance of ethnic commitments for all ethnic communities, he fails to 
recognize the value of cross-cultural incommensurability in thinking about 
multicuIturalism.23 
Moreover, I think that Trotter is quite right when he discusses Royce's view of 
provincialism, and his theory of loyalty and community. However, I disagree with 
Trotter's conclusions drawn from provincialism and how it leads to a strategy of ethnic 
reductionism. Trotter believes that provincialism entails a subordination of one's specific 
community commitments to the larger province. He interprets provincialism in relation 
to cultural diversity in two ways, both highlighting the lack of importance of ethnic 
differences. First, he argues that Royce would not agree that Native Americans have the 
sole scholarly authority to publish a work on the Cherokees. Trotter defends this claim in 
the following way: 
He [Royce] would want to point out that there are manifold sources of diversity 
other than ethnic background, and that too intense a focus on ethnic differences 
neglects an ultimate commonality of interests, as well as the capacity of 
individuals of differing ancestry to have similar experiences and sympathies 
(1994,264). 
23 I would also add that he ignores how different ethnic communities view their commitments in terms of 
cultural survival. In Power and Place, Wildcat argues that the process of indigenization in Indian education 
involves, "making our own" approach to pedagogy. This involves a revitalization of cultural knowledge 
that has been suppressed for many years (2001, viii). In Homebound, Yen Li Espiritu reveals how the 
homeland plays an important role in the Filipino American's process of homemaking in America (2003, 
14). In thinking about borderland identities, recall Anzaldua's claim that "Wherever I go I carry home on 
my back" (1999,43). For many ethnic individuals, one's commitments to one's ethnic community cannot 
be reduced in light of the history of colonization, racism, classism, and sexism in America. For the 
purposes of this chapter, I will focus on how Trotter ignores the positive aspects of incommensurability 
and, ultimately, the betweenness relation in Royce's thought. 
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In other words, there are many ways ofbeing different other than through one's ethnic 
community. For Trotter, one's ethnic commitments would prevent us from seeking 
commonalities. 
Second, Trotter understands individual choice not as involving one's choice to be 
a member of an ethnic community, but as one's choice to belong to a province. Here, he 
makes a distinction between an ethnic community and a province. One's choice is 
defined by one's loyalty to a province since it is un-coerced by the demands of ancestry 
of one's ethnic community.24 In this sense, Trotter thinks that Royce "would recommend 
that persons subordinate their devotion to an ethnic community to their devotion to a 
province" (1994, 264). 
A few remarks are indeed called for on Trotter's analysis of Royce's view on 
cultural diversity. The first point is that Royce would certainly agree that ethnic 
differences need not be absolute, but that does not commit Royce to the conclusion that 
ethnic differences play an inferior role in resolving cultural differences. Second, Trotter 
understands ethnic incommensurability in opposition to one's sense of belonging to a 
province, which ultimately represents one's sense of agency and choice. However, 
Trotter does not understand the importance of ethnic or cultural incommensurability in 
thinking about cultural diversity. According to Ofelia Schutte's discussion of cross-
cultural communication, the principle of incommensurability can be seen as a "site of 
24 Trotter defines an ethnic group as "An ethnic group is any smaller subset of the population of a nation or 
province which maintains a separate identity by virtue of ancestrally-acquired cultural memories, 
immediate or removed, which members hold as an essential and fundamental part of their personal 
identities" (1994, 235). I disagree with this definition of an ethnic community because he frames ethnic 
groups as the minority and hence not integral to the makeup of provincial communities. This view 
conceals an understanding of transnational migrant communities. These communities cannot be seen as 
exclusive given the history of colonization, racism, and sexism in America. 
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appreciation" rather than as an indication of separatism. One common way of conceiving 
incommensurability is "arithmetically," as Schutte describes: 
What I get from the differently situated speaker is the conveyable message minus 
the specific cultural difference that does not come across. Theorized in this 
manner, the way to maximize intercultural dialogue would be to devise a way to 
put as much meaning as possible into the plus side of the exchange, so as little as 
possible remains on the minus side (2001,49). 
However, this quantitative description of incommensurability, as Schutte argues, does 
nothing to help us understand what cultural difference is. For Schutte, taking an 
existential approach, incommensurability resonates a kind of "strangeness," a 
"displacement of the usual expectation." Taking into account the cultural differences of 
others, one does not "bypass these experiences or subsume them under an already 
familiar category" (Schutte 2001,49). Schutte recommends using "non-totalizing" 
concepts to account for difference. Pluralism and diversity are all concepts that need to 
be re-examined if what counts as pluralism or diversity is made to "fit within the overall 
rationality that approves and controls the many as one" (Schutte 2001, 50). In the case of 
provincial identities, larger identities should not subsume our more familiar ethnic 
identities. Rather, for Royce, ethnic identities playa role in constructing provincial 
identities. This requires an attention to how incommensurability is treated in social 
expenence. 
A second important argument is the concept of intersectionality. Schutte claims 
that most Latin American cultures "intersect" various cultures' temporalities (African, 
indigenous, Spanish colonial, and modem) given the history of colonization and slavery 
in the Americas. Thus a speaker's discourse in Latin America may intersect with various 
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other cultures' discourse and temporalities. Furthermore, immigrants to the United States 
bring these "forms of cultural difference and hybridity" (Schutte 2001, 50). 
Through cross-cultural encounters and intersections, one is able to reconstruct a 
"non-totalizing" translation. This requires an act of choice. Through the process of 
translation, one's ethnic commitments remain distinct as well as provide a way of 
unifying cultural difference through processes ofhybridity and cross-cultural interactions. 
In this sense, ethnocentric concepts need not lead the theorist of incommensurability into 
contradiction when these very concepts are used to form larger metatheories of trans­
cultural or cross-cultural dialogues, as Trotter suggests. 
More generally, Trotter maintains a majority and minority framework in thinking 
about cultural diversity and pluralism. This prevents his analysis of Royce's notion of 
provincialism from seeing the "in-between" character of ethnic and provincial loyalties as 
well as the ways in which transnational ethnic communities do, in fact, change the 
identity ofthe nation they encounter. Incommensurability and ethnic differences need 
not lead to separatism, as Smith suggests, nor would they demand a reduction of one's 
ethnic commitments, as Trotter proposes. I think Royce, much like Schutte, would see 
these incommensurable moments among culturally different others as "sites of 
appreciation." Experiences of incommensurability are indications of a need to find 
meaning in this world. They force one to consider other points of view and possibly 
modify one's own. They put one into relation with others to whom one may have never 
been exposed ifleft to one's familiar community. However, in order to make a case for 
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this view, I will draw out the "betweenness" relation in Royce's view ofloyalty, 
community, and provincialism. 
Travel and Home: The Paradox of the Individual and the Community 
During Royce's first year at Harvard, he produced his first historical manuscript 
about California. It was apparent that Royce insistently held on to his provincial 
commitments to California throughout his philosophical writings. Royce was concerned 
with land disputes, newcomer and settler issues, and community order, very local issues 
that spoke to his frontier experience as a native Californian (Clendenning 1999, 130-144). 
Travel played an Important role in Royce's thought. He took frequent ocean trips to other 
countries, such as Australia, as a cure for his mental breakdowns, often returning to 
California with a renewed sense ofloyalty for his family.25 Additionally, as a California 
immigrant living on the East Coast, his dislocation developed a yearning for California 
life, despite its intellectual limitations for him. Even after living in Boston for many 
years, Royce, in a 1915 speech at the Walton Hotel, looks back affectionately to life in 
California as a starting point for his philosophical inquiry: 
The sunsets were beautiful. The wide prospects when one looked across the 
Sacramento Valley were impressive, and had long interested the people whose 
love for my country I heard much. What was there then in the place that ought to 
be called new, or for that matter, crude? I wondered, and gradually came to feel 
25 See Oppenheim's analysis on how Royce's voyage to Australia played an important role in developing 
his philosophy (1980). Moreover, as Clendenning notes, Royce's first literary effort at the age of 8 
involved the travels of "Pussy Blackie," a confined and lonely cat who left home often and went on various 
travels only to return home always with a renewed sense of understanding for his family (1999, 29-30). 
Clendenning also notes that Royce's philosophical works have been in response to his childhood concerns 
and anxieties (1999, 29). "Pussy Blackie's Travels" reveals how Royce problematized his philosophical 
concerns in terms of travel and a return to home. In this chapter, I draw out this concern in Royce's work 
of provincialism as a resource in thinking about the nature of transnational communities. 
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that part of my life's business was to find out what all this wonder meant (2005 
(1), 31-32). 
His reflections near the end ofhis career suggest that while travel served as a backdrop 
for his philosophy, one might read an accompanying theme ofhome-through his 
recurring reflections on California life while constantly finding a home at Harvard-as he 
developed his theory of loyalty, community, and provincialism. 
In The Philosophy ofLoyalty, Royce identifies an important paradox in the 
relation between the individual and the community. Royce identifies two necessary but 
contrary principles. The first hearkens back to Kant's principle of autonomy, "or self-
direction of the rational will of each moral being" (1995, 14). Royce argues, "Your duty 
is what you yourself will to do in so far as you clearly discover who you are and what 
your place in the world is" (1995, 14). The requirement of the principle of autonomy is 
self-knowledge. One needs to know who one is, what one's "place" is in the world. How 
might one know one's place in the world? This leads to the second principle of self-
knowledge: 
I can never find out what my own will is by merely brooding over my natural 
desires, or by following my momentary caprices. For by nature I am a meeting 
place of countless streams of ancestral tendency. From moment to moment, if 
you consider me apart from my training, I am a collection of impulses. There is 
no one desire that is always present to me. Left to myself alone, I can never find 
out what my will is (1995,14). 
The fundamental ambiguity of self-knowledge conflicts with the requirement of the 
principle of autonomy. While it is important to know who one is, the self, according to 
Royce, is a "meeting place," a confluence of the various streams of social histories that 
constitute our experiences. Left to mere introspection abstracted from these social 
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histories, it becomes impossible to know one's will. A further ambiguity arises in 
understanding the character of this meeting place or the confluence of social encounters. 
The paradox of the individual emerges for Royce in ethical situations because, on 
the one hand, "I and only I, whenever I come to my own, can morally justify to myself 
my own life plan. No outer authority can ever give me the true reason for my duty" 
(1995, 16). In forming one's life's plans, choice is a deeply individual act. On the other 
hand, "I, when left to myself, can never find a plan of life. I have no inborn ideal 
naturally present within myself' (1995, 16). Since the self is a "meeting place" of our 
social histories, without social interaction the self remains directionless, lacking the 
purpose and ability to form a life plan, and goes on "crying out in a sort of chaotic self­
will, according as the momentary play of desires determines" (1995, 16). The question 
Royce lays out for us is how can the individual preserve her sense of choice and 
autonomy in a state of dependence on others for the development of self-knowledge and 
formation of life plans and sense of meaning? Implicit in this paradox is Royce's 
insistence on thinking about the nature of human belonging, or finding "one's place" in 
this world. This involves taking into consideration one's yearning for a place in a 
community as well as one's desire to remain an individual, to think and to act from one's 
choices and not from the social control of others. 
Situating Royce's paradox in terms of travel and home, Doug Anderson highlights 
the importance of wandering in Royce's work as it "serves both as a guide for our own 
philosophical endeavor and as an allegory for the hope for an American and, ultimately, a 
human community" (Anderson 2006, 35). Anderson characterizes Royce's travels as a 
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kind ofmovement accompanied by an existential transformation, which recognizes our 
finitude and sense of displacement. The resulting sense ofloss, however, is a productive 
loss that prompts us to seek the necessary connections, which unify the fragments of our 
"selves." In "The Problem of Job," Royce accepts suffering as a necessary condition of 
our finitude. The suffering of the wanderer "becomes part of a strenuous whole of life" 
and is not to be interpreted as "mere experience" (2005 (2), 853). Royce is not only 
concerned with the complicated sense ofbelonging, or knowing "one's place" in the 
world, but is also concerned in formulating a practical strategy for the wise traveler 
interested in finding meaning and truth in her life of finitude, or her home. It is because 
we begin with a sense of our finiteness as human beings that we are able to begin our 
"road" to inquiry. 
In The World and the Individual, Royce establishes the relationship between 
travel and home in situating the nature of inquiry. He argues, "Faith has its glories; but 
the hard toil of critical reflection brings its own rewards. None prize the home-coming 
more than those who wander the farthest" (1904, 5). Travel, in this context, highlights 
some important features that recognize one's "road" to self-knowledge. First, Royce 
understands travel as a departure from home. The wanderer should not be rigidly 
circumscribed by her home and must eventually leave. This departure refers back to 
Royce's understanding of the self as a "meeting place" of various social histories. 
Without various social interactions, the self is incapable of forming choices and life 
plans. Rigidly remaining within a familiar community prevents the possibility of 
interaction. Second, travel is an activity that involves toil and suffering, unlike touristic 
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fonus of travel, which entail activities of leisure. Critical reflection involves degrees of 
discomfort and constant effort. Travel is not a benign activity, but one that involves 
emotional and physical work. 
Third, travel brings us into relation with what is foreign and what is familiar. 
New experiences might appear foreign to the traveler or to the community encountering 
difference, however, it is important to view this sense of newness as underscoring 
connective transfonuations of the community, bridging what is familiar and what is new 
or experienced as foreign. As Anderson points out, Royce views the wanderer in The 
World and the Individual as possessing a sense of purpose, not as a lost free-floating 
sojourner in experience. The wanderer travels with a sense of home and community in 
mind. Travel and home provide resources for thinking about Royce's answer to this 
paradox of the relation between the individual and the community. Let us now move to 
an examination of his answer to the problem of travel and home in the philosophy of 
loyalty. 
The Philosophy of Loyalty and the "Betweenness" Relation 
Loyalty might be viewed as an ethical response to the problem ofhuman meaning 
in this world. The project of ethics for Royce leads the individual from a state of 
estrangement and being lost towards a sense ofhome, of belonging within a larger social 
experience. Royce argues, "I want to know the way that leads our human practical life 
homewards, even if that way prove to be the infinitely long" (1995,6-7). The desire for 
home, the desire to belong to some social experience or to some community, fonus the 
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basis of Royce's ethics ofloyalty. Loyalty "fixes," "centers," "stabilizes," and "unifies" 
(1995, 12) our life such that our efforts are directed towards that to which we are loyal, 
our cause. Royce defines loyalty as "The willing and practical and thoroughgoing 
devotion of a person to a cause" (1995, 9). The two requirements of this definition 
include, first, the choice of the individual to devote herself to a cause, and second, the 
practical and sustained manifestation of this devotion through acts ofloyalty. These two 
requirements represent the characteristics of the devoted loyal subject. Loyalty to one's 
cause, be it a family, a gang ofpirates, or a captain's ship, binds the self to others in some 
form of unity. However, it is not a superficial kind ofunity (i.e. a collection of 
individuals) that binds us to others. Loyalty is experienced as a personal affection to 
others as well as a superpersonal devotion to the larger social collectivities to which we 
belong. Ultimately, for Royce, loyalty solves the conflict of the wayward individual lost 
in her private experiences and the risk of the individual conforming to social standards. 
Loyalty affirms both the individual will and the social realities in which we live. 
Keeping this existential starting point in mind, it is also important to understand 
Royce's project ofloyalty as affirming an ethical and logical principle: loyalty to loyalty. 
Loyalty to loyalty can be understood as a formal conception of relations to the existential 
situation of the loyal individual. Ifloyalty is thoroughly an individual choice and is 
considered a supreme good ofhumanity, then fostering this capacity rather than 
diminishing it should also be an accompanying value. Royce argues: 
... we see that the best in human life is its loyalty; while the worst is whatever has 
tended to make loyalty impossible, or to destroy it when present, or to rob it of its 
own while it still survives (1995,55). 
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In cases where causes conflict, the principle ofloyalty to loyalty directs the ethical 
evaluation of certain causes by the standard that encourages the "furtherance of loyalty to 
loyalty in my fellows," a cause that, "despite the loyalty it arouses in me," can be 
"destructive ofloyalty in the world of my fellows" (1995, 56) and is considered evil. 
Bearing a similarity to the doulia principle I discussed in Chapter 3, loyalty to loyalty as a 
moral principle seeks to cultivate and sustain connections within relationships. 
As a logical principle, loyalty to loyalty functions as the supreme limiting 
condition ofhuman action, thus making loyalty necessary in rational activity. Royce 
identifies this logical function ofloyalty as a self-reinstating principle, which entails 
modes of actions that are not "contingent and arbitrary, but as so implied in the nature of 
our rational activity that the effort to remove them from our world would inevitably 
imply their reinstatement" (1913,368). In other words, the very act of negating a mode 
of action, such as loyalty, implies a reinstatement of the mode of action negated. To 
negate loyalty implies one is loyal to the process of negation. The limiting condition of 
rational thought turns out to be a principle of inclusion. Loyalty to loyalty suggests that 
loyalty is necessary for any logical claim; even the process of negating loyalty involves 
its reinstatement in practice.26 
To further examine this logical relationship ofloyalty to loyalty, I tum to Royce's 
logical treatment of the betweenness relation in the World and the Individual, relate this 
interpretation to his metaphysical work on "order," then apply these interpretations back 
to loyalty to loyalty. I show how the "betweenness" relation offers ways of 
26 The notion of a self-reinstating principle emerges again in my discussion of home-making in Chapter 5. 
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understanding how loyalty supports individual choice without denying the social histories 
in which one lives. 
In The World and the Individual, using geometric formulations, Royce describes 
the intermediate point m as a "blending" of the two distinct points a and b. 
Following the mathematician Thomas Kempe's insight, Royce argues that since m lies in 
between a and b, m contains within it both aspects of a and b. In this example, Royce 
highlights the ways in which a and b are related through m. However, m is much a point 
on the number line as a and b are, but is distinct from a and b through its mediating 
character. As opposed to a dyadic structure, which highlights a dual relationship between 
two points, Royce proposes a triadic structure and argues that a third object exists, 
namely m, which articulates the point of difference, likeness, contrast, or similarity: 
The generalization here founded upon Mr. Kempe's paper will show us that 
contrast and comparison involve, in general, a relation of at least three objects, 
viz. a and b, that illustrates the point wherein they differ, or that helps to 
determine the sort, degree, or direction of their difference. This something may 
be an object of the exact character here ascribed to m (1904, 80). 
The betweenness relation asserts a triadic function in the cognitive processes of 
comparison and distinction, highlighting the agential component inherent in metaphysics. 
m represents a process of relation and mediation, which imply agential capacities of 
discrimination and comparison. Moreover, the betweenness relation asserts that the 
intermediary point is not external to a and b, but that the intermediary is "in" them - "as 
their nature is diversified into their differences" (1904, 81). How a and b are distinct 
from one another occurs between their points and is not decided apart from their 
relationship. m represents the point that marks the difference between a and b, but as 
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Royce argues, m also establishes a link between the points, a link that would not have 
been present if we were not attentive to them. Thus, a and b represent not only distinct 
points, but also inherent in a and b is the possibility of a "common nature" that is 
dependent on a third agent who brings the two into relationship through an active process 
of an agent's attention, desire, and purpose. 
The triadic structure assumed in the betweenness relation invokes a 
transformation of its members. According to Royce: 
For in so far as we define such a triad, we discover how we could conceive one 
member of our original pair as transformed into the other, by means of a process 
that involves first distinguishing the intermediary between the two from one of the 
extremes, and then the other member from the object thus distinguished (1904, 
87). 
Royce understands this process of transformation (a transforms to b) as a mediating 
activity represented by m. In this sense, the mediating character of m brings into relation 
a and b and hence establishes a connection between them that would not have been 
present ifnot attentive to the reality ofm. Royce articulates the general postulate of 
betweenness as follows: "Between any two objects of the world there is always another to 
be found" (1904, 88). Scott Pratt, commenting on Royce's logic, views the betweenness 
relation as making "both diversity and connection possible regardless of the things in 
relation" (2007, 138).27 In this sense, m maintains its own distinct character and 
preserves the distinctness of a and b because of its "insistent" character of emergence 
between them, while at the same time connects a and b through its mediating function. 
27 Pratt also views Royce's project oflogic as framed by the betweenness relation. He writes, citing Royce, 
"Logic, or the Science of Order will be the study of 'the single question, What for us is implied by 
discriminating a from b?'" (Pratt 2007, 138). 
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For Royce, the intermediaries expose to us "fragments" on a continuum, and the 
optimistic message implicit in his postulate of betweenness provides some logical 
measure of security that a relationship can be found. The "insistency" of the middle 
point's emergence reveals to us the many discrete entities on a continuum, a sort of 
radical pluralism. However, implicit in the proliferation of many discrete individuals the 
insistent middle represents, there is also a corollary message of hope, a logical security 
that a relationship of connection between entities emerges into existence. While Royce 
acknowledges that the "ideal continuity" contained in his postulate is a "provisional goal" 
we hold, it produces a methodology in which we are to "observe facts, and then look for 
their linkages" (1904, 99). In this way, the postulate underscores two corollary 
requirements in inquiry. First, through the process of discrimination, being attentive to 
the uniqueness and variation found in intermediaries preserves individuality. Second, the 
postulate underscores a logical security ofhope that relationships are ordered in such a 
way that meaning arises in between any disparate concepts, ideas, or objects by invoking 
a provisional goal. 
Since the postulate of betweenness implies that any intermediary employs agential 
acts of discrimination and comparison that form relationships between entities, Royce 
gestures towards the possibility of a larger collection that goes beyond the narrow 
interests of the individual members. However, it is important to understand this larger 
collection as one that does not require the subordination of a person's ethnic or provincial 
loyalties. In his encyclopedia entry entitled "Order," Royce argues that, unlike laws that 
function as "top down" and posit generalities among a given collection, order emphasizes 
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a more horizontal approach, highlighting the individual's relationship relative to other 
individual members in the collection (1917,208). What makes the order "lovable" 
(1917,227) to its members involves a horizontal relationship to individual members in 
the collection, rather than subsuming one's individuality within a larger collective. This 
kind of relationship establishes the ethical context in which the character of the collection 
is defined: 
To conceive a world in which there is such order is to conceive what makes 
possible the realization of those ethical ideals most characteristic of organized 
communities (1917,227). 
Community formation and order, under this view, are revealed when acts of inference 
occur. As we have discussed in the betweenness relation, these acts of inference occur 
within intermediary spaces. Royce argues that in a sea of chaos, such as a marketplace, 
one is able to identify a certain order by observing individuals in relation with other 
individuals. One must observe the "business" that goes on between people to know the 
order. In this sense, observation is placed between individuals such that comparison and 
discrimination is possible. More general observations expand once discrete comparisons 
are made. These observations mediate between discrete entities. The mediation of 
multiple entities creates generalizations of a particular community order. 
This process of inference is necessary in determining the nature of a community 
and is predicated on the idea of an open series. The concept of an open series enables 
one to infer beyond the individual and narrow interests of a single individual or a single 
community. Royce defines an open series as "series which do not return to themselves, 
and which possess no repetitions of a member" (1917, 216). Events in an open series, 
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thus, do not repeat. Ultimately, for Royce, it is the open series that allows us to interpret 
beyond ourselves by seeking intermediaries at the borders of our experience, making 
possible the movements in our life. An open series makes transformation possible for 
each discrete entity. The insistency of the middle point underscores the infinite ways in 
which discrete individuals can be related. Thus, an open series supports the idea of the 
postulate of betweenness by exposing the incompleteness of discrete individuals. While 
the intermediaries practically bring discrete individuals into relation (as well as preserve 
their own uniqueness and the uniqueness of the entities in which they are relating), they 
also expose the porosity of the discrete individuals. The transformative character, 
implicit in the mediating activity of the intermediary, challenges the narrowness and 
rigidity of discrete individuals. Royce's notion of an open series gestures towards a hope 
that abides by the postulate of betweenness. Since the intermediaries are, in fact, infinite, 
the possibilities for a community are endless, their boundaries porous to the infinite 
possibilities of future interactions with other communities of experience that will lead to 
its transformation. An open series, then, understands the events and deeds of a 
transformation as unrepeatable. However, there will always be an opportunity to 
transform a community due to the postulate of betweenness. 
Thus, his doctrine of order consists not just of mathematical or geometrical 
concepts of collectivity, but also applies to social theory and the character of society. He 
argues: 
It is, therefore, not a matter ofmere accident or ofmere play on words that, if a 
man publishes a book simply 'A Treatise on Order' or the 'Doctrine ofOrder', we 
cannot tell from the title whether it is a treatise on social problems or on 
preserving an orderly social order against anarchy or with studying those 
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unsymmetrical, transitive relations, those operations and correlations upon which 
the theories of arithmetical, geometrical, and logical order depend (1917, 223). 
His insistent holism between the logical and mathematical sciences and social theory is 
predicated on the notion of an open series and the postulate ofbetweenness. He argues, 
"The bridge that should connect our logic and mathematics with our social theories is still 
unfinished. The future must and will find such a bridge" (1917, 223). It is the bridge that 
we know exists because of the postulate ofbetweenness, but desire and attentiveness are 
required for the construction ofthis bridge. It is not conceived from above, but between 
the disparities. Moreover, the future is the ethical possibility in which communities are 
sustained and guided towards their own growth and flourishing. 
Loyalty to loyalty accomplishes the two tasks ofthe betweenness relation. First, 
it sustains connections between individuals and communities. Preserving loyalty among 
others means preserving their very expression of individuality and sense of meaning. 
Rather than rejecting either the tendency towards individualism or social conformity, 
Royce seeks the reconciliation and unification ofboth individualist and social tendencies. 
This, according to Royce, "is the essence ofloyalty" (1995, 59). Second, loyalty to 
loyalty accomplishes the task of creating hope. Royce believes that loyalty goes beyond 
the narrow self-interests of individuals and argues, "It is a universally human good. For 
it is simply the finding of a harmony ofthe self and the world, - such a harmony as alone 
can content any human being" (1995,58). Loyalty to loyalty not only puts us into 
relationship with others in our social experience, but also provides an idealization of a 
community ofhumanity that is formed by this very principle. Royce suggests, "What I 
sought for myself I should then be explicitly seeking for my whole world" (1995, 60). 
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Moreover, loyalty to loyalty ensures that individual loyalties will not be given up in the 
face oftransfonnation. Royce recognizes the need for loyalties to be organic and 
evolving. "Moreover, my loyalty will be a growing loyalty. Without giving up old 
loyalties I shall annex new ones. There will be evolution in my loyalty" (1995, 63). 
Loyalty to loyalty ensures that individuality is preserved in the process of social 
interaction as one's loyalties intersect with others. New loyalties develop and eventually 
connect the disparate loyalties. 
The World and the Individual and his understanding of order are essential in 
thinking about his mature work in The Problem ofChristianity. These ideas laid the 
foundation for his theory of interpretation and mark its development in his understanding 
of time and the community process and what he later calls communities of interpretation. 
In thinking about the problems of cultural diversity, Royce provides us with a 
philosophical critique ofmethods that do not socially interact with others and encourages 
the wanderer/philosopher to engage in socially interactive methods of travel that demand 
a departure from one's home and seek the intennediary road of knowledge. With each 
new connection, one returns home with a new vision of possibilities for one's own 
community. One ultimately is able to establish the connections and find the relationships 
that bring the various aspects of one's experiences to a larger unity. 
Self-Consciousness and the Community of Interpretation 
Both the postulate of betweenness and the theory of order reveal the social 
ontology embedded in Royce's understanding ofthe self. In his theory of order, the 
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ethical character of a collection is predicated on the individual's relationship to other 
individuals in the collection. His postulate ofbetweenness can be understood in a dual 
sense, as a methodological starting point in thinking about relationships between 
individuals and also as a logical principle guaranteeing the possibility that disparate 
individuals are indeed related to something outside their own individuality. The 
community serves as the larger collection one lives in and inhabits. Following his 
understanding of order, however, the community serves as the larger order because it is 
constituted by the individual's relationship to other members in the community. Thus, 
the community cannot be conceived as an aggregate social group, but a living situation 
that grounds the individuality of its members. 
One aspect of Royce's social theory of the self involves a commitment to 
complexity and variation in our social life. In Royce's essay, "Consciousness, Self 
Consciousness and Nature," we learn that social communication presupposes that there 
must be "other experience than mine, not merely as possible experience, but as actual 
experience" (1901, 438). Self-consciousness arises from processes of imitation when we 
observe our fellows in communication within a social environment. In The Problem of 
Christianity, Royce further argues that human conduct is predicated on a social 
environment. Other "foreign" individuals or communities "startle" us out of our 
individual bubble and socially interfere with our normal day-to-day activities. For 
Royce, this constitutes the beginning of self-inquiries, which "train us to higher and 
higher grades and to more and more complex types of self-consciousness regarding what 
we do and why we do it" (2001, 108). His social ontology suggests that the more 
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complicated activities we engage in that "startle" us out of our isolated individuality, the 
more we become self-conscious of ourselves and thus are able to understand the reasons 
why we act ethically. The more routinized, insular, and predictable lifestyles we create 
for ourselves, the less self-consciousness we develop and are less able to reflect upon our 
ethical conduct. The more uniform our understanding is of our social environment, the 
less we are able to understand the implications ofhuman conduct. It is the "conscious 
imitation and conscious social interaction between man and man - these are the sources 
of each man's consciousness of his own conduct" (Royce 2001, 108-9). The correlative 
analysis of complexity and self-knowledge abides by Royce's understanding ofthe open 
character of serial orders and communities. This also suggests that interpretation is never 
complete and is always open to the anomalies of experience. Rather than rejecting this 
complexity, Royce sees its fruitful possibilities in positioning us to a perspective greater 
than our own. Keeping the dual commitment of the postulate of betweenness in mind, it 
is important to think about how the need for complexity relates to "communities of 
interpretation." 
Royce understands the self engaged in processes of interpretation of its past in 
order to define its present and shape its future. Expanding on Peirce's theory of signs, 
interpretation for Royce consists of three elements and forms a triadic relation. The first 
element is the term that is being interpreted, A. The second element is the term in which 
the interpretation is directed towards, B. The third is the mediator or translator that 
serves as the basis for the interpretation, C. This triadic relationship forms a determinate 
order, C interprets A to B. In this case, C brings some determinate order to the dyads, A 
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and B (2001, 287). One important implication to the triadic structure of interpretation is 
that the interpretation itself, C, becomes a new term that is open to interpretation as well 
and is also open to be placed in some determinate order. Every new interpretation 
becomes a term or sign that requires interpretation (2001, 290). The process of 
interpretation anticipates future relationships and order. 
In communities of interpretation, Royce temporalizes the many aspects of the self, 
insisting that "a self is, by its very essence, a being with a past" (2001, 244). It is the past 
that also defines communities and marks its difference between a group at a picnic or a 
dangerous mob (2001,243). For Royce, human deeds are a record for others to 
remember, and this reveals the fact that the self is not "mere present datum, or collection 
of data" (2001, 245), but is an interpretation of the meaning behind one's life activities, 
which includes various social histories that we inherit. A community, thus, is formed by 
the interpretation of many selves understanding themselves in relationship to some 
historical event that provides a common organizing past. The New Zealander's memory 
of his ancestors arriving on a canoe serves as this reminder that a common past links the 
many individual members to form a community, thus enabling the proclamation among 
its members to claim "We are a community." The hopes and desires of the self are 
intimately connected to its relationship to her past. Royce argues that a community of 
memory is formed when each of its members accept "in his own individual life and self 
the same past events that each of his fellow-members accepts" (2001, 248). Loyalty to a 
cause involves a commemoration of certain past events that make the development or 
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history of the cause shared by many people, which underscores the personal and affective 
relationship one has with one's community. 
Moreover, the self also projects its future in relationship to the past events. In a 
community of expectation or a community ofhope, the individual members not only 
share the personal or affective relationship with the past, but are also able to form life 
plans along with the community. Jacqueline Kegley understands this process as a 
personal narrative one creates ofherself in relation to a community. She argues that 
"identities have a collective aspect" (Kegley 2005,222) and this phenomenon can be 
understood within Royce's notion of a community of expectation or hope. In this sense, 
the individual is not only defined by the interpretation of one's own past, but also by 
one's interpretation of the future. In other words, one is able to create a life plan for 
oneself with the ideals of one's community in view. Following the dual commitment of 
the postulate of betweenness, while communities are linked to a common past, 
communities also operate much like an open serial order that allows for multiple 
transformations relative to how one interprets one's own future expectations relative to 
one's commitments to their community. According to Royce, "The concept of the 
community depends upon the interpretation which each individual member gives to his 
own self, - to his own past, - and to his own future" (2001,249). Understanding a 
community in this way allows us to view the unity of many selves in light of a historical 
and living community, rather than an abstract principle of social pluralism or a collection 
of individuals as a mere aggregate body. 
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The triadic structure embedded in a community of interpretation allows for the 
possibility that any of its members can serve as mediator. New communities of 
interpretation can form once the members change their positions in the triad of 
knowledge, since there is a determinate order to every reconfiguration of positions within 
a community of interpretation. In this case, the ideal observer is not reducible to a single 
person but is, as Joseph Orosco argues, an attitude of public discourse. Orosco 
understands Royce's concept of "community of interpretation" in the context of 
globalization as a "communicative framework of cooperation among the actual existing 
communities of humanity that will facilitate their mutual understanding" (2003,210). 
The community of interpretation's triadic structure allows for the possibility that 
autonomous agents are "brought into conversation" without trumping one another with 
their own interests. Rather, the role of the interpreter strives to develop "mutual 
understanding oftheir differences, as well as their areas of overlapping concern" (Orosco 
2003,210). Thus, communities of interpretation both encourage mutual understanding 
by sustaining unique community differences and bring disparate communities together by 
creating intersecting perspectives that bridge divergent interests. 
Royce's Transnational Provincial Loyalties 
Once the betweenness relation is charted throughout Royce's metaphysical and 
ethical works, one of its social and political manifestations emerges in his notion of a 
"wise provincialism." Opposed to any abstract notion of citizenship, Royce returns to a 
sense ofprovincialism that emphasizes the specific commitments and interests of one's 
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more intimate community. However, both Smith and Trotter worry that too strong a 
devotion one may hold to their ethnic community would result in a kind oftoxic 
nationalism, which prevents the possibility of any kind of unity beyond the province. It 
is important to point out that both views ignore the realities of immigrants' day-to-day 
lives as inescapably participating in the dominant social values of their host country. 
Provincial loyalty, as Royce understands it, bears much resemblance to Randolph 
Bourne's sense oftransnational identities, which constantly re-make the American social 
fabric. 
Bourne articulates four components in a trans-national view of America, which 
share Royce's notion of the betweenness relation. First, the principle of interaction 
manifests in a need to move away from an abstract identity, such as the "melting-pot" 
metaphor to an identity based in lived experience. Immigrants' "diverse nationalistic 
feelings" (Bourne 1916, 86) should not be perceived as alien or unpleasant, but rather 
underscore an epistemic location through a principle of interaction that seeks to engage in 
practices of travel and translation to make sense of their multiple commitments within 
various countries. Second, the principle of voluntarism arises in Bourne's emphasis on 
the importance for immigrants to retain their loyalties and commitments to their country 
of origin. This entails that immigrants should not be subject to the imposition of a 
singular Anglo Saxon immigrant narrative ofbelonging. Third, a trans-national America 
"reweaves" the social fabric of America by forming a distinct and interactive 
international community where a cosmopolitan spirit is made through the experiences of 
immigrants traveling back and forth and making the necessary social adjustments. 
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Fourth, growth emerges as a creative act when immigrants "blindly [strive] to weave 
themselves into a novel international nation, the first the world has seen" (Bourne 1916, 
95). Growth, for Bourne, represents the myriad crossings between countries, keeping an 
open (nationally porous) view ofthe American self and rejecting any forces that 
"confine" our thinking or any attempts to "dye the fabric one color" (1916,96). 
Rather than view Royce's provincial loyalties as leading to sectionalism or as a 
strategy of ethnic reductionism by subordinating one's ethnic commitments to a larger 
community, it is important to keep in mind the betweenness relation within Royce's 
thought. The first requirement of the betweenness relation involves the desire for 
unification of divergent entities. In the case of distinct countries, the transnational space 
of exchange and travel provides infinite ways in which countries can be related. While 
choice may not characterize the reasons why travel is conducted in every case, choice is 
important in directing and creating the translation between the different countries. The 
principle of voluntarism suggests how one's home is re-made through practices of travel, 
thereby ensuring that the connections are maintained. However, these choices are bound 
up in communities that continually mediate between the home and adopted countries. 
These communities might be thought of as border communities of interpretation that 
emerge because of the persistence of travel and exchange that occurs on an international 
level. These communities, insofar as they unite multiple communities, are "communities 
of interpretation" that strive to unify the diverse national and provincial tendencies of 
individuals and provinces. 
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The second requirement of the betweenness relation involves the attitude of 
openness to other foreign influences. Part of the consciousness of the provincially loyal 
involves a constant "longing for the improvement of the community" (Royce 1967,102). 
In this sense, a wise provincialism is open to foreign influences from abroad. It is a 
consciousness that does not become mired in separatist logic but seeks transnational 
relationships that enable the interpretation of other forms of loyalty in relation to our own 
so as to improve and reassert meaning for our own loyalties. This can only be done when 
provincia110yalties are porous and open to social influences outside of the local 
community to which one belongs. Royce understands provincialism as a form of a loyal 
attitude which "does not mean-a lack ofplasticity, an unteachable spirit; it means a 
determination to use the spiritual gifts from abroad in our own way and with reference to 
our own social order" (1967, 105). Much like the process of imitation central in 
developing self-consciousness, provincialism presupposes a comparative faculty 
necessary in developing a sense ofbelonging to one's home. Royce encourages the 
activity of travel to be practiced by all, even though economic conditions might limit and 
determine the nature ofthese travels. However, travel, in Royce's view, cannot dispense 
with a concept of home. This theme is similar to the one Bourne identifies in his 
characterizations of a transnational America. America cannot be thought of as 
homogenous but as a myriad of crossings between countries. Between one extreme of 
the unwillingness to travel and the other extreme ofbeing a lost wanderer, Royce's 
notion of travel encourages a reflective element that seeks out the education of foreign 
influences while always maintaining an anchor to one's home. Home is never a place 
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one leaves completely and travel reasserts its meaning. This transnational conception of 
provincialism allows us to understand the importance ofputting our own provincial 
loyalties in relation to a social experience outside one's own community. 
Finally, understanding a wise provincialism as a form of consciousness allows us 
to see transnational circuits of exchange as participating in the interpreting process of 
belonging to a home. While provincial loyalties are specific and particular, they are 
never closed and fixed. A sense ofbelonging understood as a provincial loyalty is an 
infinite process in much the same way a middle point insistently arises between points on 
a number line. Royce offers a view of transnational provincial loyalties as both processes 
of discovery as well as invitations for the individual to assert freedom. In this way, one 
can see how transnational migrant communities can never be understood as closed 
communities as Smith and Trotter might suggest. Not only do immigrant communities 
continually interact with dominant culture out of a need for survival, but in so doing, 
border communities emerge between immigrant communities and larger communities. 
To the extent that these communities make survival and growth possible, variety and 
multiplicity of various provincial communities should be fostered and maintained. Royce 
understands this variety and attention to provincial loyalties as integral in understanding 
the larger plight of the community ofhumanity. In the Hope ofthe Great Community, 
Royce argues: 
The distinct national unities must remain intact, each with its own internal motive 
for loyalty and with its modes of expression whereby the loyalty of its individual 
citizens will be won and sustained in the community ofmankind, which the ideal 
future must contain if humanity is to be really saved (1916,53). 
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Royce suggests that provincial loyalties maintain a superpersonal perspective that views 
the loyalties of others as tied to one's own. A citizen of the world is not loyal to an 
abstract notion of humanity, nor does she subordinate her loyalties to a larger community. 
She is loyal to a real province and, for some, a real ethnic community that serves as a 
basis for understanding one's sense ofbelonging to the larger community ofhumanity. 
According to Royce, "the loyal indeed are always home" (1995, 43). The loyal are 
always home because one remains connected to their sense ofhome and to their sense of 
community regardless ofhow far they depart from home both physically and mentally. 
Being at home for the loyal subject is a process of interpretation within the context of 
displacement and sense of loss. Royce provides some important resources in thinking 
about Anzaldua's insistence of carrying her home whenever she travels (Anzaldua 1999, 
34). In this sense, transnational provincial loyalties relate distinct communities together 
even as they form an ideal extension of the selftowards a community ofhumanity 
recognized through our specific commitments to our own particular communities. 
Moreover, this understanding of Royce's notion of provincialism connects with 
Addams' work at Hull House in two ways. First, Hull House became a transnational 
space that sought to link the immigrants' sense of home from their country oforigin to 
their process of settlement into the host country. This process of relation does not view 
the ethnic commitments of the immigrant as separatist or closed and hence subordinated 
under a larger collective identity, but views the process of settlement necessarily 
engaging and interacting one's ethnic commitments, customs, and ideals, which quite 
possibly changes the very nature of the identity of the larger collective. This kind of 
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interpretation was inspired by efforts such as the Labor Museum and the art gallery at 
Hull House. 
Second, Hull House's project of social change was experimental in scope. The 
nature of boundary spaces involves an attitude of openness and fluidity. The interaction 
is constantly in flux and requires a more flexible approach in genuinely addressing the 
concerns of the immigrant neighborhoods. A settlement project that is geared towards 
rigid rules and abstract principles prevents the possibility for mutual exchange and social 
transformation. Thus, it is important to see Hull House as a boundary space of 
interaction that does not reject one's ethnic commitments, but seeks to bring into relation 
multiple homes to which we belong in the process of settling in a new community. New 
identities emerge within this interaction at the boundary spaces of community. 
In the next chapter, I wish to concretely show how notions of travel and home 
work together in defining the space between. Travel and home have been used in 
feminist theory to articulate feminist coalitions of solidarity, given the fractured state 
feminist politics in light of the concerns raised in identity politics. I tum to feminist 
theory at this point to show how the metaphysics of belonging are contextualized within 
political discussions of coalitions, which envision future possibilities for larger unified 
communities. This understanding of community plays an important role in understanding 
how the multicultural subject is brought into relation within a larger transnational vision 
of community. 
130 
CHAPTER V 
"HOME-MAKING" AND "WORLD-TRAVELING" IN FEMIIST POLITICS: 
CONCEIVING THE BORDERLANDS IN TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST 
COMMUNITIES 
The answer is never just to completely 'let go' or 'transgress,' but neither is it to always 
'contain yourself' or 'repress.' There's always some liminal (as opposed to subliminal) 
space in between which is harder to inhabit because it never feels as safe as moving from 
one extreme to another. 
bell hooks (1994, 211) 
Travel and horne are corollary concepts that work together to frame a metaphysics 
of belonging and are crucial resources in conceiving the nature of transnational identities. 
Understanding care within a transnational space situates one's responsibilities to distant 
others in more concrete terms rather than relying upon abstract notions of humanity. 
Moreover, Royce shows us that a wise provincialism assumes a porosity between 
communities, and travel enables a community to learn and realize its connections with 
other communities. However, as I argued in Chapter One, horne may be a confining 
concept for women or those who deviate from the social norm of the horne. Additionally, 
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homes may not be hospitable to many people who must leave home and never return. In 
this sense, home is understood as a place, and travel, it might appear, depends on the 
notion ofhome as a place that one leaves. 
Elizabeth Bohls problematizes this notion of travel and home in the context of 
slavery. She asks, "Can a slave have a home? Can a slave be a traveler?" (2005, 45). 
Bohls begins with an understanding ofOrlando Patterson's notion of the "natal 
alienation" experienced by slaves. Since the masters have defined homes for slaves, 
Bohls argues, "a slave cannot have a home in the way that a free person can" (2005, 54). 
However, for Bohls, a notion ofhome is operative within the slave narratives ofMary 
Prince, who restores her humanity in two ways that reference home. First, Prince's 
yearning for her native place denies "the slaves' natal alienation" (Bohls 2005,60). The 
yearning is understood as Prince reflects on her commitments to her family. Second, 
Prince links her connections with her family and her country and hence becomes a kind 
of cosmopolitan: "learning and growing through her involuntary or quasi-voluntary 
travels, each journey moving her further toward the sense of self she will need to narrate 
her life story for publication" (2005, 61). This sense ofhome underscores a process of 
making an identity for a slave woman, such as Mary Prince, within social conditions that 
strip a home from her. 
Much like Mary Prince's understanding ofhome, the kind of home that I seek to 
recover is a home in process, and hence I see home in the active sense of "home­
making." Home, in the transnational sense, gives one a way of staking oneself and one's 
community in the process of transformation in encounters with other foreign 
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communities. In this sense, notions of travel and home enable the possibility of resisting 
homogeneity by transforming one's communities relative to the encounters with other 
foreign communities. 
In this chapter, I examine how travel and home percolate into attempts in feminist 
theory to cultivate feminist coalitional communities, given the fractured state of feminist 
politics due to the concerns of difference raised in identity politics. I examine the 
theoretical space-between, in feminist theory through the lens of a metaphysics of 
belonging framed by notions of travel and home. Feminist theory has a history of 
examining the fundamental nature of the space between in thinking about categories of 
"woman" and strategies for coalitional politics. This provides a more concrete context to 
envision how travel and home may provide important resources in understanding the 
nature ofthe multicultural self. Patricia Hill Collins observes the "interlocking" nature of 
oppression and how a "matrix" of domination exists that affects the diverse "axes" of 
identity (1990). This powerful theoretical approach in criticizing dominant epistemology 
highlights methods of intersectionality crucial for understanding women's lives. In many 
ways, feminist theory has been a leading force in the academy and activist activities in 
realizing the importance of the space-between. 
One of the main theoretical contributions in thinking about the space-between is 
Maria Lugones' notion of "world-traveling," which addresses the problems of exclusion 
in feminist coalitional politics. This groundbreaking concept has been cited in numerous 
fields outside of feminist theory, including political theory, philosophy, social science 
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research, and medical ethics.28 The importance of this work not only exposes the need 
for a model of understanding relationships between disparate individuals, but also 
highlights the importance of recovering social boundaries as a space of encounter, rather 
than rendering this space as marginal or merely as marks of separations and distinctions. 
"World-traveling" is an excellent metaphor that relates to one's lived experience at the 
social boundaries of what is familiar and what is foreign. I find Lugones' concept of 
"world-traveling" inspiring and foundational to the project of recovering the space 
between in feminist theory. Because of the importance of this concept, I seek to examine 
how this concept is taken up in feminist theory and also to show how "world-traveling" is 
associated with a correlate concept of "home-making." 
My basic strategy in this chapter is to examine this notion of home-making within 
the landscape of feminist intersectional theory, then to assess critically two strategies of 
world-traveling that address feminist coalitional politics, arguing that both strategies lack 
the corollary concept of home-making. Finally, I show how transnational feminist theory 
revives this notion of home, as a process, in their understanding of world-traveling and 
thus provides an important contribution in addressing the state of feminist coalitional 
politics. 
The Landscape of Intersectionality in Feminist Theory: Situating Home-Making and 
World-Traveling 
In this section, I would like to contextualize the discussion ofhome-making, 
world-traveling, and the space-between in feminist theory with three important 
28 See Suzanne Jaeger's "World-Traveling as a Clinical Methodology for Psychiatric Care" (2003). 
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theorists/activists (Kimberle Crenshaw, Bernice Johnson Reagon and Gloria Anzaldua) 
who have made significant contributions in developing a theory of intersectionality. In 
examining these three theorists, I want to highlight the tension of home that animates 
their discussion of intersectionality. More specifically, Crenshaw and Reagon wrestle 
with a notion ofhome as a place (which can be confining) and offer the negation ofhome 
(not at home) as a way of resisting the limitations of home. However, in leaving home, 
Crenshaw and Reagon envision another kind ofhome that seeks social transformation 
and hence does not completely abandon the notion of home. Anzaldua brings together 
this tension ofhome and underscores the process of social transformation in her 
understanding of the borderlands. 
Crenshaw's important contribution in critical race theory includes an analysis of 
the intersection of race and gender. In "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color," Crenshaw examines the intersections 
of race and gender and shows how a singular approach in understanding identity fails to 
address the complexities of the lives ofwomen of color in the context of violence. While 
identity politics serves as a way of recognizing the social constructedness of identities, it 
nonetheless "conflates or ignores intragroup differences" (Crenshaw 1995,357). For 
women of color, this conflation of their identities resulted in political and social 
inequities, which rendered situations of domestic violence invisible and unintelligible in a 
social and political system that was meant precisely to help women in situations of 
violence. 
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While Crenshaw develops a theory ofintersectionality to address violence against 
women of color, she understands an intersectional framework also to "mediate the 
tension between assertions ofmultiple identity and the ongoing necessity of group 
politics" (1995,375). An interesting element in Crenshaw's notion ofintersectionality is 
that categories, such as woman or Asian or middle class, need not be stripped of all 
meaning as they can serve an important function in coalitional politics. While these 
categories have been created by power and used to marginalize groups, the problem with 
these categories is not their existence, but "the particular values attached to them and the 
way those values foster and create social hierarchies" (1995, 375). Thus, Crenshaw 
views categories of identity as sites of agency in which subordinated groups "can and do 
exert in the politics ofnaming" (1995, 375). Rather than eliminate the categories of 
identities, Crenshaw believes that a source of agency for subordinated groups would 
"defend a politics of social location" (1995,375). 
Her defense for the importance of social location seems curious after she 
systematically exposes the rigidities of social identities, which leave women of color who 
occupy multiple social locations vulnerable to structural inequities and violence. So what 
do group identities amount to, for Crenshaw? Ultimately, Crenshaw views categories of 
identities as "coalitions, or at least potential coalitions waiting to be formed" (1995,377). 
Rather than view identities as rigid and fixed, identities are formed as multiple and 
intersecting social collectives. In the context of anti-racist politics, intersectionality 
would reconceptualize race as a coalitional concept for both men and women of color 
rather than as an inert, fixed identity. Understanding identity as a coalitional concept 
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emphasizes that the agency of subordinated groups in determining the meaning of their 
identities is an active process that negotiates the multiple and intersecting aspects of their 
social identities. 
According to Crenshaw, a coalitional identity understands social group identities 
as '''home' to us, in the name of the parts ofus that are not made at home" (1995,377). 
Here Crenshaw seems to shift between a notion of home as a place that may be confining 
for those who are marginalized and a notion ofhome as a coalition that entails a sense of 
possibility and a process ofbecoming. The sense ofbeing not "at home" assumes an 
encounter with differently situated others in a social group. Intersectionality highlights 
the space-between, which requires "a great deal of energy and arouses much anxiety" 
(1995, 377). It is a social space created at sites where identities intersect or encounter 
one another. However, the notion ofhome as a place from which one must depart need 
not saturate the term of home as a fixed geographic location. In fact, Crenshaw highlights 
the sense of home as a flexible ideal of belonging, an imaginative space that seeks to 
make the necessary connections between diverse social actors. Home, in this sense, 
reveals a sense ofliminality, of betweenness, that invites potential coalitions and 
connections to be made. 
Bernice Reagon Johnson in her speech to a 1981 West Coast Woman's Festival in 
Yosemite takes a more critical approach to the notion of home, as she pares down the 
notion of home to a "barred room." While the barred room initially is a nurturing place in 
which one's sense of self is developed in a community, the barred room also functions as 
an exclusive place. "In fact, in that little barred room where you check everybody at the 
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door, you act out community" (Reagon 1983,358). Community grounds one's identity 
through acts of exclusion. The only way in which "coalescing" can be done is to open 
these barred rooms, allowing those who are different to one's community enter and 
mingle within the barred room. At this point, Reagon observes, "And it ain't home no 
more. It is not a womb no more. And you can't feel comfortable no more" (1983,359). 
Coalescing is a process that seeks a disruption of home. Those who were "outsiders" to 
one's community now disrupt the nurturing space of home. The home that served as a 
ground for one's identity is uprooted and displaced. 
However, for Reagon, this sense of displacement, of leaving the womb, is a 
necessary step in developing coalitions. For Reagon, "Coalition work is not work done in 
your home" (1983, 359). While home may again serve as a limiting concept that 
prevents the possibility for coalition building, Reagon invites the audience to seek out a 
liminal space that departs from understanding home as a fixed place in order to develop 
coalitions. This liminal space that we enter when leaving home is fraught with tension 
and demands persevering effort. In this sense, commonalities between disparate groups 
must be created and developed in a social space, rather than intellectually fashioned. The 
social space is a space of action. The departure from home, from the barred room, need 
not imply a wholesale rejection of a place of comfort. The departure from home situates 
the self in between homes, in between identities, in order to form alliances. Thus, leaving 
home immediately places us in the space-between, which seeks further alliances with 
others who are culturally and socially different. In this way, Reagon maintains a sense of 
home as a coalition, as a process that seeks a collective belonging. However, the process 
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of coalition building, ofmaking a home, must be engaged as a place of action. Coalitions 
are not fixed centers or closed homes but processes that change the nature ofhomes. 
Rosemary Marangoly George views Reagon's sense of identity as "mini-coalitions," 
which evoke a temporary sense ofhome, "yoking together sexuality, race, gender, class, 
and countless other ideologies working toward locations where all ofme could feel at 
home for the time being" (George 1996,33). This interpretation of Reagon underscores 
the tension ofbelonging that comprises the seWs departure from home as well as the 
need for the self to develop coalitions with others who are differently located. The 
boundaries of communities represent the space in which belonging is created through 
effort and where communities are constructed without rigid borders. 
In my analysis, I argue that while both Crenshaw and Reagon take a critical 
stance-in varying degrees-to the notion of home, both their respective approaches to 
intersectionality and coalition resonate a sense of belonging and a sense ofhome 
conceived in a liminal space in between communities and identities.29 In this space-
between, home cannot be conceived as rigid or fixed and hence cannot be wholly viewed 
as a closed place where one is nurtured and isolated from the social realm. Home 
motivates our very yearning for belonging. This evokes a reflective process that 
continually demands one's re-interpretation ofthe self. This can be understood as the 
"insistent middle" that keeps emerging between the disparate points Royce discusses. 
The "insistent middle" represents the psychological longing for connections between 
homes in the experience of displacement. It is not something that can be repressed but 
29 This aspect in their work recalls Royce's self-reinstating principle. The very act of negating home 
necessarily brings the notion of home back into their theories. This exposes how the space-between 
engenders a principle of inclusion. 
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rather embraced. Gloria Anzaldua's seminal work Borderlands/La Frontera: The New 
Mestiza offers an embodied experiential account of the space-between in her theory of 
the borderlands, which understands home as both a place of confinement, oppression, and 
exclusion as well as a place that generates a sense of belonging and establishes temporary 
homes, open for further interpretations. 
While Anzaldua understands borders as a "dividing line" that separates 
communities, borderlands are a "vague and undetermined place created by the emotional 
residue of an unnatural boundary" (1999, 25). Similar to the experience of being not at 
home, the inhabitants of the borderlands are "the prohibited and forbidden" (1999, 25). 
The residual emotions of borderlands are fraught with tension and anxiety even as they 
evoke a sense of yearning for connection. Boundaries viewed within the borderlands 
appear "unnatural," fictions created by the arrogance of the dominant community's power 
to name. Borderlands are those physical places that emerge between communities, 
constantly insisting on an interpretation for their existence. 
Nonetheless, the borderlands are homes to those who are multiply oppressed. The 
"psychic restlessness" that Anzaldua brings to her audience demands a departure from 
"the familiar and safe homeground to venture into the unknown and possibly dangerous 
terrain" (1999,35). Borders may provide a safe haven, much like Reagon's notion of a 
barred room; however, for those who are multiply oppressed, the displacement is fraught 
with terror. Anzaldua dislodges a possible treatment of travel as a touristic act in 
response to one's banal life. The border crosser is forced to leave home, and this 
departure reveals the liminal space-between where she lives out of necessity and survival 
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on a "thin edge ofbarbwire" (1999, 35). While borderlands may appear to be antithetical 
to fixed communities, in my view, borderlands evoke a sense of yearning for connection, 
which establishes continuities between homes.3o Anzaldua also describes the borderlands 
as "in a constant state of transition" (1999, 25). This experience manifests in her analysis 
of mestizaje, the process of "continual intermarriage between Mexican and American 
Indians and Spaniards" (1999,27). This process ultimately created a new race, fa raza 
nueva. The process of mestizaje formed under conditions of contact and encounter with 
"gold-hungry conquistadors and soul-hungry missionaries from Mexico," who came 
along with many mestizos and Indians to the American Southwest. While Anzaldua 
highlights the kind of colonial travel enacted by conquistadors and missionaries, she also 
identifies the return of many Indians to their homeland, Aztlan. This return made 
Chicanos "secondarily indigenous to the Southwest" (1999,27). The return to the 
"homeland" is important as it incorporates a mode of travel that maintains a sense of 
home through seeking to sustain otherwise lost cultural centers. The process of mestizaje 
ensures that the "Indian heritage" remains in Mexico and the US Southwest despite the 
persistence of colonialism. However, these lost cultural centers are considerably 
transformed because of this process of interaction. This historical interpretation of 
colonization and return to the homeland anticipates her theory of the self at the 
borderlands. 
30 My interpretation of home in Anzaldua's work is similar to Lugones' interpretation of Anzaldua's border 
subject. In her essay, "On Borderlands/La Frontera: An Interpretive Essay," Lugones is concerned with a 
reading ofAnzaldua's sense of crossing-over as a solitary act. However, she argues, "If rebellion and 
creation are understood as processes rather than as acts, then each act of solitary rebellion and creation is 
anchored in and responsive to a collective, even if disorganized, process of resistance" (Lugones 1992, 36). 
I view this dual response of resistance and creation as a process of home-making, which highlights the 
continuity of the self who border crosses through a process of interpreting and revising communities. 
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In examining notions of the self at the borderlands, many theorists have 
commented extensively on Anzaldua's notion of the self as Coatlicue, la Jacultad, la 
Llorona or mestiza consciousness, but to my knowledge, no one has commented on the 
image ofherself as the turtle. In characterizing the movement of resistance, she explains 
the nature ofher departure from "horne" as follows: 
I was totally immersed en 10 mexicano, a rural, peasant isolated mexicanismo. To 
separate from my culture (as from my family) I had to feel competent enough on 
the outside and secure enough inside to live life on my own. Yet in leaving horne 
I did not lose touch with my origins because 10 mexicano is in m)' system. I am a 
turtle, wherever I go I carry 'horne' on my back (1999, 43). 
The turtle image represents her confidence to rebel and criticize her culture because 10 
mexicano pervades her identity. This embodied commitment to her culture will not 
disappear simply because she leaves her horne. Her notion of travel retains this sense of 
her culture, which anchors her voyages outside of her culture to a sense of place and 
community within the borderlands. These anchored voyages establish, on the one hand, a 
continuity between her "horne" community with the "outside," and yet on the other hand, 
also characterize her reflective process as interactive, where she is able to "live life on her 
own" through skills that involve "being secure" of her identity at "horne" as well as 
having competency in the outside world. The sense ofhorne the turtle represents 
continually re-examines one's community in the hope oftransforrning it. 
Interestingly, this process of interaction she emphasizes is also characterized by 
her "fear in going horne" because she criticizes her cultural traditions, i.e. those that 
enslave women. However, her criticism ofher culture does not mean she is disloyal to 
her cultural community, since she is able to "defend" her culture from non-mexicans. 
142 
Anzaldua's sense ofhome connotes an embodied dimension in the fact that home, her 
commitments, to community are something she can never easily dispense with. Her 
travels are not characterized as autonomous, individual acts ofmovement but as being 
anchored to her community. This prevents her from fully identifying with culturally 
different others because "every sinew and cartilage" ofher body is permeated by "home" 
(1999,43). Her criticism ofher culture is represented at its edges, marked by her 
"leaving home," and thus attempts to ultimately transform her cultural community. 
Anzaldua's use of the turtle reminds the audience of home, both as a nurturing 
place that can also breed oppression, demanding an inevitable departure as well as the 
possibility that homes can be transformed by recognizing the borderlands as an 
interactive place, which invite unknown and possibly dangerous encounters with 
differently situated others. These perilous spaces establish a sense of continuity between 
communities and enable social transformation to take place. Anzaldua represents this 
temporary psychic state of connection in the following way:31 
It passes through my body and comes out of the other side. I collapse into myself 
- a delicious caving into myself - imploding, the walls like matchsticks softly 
folding inward in slow motion...Not the heterosexual white man's or the colored 
man's or the state's or the culture's or the religion's or the parents'- just ours, 
mine (1999, 73). 
The selfis multiply harmonizing into a pluralistic rhythm, slowly engaging the various 
supports of the encounter at the borderlands. The transformation is characterized initially 
as a sense of the selfbeing blocked by the confining forces ofhome as a place. However, 
Anzaldua articulates a process that "passes through her body." The "walls" ofher 
31 I thank Mariana Ortega for pointing this out to me at the First Annual Latina Feminism Roundtable held 
at John Carroll University, April 2004. 
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identity cave in as a new self is fonned. There is a sense in which the experience of 
transfonnation entails that selves are separated and fractured, and yet these chasms are 
overcome by a creation of a new identity that hannonizes the various aspects of the self. 
Coalition emerges as a new identity that involves a transfonnation of the self as well as 
the community. It does not dispense with a notion of home, but seeks a vital 
transfonnation of it: 
And suddenly I feel everything rushing to a center, a nucleus. All the lost pieces 
ofmyself come flying from the deserts and mountains and the valleys, 
magnetized toward that center. Completa (1999, 73). 
Much like Royce's wanderer, Anzaldua seeks to bring together the various aspects ofher 
experiences. This sense of a center, a nucleus, or a home perhaps exists in the space 
between homes. It represents not just a place, but an un-repressible psychic space created 
by the yearning for a sense ofbelonging, for a new interpretation between communities. 
It is the felt presence of the "insistent middle" that animates the condition for the 
possibility of conceiving larger communities. 
Crenshaw, Reagon, and Anzaldua recognize the importance ofhome despite the 
inevitable departures from it. Both Crenshaw and Reagon identify the notion of home as 
confining and hence a place from which to depart. While it may appear as a place of 
nurturance, home, as a place, cannot ground coalitions. Hence the notion of "not at 
home" becomes a place in which coalitions may be constructed. However, "not at home" 
implies another sense of home as a process ofbecoming, a possible future where 
coalitions are fonned. Anzaldua identifies the phenomenological experience that 
captures the notion of home as a limiting condition but also as a process that envisions 
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the formation of new identities within a social collective. Home is never something one 
leaves, but serves as a process that seeks social transformation. It is not fixed or closed, 
but conceived as a reflective process that establishes "mini-coalitions" or "transitory 
homes" that enable the possibility for multiple communities to remain connected. 
Instances of travel indicate possibilities for new connections, new relationships and thus 
serve as a way of thinking about transnational communities. 
World-Traveling Feminists and the Process of Home-Making 
Given the importance of home in thinking about coalitions, I seek to highlight the 
element of "home-making" in an examination of "world-traveling." In my view, 
underscoring the notion of home-making reveals how the project of world-traveling has 
become an important theoretical resource in thinking about feminist coalitional politics. 
Since Lugones' important paper calling for feminists to "playfully world-travel" in order 
to bridge the social and cultural differences between women, many feminists have 
incorporated this concept in projects addressing pluralism. 
In this section, I criticize two feminist thinkers (Christine Sylvester and Sonia 
Kruks) who expand Maria Lugones' concept of "world-travel" as a method of 
understanding empathy between differently situated women. For both theorists, empathy 
serves as the possibility for coalition in feminist politics. While I think both theorists' 
work in empathy is important in cultivating a cohesive feminist politics, I argue that both 
Sylvester's notion of "empathetic cooperation" and Kruks' concept of "respectful 
recognition" fail in addressing the necessity of home and consequently the social 
- ----_._-------------­
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dimensions of interaction, which are foundational to the project of "world travel." In 
response to these feminists' understanding of world-travel, I consider the process of 
horne-making theorized by Yen Li Espiritu in her work with Filipino American 
communities as an alternative model of empathy, which relies on imaginative journeys to 
the worlds of others while recognizing the literal ways in which one is embedded and 
entangled in multiple relationships. 
Responding to the different tendencies in feminist politics, Christine Sylvester 
sees the project of world-travel as "a method of empathetic cooperation" while taking 
into account the differences between women (1995,942). For Sylvester, feminist politics 
should not be viewed as a "lifestyle of feminist ad-ons," (1995, 945) much like the tourist 
who merely passes through without establishing any kind of commitment to culturally 
different others. This kind of subject maintains an underlying "I" or center, which is 
fixed and encompasses her in the familiar borders of horne. The kind of subjectivity 
Sylvester proposes relies on Lugones' notion of world-travel. Sylvester argues, "This 
form ofworld traveling relies on empathy.. .It moves us, in other words, to places of 
subjectivity that shift and hyphenate into the worlds of others" (1995, 946). For those 
who are in privileged positions, world-travel must be willfully imposed. However, for 
some border crossers, world-travel is done out ofnecessity and hence the traveler is not 
necessarily conscious and reflective ofher travels. Between these two modes oftravel, 
Sylvester seeks to understand empathy as neither willfully imposed nor done 
compulsively out of survival, but as "something you do" in a "pluralistic mode" (1995, 
949). 
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Sylvester's overall project is important as it suggests the possibility that women of 
differently situated experiences can develop relationships of solidarity central to feminist 
politics. However, her method is epistemically abstract as it is difficult to understand 
concretely how we are to imagine, let alone act upon, the concept of empathetic relational 
identities. Sylvester gives an example ofAfrican world traveling that entails the narrator, 
Sekai Nzenza, a displaced Zimbabwean in the UK attempting to reconcile her location 
and politics against colonialism, mentally world-traveling to the "historical era of slavery 
in the US for insight into her quandaries" (1995,949). Rather than actually engaging in 
discussions or interactions with those who are affected by slavery or with US anti-black 
racism, this kind of traveling imagines the lives of distant others without actually 
encountering them. This mental world-traveling represents for Sylvester "a hyphenation 
of identity" in which she can be empathetic to a distant world and era, namely the era of 
slavery in the US. In this example, Sylvester is not clear about the processes ofthis 
mental world-travel and how this might develop any kind of empathy. Presumably, 
Nzenza is able to establish a sense of solidarity with US slaves without engaging in their 
lives. In this sense, Sylvester dismisses the interactive dimension or the social space 
between that anchors the self in a social collective. 
The abstract nature of empathetic relational identities, which dismisses the social 
space of interaction, becomes evident in Sylvester's discussion of "empathetic 
cooperation." She describes the world traveler as: 
a subject moving in, through, and around subject statuses of the self and other as 
she goes abroad (read mentally-my insertion). Hers is not a journey of isolation 
that has one wandering around lost in the 'strange' streets of exotica. It is a series 
ofjourneys of empathetic social recognition, of acknowledgement, which lead the 
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traveler into cooperations to 'negotiate respectfully with contentious others' 
(1995,954). 
It is unclear how a mental journey to distant cultures can be understood as "cooperative." 
This assumes that the distant other also has a stake in the interaction. Given the example 
ofbeing empathetic to others who share similar struggles in distant temporal places, there 
is no clear point of interaction. Furthermore, who decides the norms that should guide 
the cooperation? In Sylvester's notion of empathetic cooperation, it is unclear how this 
decision is conducted, particularly if this is an individual mental journey, which need not 
require the interaction with others. Her empathy is a solitary act and does not seek an 
encounter with distant others nor ground her sympathy within a social collective. The 
social collective involves encounters with others where their experiences are recognized 
and playa role in the development of sympathy. Nzenza's world-travels to the distant 
lives of US slaves is a partial and solitary act and does not consider the experiences of 
those affected by US slavery. 
Moreover, Sylvester does not concretely provide a way ofunderstanding how 
privileged persons can "willfully" embrace this notion of identity and how this willful 
embrace can be understood as a process of interaction, where one is in an entangled 
relationship with persons outside of dominant culture. The subject looks more like a 
researcher seeking to learn from others, rather than engaging in the messiness of 
coalitional politics. 
Unlike Sylvester, Kruks attempts to provide a less abstract sense of world-travel 
by highlighting the embodied experiential dimensions to world-travel through feminine 
embodiment. However, Kruks' rendition of world travel, nonetheless, does not address 
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the social experience of interaction or possess a sense ofhome central for understanding 
the project of world travel. Kruks seeks an experiential account of world travel, 
highlighting the affective dimensions of empathy that avoid the problem of full 
identification. In Kruks' mind, Lugones' notion of world-travel assumes not only a 
perceptual or cognitive shift, but an ontological shift as well. Lugones' world-traveler is 
one who can actually "be" the different person and embody their cultural..personality 
(Kruks 2001, 157). Given what Lugones says about her notion of world-travel as 
anchored within a social collective, I believe Kruks misreads Lugones' notion of the 
ontological shift in world-travel as a case of fully identifying with differently situated 
women. I believe this misreading stems from Kruks' failure in understanding the 
ontological significance of the space-between. According to Kruks, empathy can be 
reached between women because of shared similar feminine bodily experiences. 
Ultimately, this allows for the possibility ofunderstanding how empathy can be 
"willfully embraced" by privileged world travelers. 
One example that situates for us what Kruks' notion of world-travel looks like is 
her rendition ofher experience with a Nigerian woman in a battered woman's shelter, 
which illustrates how her notion of feminine embodiment can explain the affective 
dimensions of empathy. This is what she extracts from her experience: First, Kruks felt 
that the social differences between the two women were "temporarily suspended for me" 
(2001, 166). What remained for Kruks was this immediate affective sentient response. 
Second, she felt her body was connected to the Nigerian woman's body as she imagined 
the blows that rained down her face and that her dissimilar pain she experienced was 
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something that was provoked by a feeling-with her pain. Third, because the Nigerian 
woman possesses a female body, Kruks argues that she shares similar key invariants of 
her body with the Nigerian woman. To a certain degree, .Kruks subscribes to a kind of 
sexual solipsism, as she is able to feel-with the Nigerian woman's pain more so than a 
man's physical pain. For Kruks, feminine embodiment does not guarantee a bond 
between all women, but she suggests that it is one of the conditions for the possibility of 
traveling to the other worlds of women. 
In this example, it is clear that Kruks is attempting to concretely account for the 
social dimensions of world travel by highlighting the social settings and institutions that 
characterize her exchange with the Nigerian women. However, while her analysis 
reveals the minimum conditions for cross-cultural interaction, Kruks fails to address the 
processes in which the self is engaged with culturally different others within particular 
social settings. What are the reflective processes that go into the embodied dimension of 
empathy that actually consider the points of views of other differently situated women? 
Her methodology focuses on how the individual world traveler experiences the social 
exchange between women. While feelings of empathy did emerge when she encountered 
the Nigerian woman at the battered woman's shelter, she interpretsfor her a "temporary 
suspension" of social differences between the two women. However, it is a suspension 
that occurs only for Kruks, as she does not consider whether or not the Nigerian woman 
also felt this temporary suspension of social differences. In other words, focusing on the 
capacity of the individual to feel-with another's experiences seems to deny the basic fact 
that the differently situated woman might also feel-with and possibly quite differently to 
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Kruks.32 To deny the other differently situated woman's experience in this way reduces 
her subjecthood to an effect of one's experience, thus preventing meaningful social 
relationships to emerge. In other words, having shared bodily experiences does not 
engage in a mutual process of reflection that generates meaning. 
Moreover, Kruks' methodology of world travel seems to imply a notion of the 
privileged individual traveler. In fact, she specifically makes a case to "venture forth" 
from Reagon's "barred rooms" in understanding feminist solidarity because it is 
contentious and resembles a Hobbsian sense of survival. In this way, her notion of 
world-travel is limited to individual perceptual changes that do not require the presence 
of others or a sense ofhome. As mentioned earlier, the felt anxiety and tension of 
"barred rooms" is predicated on actual interaction, actual "coalescing" with culturally 
different others. Escaping this tension through individual shifts ofmental states would 
not guarantee coalition. While female bodily experiences may be shared in order to 
escape this tension and anxiety, this strategy ultimately seems to escape the space-
between, the space in which social transformation is possible by being enmeshed with 
culturally different others. 
One possible reading of Sylvester and Kruks may suggest that their respective 
strategies of world-traveling involving empathy are a minimal claim in understanding 
differences between women. In other words, empathy, understood as world-traveling, 
serves as the condition for the possibility of entangling oneself in social relationships and 
32 In colonial travel literature, for example, the VvTitings are based on the implicit fact that the colonial 
travelers were the only ones traveling and did not even consider the obvious fact that traveling was possible 
for the natives they were visiting. See Mary Louise Pratt's Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and 
TransculturatlOn. 
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generating meaningful social interaction with differently situated women. However, this 
reading of world-travel limits the notion of travel to individual experiences prior to 
actively seeking out encounters with culturally different others. This view assumes that 
an attitude of sameness must develop prior to an interrogation ofwhat those standards of 
sameness might be. The temporary suspension of social differences that occurs only for 
Kruks already has determined the conditions of the social without considering whether 
the Nigerian woman may also have a role in determining these social conditions and 
individual experiences. The project of world-traveling, as Lugones understands it, pays 
attention to the social (2003, 20). Those who don't pay attention to the social, in 
Lugones' mind, do not travel. The social is something that involves tension and anxiety 
over the conditions that determine the encounter. It assumes that knowledge is partial 
and that meaning emerges within a shared encounter with others rather than assuming 
that isolated individual experiences have a more reliable access to knowledge. It seems 
almost impossible to develop a notion ofworld-traveling prior to any encounter with 
culturally others. Moreover, Lugones understands her notion of travel within the 
experiences of those who are subordinated, in which they practice world-traveling 
everyday. This does not assume a mere perceptual shift in individual states of 
consciousness to distant cultures or to distant social experiences. These shifts are 
predicated on actual experiences of engaging with culturally different others within a 
space-between that occupies multiply located subjectivities. The partiality ofknowledge 
assumes that individual experiences only reveal a limited view of the social interaction. 
This recognition of a lack in knowledge should guide inquiry into the ontological space­
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between, which demands that one actually engages with differently situated others and 
mutually constitute meaning. 
While Sylvester and Kruks may wrongly view the social interaction ofworld­
traveling as formed by individual knowers willfully shifting their perceptions without 
investigating the point of view of another, I believe they are right in pointing out the 
imaginative element in world-travel that moves individual subjects into the space­
between. Espiritu's work with Filipino American communities reveals a sense ofbeing 
"home-bound" as an imaginative process in which Filipinos are "bound for home, and 
they are also bound to and by home" (Espiritu 2003,22). Being "home-bound," in this 
dual sense, centers one's imaginative mental world-traveling to actual commitments one 
may have to one's country of origin or sense ofhome. Espiritu understands the 
immigrants' notion of home as "not only a physical place that immigrants return to for 
temporary and intermittent visits but also a concept and a desire - a place that immigrants 
visit through the imagination" (2003, 10). Hence, there is a literal and symbolic 
component in thinking about the process ofmigration that defines the kind of 
transnational framework informing Espiritu's research (2003, 11). 
Moreover, rather than understanding Filipino displacement in terms of "enforced 
homelessness," Espiritu seeks to reassert a notion of home that many Filipinos have 
articulated "by memorializing the homeland and by building on familial and communal 
ties" (2003, 14). Quoting Rosemary George, Espiritu argues, "imagining a home is as 
political an act as is imagining a nation" (2003, 14). The commemoration ofhome 
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signifies a process that defines one's identity and builds communities despite 
geographical distances. Espiritu argues: 
Memory ofplace is significant because it helps to locate the individual in a 
community, to bind family members together, and to shape personal identity 
(2003, 14). 
According to Espiritu, ties to the homeland through memory are important not only 
because they serve as a "lifeline" for many immigrants, which form the basis of their 
group identity, but they also serve as a source that guides the ways in which they build 
communities and stake their political commitments in their host country (2003, 14). In 
this sense, Espiritu conceives Filipino American identities within a tension of home, 
"between the necessity and inevitability of a desire for 'home' and the accompanying 
dangers of that desire" (2003, 15). 
Home-making places the subject within a process of social interaction as 
immigrants carefully create a home in their host country, while remaining insistently 
home-bound in their country oforigin. Rather than view home as an unproblematic 
geographic location, Espiritu seeks to politicize geography by underscoring the realities 
that "belonging and origin" (2003, 15) are not always the same thing. This kind of 
imaginative journey to distant countries is not abstract, but part of the lived experience of 
those who live in-between nations. This kind of mental world-traveling does not 
dispense with the tension and anxiety of social differences, but transforms this anxiety to 
something else as a political act in their process of home-making. Home-making as a 
concept in social and political life underscores the ways in which the social is realized 
when one "world-travels." Empathetic journeys to other worlds must be anchored to a 
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sense of home, which ultimately guides the social and political sense of one's belonging 
in a social collective. 
"World Traveling" and "Home-Making" in Transnational Feminist Communities: The 
Politics of Belonging in Feminist Coalitional Politics 
My criticisms of Sylvester and Kruks should not suggest that world-traveling is a 
skill that is available to only immigrants and other subordinated, less privileged groups. 
In fact, Lugones makes it clear that white privileged feminists should practice world­
traveling in order to address what Mariana Ortega identifies as their "loving, knowing 
ignorance" (Ortega 2006, 68). According to Ortega, the "loving, knowing ignorance" 
attempts to theorize "about women of color without checking and questioning about their 
actual lives, without actively trying to participate in their actual lives, without knowing 
any flesh-and-blood women of color, or without practical engagement with them" (2006, 
68). Ortega reminds privileged feminists of their fear of "plurality that emerges when 
encountering women of color" (2006, 68). This fear of plurality can also be understood 
as a fear ofhome-making. In contrast to Lugones' sense of engagement in her notion of 
world-traveling, privileged feminists, such as Sylvester and Kruks, ignore the messiness 
of home-making that is corollary to world-traveling. This involves staking one's political 
and social commitments in pluralistic encounters with culturally different others. This 
might entail critically examining one's location ofprivilege. According to Ortega, 
feminism becomes an imagined homeland for many women of color because white 
feminists have guarded the doors of feminism (2006, 71). In this sense, the felt and 
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actual displacement guides the criticisms of women of color, such as Ortega, to 
encourage white privileged feminists to actually engage, not just theoretically include, the 
concerns of women of color. This situates privileged feminist subjectivities in the space-
between, the pluralistic encounters, which places their own theoretical homes in actual 
encounters with women of color. 
In this sense, world-traveling is not just a shift in individual states ofminds to 
distant cultures or social experiences as a method that produces heterogeneity or a 
plurality of selves, in which to resist the traditional notion of the self as an underlying "I." 
World-traveling can also be seen as a method of appealing to a "togetherness or 
continuity," (Ortega 2001, 16) of the self, as Ortega suggests. Relying on Heideggerean 
accounts of the self and the world, the world-traveler self need not assume a "driver," a 
"conductor," or a substantial unified "I" systematizing one's experience. This sense of 
togetherness manifests when Lugones recognizes that in the process of world-traveling, 
the "I" in one world is different to the "I" in another world. This recognition of 
difference need not assume a fractured sense of the self. The recognition of difference 
stimulates a critical reflective process in understanding the continuity of the "I" that 
similarly is recognized in both worlds. Ortega views the world-traveler self as one that 
falls between a traditional model of subjectivity, which posits a unified knower as well as 
a radically fractured subject, lacking any kind of cohesive subjectivity.33 This sense of the 
world-traveler self possesses a sense of home-making, a kind of "differential 
consciousness" (Sandoval 1991) that has more to do with a process ofbecoming, seeking 
33 For an interesting treatment of Ortega's sense of being in-between, see her essay, "Exiled Space, in­
between space: Existential Spatiality in Ana Mendieta's Siluetas Series." 
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unity within cross-cultural encounters rather than assuming antecedent to the interaction 
shared traits or social experiences. The world··traveler seWs sense of unity is lived and 
practiced. According to Ortega, the world-traveler self is "not a mental substance but an 
active self in making, which relates to the world and is capable of reinterpreting the world 
and itself; and a self that is situated in a social and historical milieu" (2001, 19). Given 
the experience ofheterogeneity and plurality, the seWs reinterpretation requires located 
and situated instances oftravel in the process of home-making. It is in this practical sense 
that world-traveling offers a path to solidarity. 
Locating agency within situated historical places and interactions characterizes 
Chandra Mohanty's sense of the self as "transnational." Similar to Ortega's concern that 
Western/white feminists engage in "loving, knowing ignorance," Mohanty seeks to 
challenge the traditional idea that Third world feminism and white feminism are merely 
situated knowledges, consisting of the "add and stir" method of inclusion. Mohanty 
agrees with Sylvia Walby's insight that saw her work as a project of solidarity and shared 
values, one that views feminism as a process of engagement between western/white 
feminism and third world/women of color feminism in defining feminist communities 
(Mohanty 2003,224). According to Mohanty, communities are defined as: 
... the product of work, of struggle; it is inherently unstable, contextual; it has to 
be constantly reevaluated in relation to critical political priorities; and it is the 
product of interpretation, interpretation based on an attention to history, to the 
concrete (2003, 104). 
By understanding experience in the realm of action and engagement as well as place, 
Mohanty understands the local as an important insight in thinking about the global. 
Understanding the local and the global in this way does not assume any universal notions 
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of sisterhood or an "experiential 'unity' among women across cultures" (2003, 120). 
This process of relation is what I have been highlighting in this chapter as a process of 
home-making. 
Home-making, for Mohanty, appears as two themes in her examination ofthe 
state of feminist politics and solidarity, which resemble the two requirements of the 
betweenness relation I articulated in Chapter 4; namely that, first, the insistent middle 
necessarily connects disparate entities and, second, the possibility ofhope that in the 
future, connections will be maintained. The process ofhome-making that is implicit in 
Mohanty's work operates in the space-between, in the intersections of global, racial, 
sexual, capitalistic inequities. Locating the self engaged within these struggles is an act 
of choice. Similar to Espiritu, politicizing geography entails that one's home, understood 
as a sense of belonging, is as much a political act as making a home in a host country. 
While one's travel or one's place ofbirth may not be of one's own choosing, placing 
oneself within relationships of struggle fundamentally centers a sense of belonging and 
provides a sense of unity of the self. One's subjectivity is understood as cultivating a 
sense ofbelonging, which highlights the unity of the subject as anchored within a social 
collective. 
Mohanty's view oftransnational feminist community satisfies the first 
requirement of the betweenness relation, which argues that insistent middles emerge and 
connect disparate entities. Mohanty argues that disparate identities are always connected 
in-between our ethical and political mappings ofboundaries. In "What's Home Got to do 
with it?" Mohanty seeks to challenge the notion that homes are absolutely separate, 
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"based on absolute divisions between various sexual, racial or ethnic identities" (2003, 
86). Reflecting on Minnie Bruce Pratt's essar, "Identity: Skin Blood Heart," on the 
subject ofhome, Mohanty writes: 
The historical grounding of shifts and changes allows for an emphasis on the 
pleasures and terrors of interminable boundary confusions, but insists, at the same 
time, on our responsibility for remapping boundaries and renegotiating 
connections. These are partial in at least two senses ofthe word: politically 
partial, and without claim to wholeness or finality (2003,87). 
According to Mohanty, and unlike Sylvester and Kruks, theorizing experience places the 
theory within the realm of action. The space-between is conceived as acts of choice in 
which the claims of ethics and politics move the subject to establish connections and 
remap boundaries. The insistence of the self as an actor creating her location within 
situated histories and places provides the possibility in which distinct entities will become 
connected. Understanding choice within a paiiieular location ensures that boundaries 
will be remapped in a way that establishes connections. Moreover, this sense of 
connection is partial, never claiming wholeness, finality, and substantiality ofthe self, 
mostly because there are infinite ways in which connections and mappings are 
established. There can be a sense ofunity, but no claim of a final interpretation for 
connections, since the middle point insistently emerges between settled identities. 
This sense of unity that lacks finality positions Mohanty's transnational subject of 
feminist coalitional politics as one ascribing to the second requirement ofthe 
betweenness relation; namely, a sense ofhope is cultivated to ensure the possibility for 
future connections to be remade. The transnational feminist subject provides a more 
concrete account of the development of the multicultural self, opposed to Nussbaum's 
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philosophical exile or Braidotti's nomadic subject. Through a commitment to home, the 
transnational feminist subjectivity anchors discussions of the multicultural selfto actual 
commitments to her community. In her essay, "Sisterhood, Coalition, and the Politics of 
Experience," Mohanty commends Reagon's attention to "our strategic locations and 
positionings" (2003, 118). This strategy locates experience within the ethical and 
political remappings between disparate entities. Mohanty understands the "old-age 
perspective" Reagon uses as a prescription for coalitional politics as a transnational or 
cross-cultural perspective (2003, 119). The "old-age" perspective rejects universal 
abstractions of unity, but is "forged on the memories and counternarratives" (2003, 119), 
on the basis of a politics of engagement that opens up the possibility of self­
transformation with culturally different others. This demands the skill of humility, "the 
gradual chipping away of our assumed, often ethnocentric centers of self/other 
identifications" (2003, 119). Mohanty feels this transnational perspective criticizes 
totalizing "homes" by "going beyond ourselves" (2003, 119). Reagon's call of "throwing 
yourself into the next century" (Reagon 1983, 365), for Mohanty, is a strategy that 
demands that selves must go "beyond ourselves" if one is to take up the task of self­
knowledge seriously. Understanding difference through this epistemological dislocation 
does not result in divisions, but seeks an interpretation, a remapping ofboundaries, that 
demands the skill ofhumility, "a disruption of ethnocentric centers of identities" 
(Mohanty 2003, 119). "Throwing yourself in the next century" demands that concerns 
are not wholly bound up within present differences. Maintaining connections is an act of 
hope that guides future actions in order to sustain communities. 
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I see these two requirements of the betweenness relation exemplified by Mohanty 
as a process of home-making. The necessity of an insistent middle that connects 
disparate entities and the hope, a commitment for the future that connections are 
maintained, reveal the process of agency, the complex processes of belonging, within the 
struggles of a social collective. Mohanty writes, "But location, for feminists, necessarily 
implies self - as well as collective definition, since meanings ofthe self are inextricably 
bound up with our understanding of collectives as social agents" (2003, 122). She also 
suggests that the fragmented nature of the self: the world traveler displaced from her 
home, "must be historicized before it can be generalized into a collective vision" (2003, 
122). In this way, it makes no sense to understand world-traveling as simply a solo 
individual activity that is enacted by privileged world-travelers; a corollary concept of 
home-making must be incorporated in order to highlight how self-definitions are 
collectively created. Feminist solidarity and struggle must be accompanied by acts of 
world-travel as well as home-making in order to guide one's act of choice within a 
politics of location and geography. 
Since there is no final destination or place involved in world-traveling and home­
making, Mohanty understands the self as a "temporality of struggle," in which the self 
must move on and ultimately remap further boundaries and connections. Her notion of 
the self is a continual process of "re-territorialization through struggle that allows me a 
paradoxical continuity of self, mapping and transforming my political location" (122). 
Home-making is a process that pays particular attention to the rootedness of the struggle 
and engagement with multiple commitments in which acts of choice emerge as a process 
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of creation within the space-between. The sense ofpolitical agency generated by this 
concept enables a more grounded interpretation of coalitional communities within the 
dominant society. Beginning with thes.e specific struggles in mind "anchors" Mohanty's 
"belief in the future and in the efficacy of struggles for social change" (2003,123). 
I conclude this chapter with a quote from a speech given by Patricia Evagelista, 
who, at the time, was a 19 year old Mass Communications sophomore of the University 
of the Philippines. This speech was voted unanimously as the winner among 60 other 
speakers from English-speaking countries in an International Public Speaking contest in 
2004. She writes, "Leaving sometimes isn't a matter of choice. It's corning back that 
is." It is important to understand feminist politics avoiding fancied flights to the worlds 
of other women relying on natural or sociological universals34 to sustain solidarity. It is 
important to understand the return to horne as a process of horne-making, a politics of 
engagement and transformation, essential in one's travels. Mohanty's experiences of 
travel and border-crossing "always provoke reflections of horne, identity, and politics" 
(2003, 135). This understanding of world-travel resembles Anzaldua's image of the self 
as a turtle. Carrying horne on one's back provokes questions ofhow the selfis located 
between transnational relationships as one negotiates the terrain of hegemonies and 
exclusions, as well as sites for autonomy. This image of the turtle correlates with the 
image of the anchor. Mohanty and I have used the word "anchor" to characterize the 
attachment of the selfto a social collective. I think "anchor" both summons the 
phenomenological experience ofbeing connected to a secure community as well as the 
34 Mohanty sees sociological universals in the same way as natural universals. According to Mohanty 
"secondary sociological universals" bind "women together in an ahistorical notion of the sameness of their 
oppression and, consequently, the sameness of struggles" (2003, 112). 
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desire for an anchorage when lost at sea. Choosing to anchor or to return to an anchorage 
is an act of choice and should be seen as continuous with the experience of travel. While 
we may see travel as the trope that sYmbolizes freedom and self-discovery, it is important 
to recognize how the process of self-discovery - even through travel - is also a 
fundamental yearning for a home, a process of the self engaging in practices ofhome­
making. In the voyage of self-discovery, one never leaves without an anchor. Through 
the process of home-making, feminist coalitional politics must be anchored within a 
politics of engagement that includes a belief in the future of feminist solidarity. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION:
 
SENSE OF PLACE IN TRASK'S NOTION OF LAND AND ESPIRITU'S
 
NOTION OF HOME: NEW DIRECTIONS IN NATIVE HAWAIIAN AND ASIAN
 
AlVIERICAN IDENTITIES
 
All the chapters in this dissertation stress the importance of the space-between in 
thinking about the ways in which our social, political, and ethical relationships are 
conceived within a transnational framework. Conceiving the nature of identities within a 
transnational framework situates and concretizes our understanding of the nature of 
international communities. In this dissertation, I analyzed the notion of travel as a way of 
thinking about the transitory nature of mobile identities in a transnational world. 
However, in thinking about the space between in a transnational framework, a corollary 
concept ofhome emerges alongside discussions of travel. Travel and home serve as 
important concepts in order to address the ways in which identities are not firmly 
circumscribed within territorially defined communities, nor are they entirely separate and 
free floating from one's community. The space between characterizes the encounters, the 
- -- --- -----------------
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tensions and anxiety ofthe realities of engaging social relationships. I have characterized 
the social element of the space between framed within concepts of the processes of travel 
and home. The space between conceived within a transnational framework fosters a way 
of thinking about difference and continuity without reducing identities under 
homogenous and universal concepts. 
In Chapter two, I discussed how philosophical discussions ofthe cosmopolitan 
self conceive a narrow notion of the cosmopolitan traveler and hence engage in a type of 
"theoretical tourism," which avoids the interactive dimension that the actual practice of 
travel assumes. Nussbaum's cosmopolitan traveler escapes the banalities of lived 
experience and concrete practical actions to an abstract realm ofhumanity that subsumes 
all differences under a common human capacity of reason. In attempting to foster 
tolerance and openness to other cultures, Nussbaum articulates a kind of travel that 
intellectualizes group differences rather than actually encountering culturally different 
others. Braidotti similarly engages in a type of "theoretical tourism" as she posits a 
nomadic subject who is ungrounded from a sense of concrete encounters with culturally 
different others. Rather than conceiving the cosmopolitan subject appealing to a 
transcendent or unified subject, the nomadic subject perpetually travels everywhere. 
Encounters are always shallow since the nomad is constantly moving. This kind of 
subjectivity cultivates a sense of escape, rather than a sense of commitment to the 
cultures in which the nomad visits, and consequently ignores the interactive dimension to 
travel. Both views ignore the space-between as a source for understanding the promise of 
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transnational theory in conceiving a concrete, non-transcendent notion of the 
cosmopolitan subject. 
Chapters three, four, and five articulate the ethical, metaphysical, and social and 
political dimensions in thinking about transnational identities. In Chapter Three, I 
showed how the transnational space between nation-states serves as an important model 
in extending the ethics of care into a global context. Rather than conceiving care as 
parochial or attentive to more local and familial relationships, I championed a concept of 
the transnational doulia principle in order to address transnational dependency workers, 
whose very agency is concealed within transnational relationships of dependency. Jane 
Addams' conception of social ethics and her work with immigrants exposed one's ethical 
obligations closer to home. A transnational space between highlights the ways in which 
one is entangled within a proximate distance with the lives of culturally distant others. In 
this way, care's concern would be directed towards the space-between, characterized as 
transnational relationships of dependency when thinking about the global context. 
Chapter Four highlights the metaphysical and ontological significance of the 
space between in social life. Josiah Royce's "betweenness" relation exposes two 
requirements of the space between. First, the insistent middle always emerges between 
disparate entities and hence maintains both differences and connections. Second, the 
insistency of the middle point also represents a logical security for hope that future 
connections will always be present. These two requirements of the betweenness relation 
frame Royce's notion of provincialism as a way of thinking about the nature of 
transnational identities as an ethical theory of loyalty. The community of interpretation 
166 
represents the "insistent middle"-and meets the first requirement of the betweenness 
relation-that logically and practically emerges between distinct entities, including 
individuals, "provinces," nation-states and so on. The Hope of the Great Community 
represents the second requirement of the betweenness relation in that future international 
communities will emerge out of communities of interpretation. The ontological 
significance of the space between underscores how both travel and home are important 
corollary concepts in thinking about the continuity and transformations that emerge 
between disparate communities. Royce's theory of provincialism underscores how 
transnational identities "reweave" the social fabric ofAmerican life since the process of 
travel seeks out connections between nation-states through their insistence ofmaking a 
home in the host country. In this way, national identities are conceived as porous 
communities, rather than fixed and static nation-states. 
Chapter Five concretely applies the notion of travel and home framed by the 
theoretical space-between in feminist theory's attempts to reconcile the concerns of 
difference raised in identity politics. Thus, I examined how the liberatory potential in the 
project of "world-traveling" is associated with the corollary project of "home-making." 
A result ofthis analysis exposes a transnational feminist subjectivity that satisfies the two 
requirements of Royce's betweenness relation and can serve as an alternative model in 
conceiving the multicultural self, opposed to Nussbaum's philosophical exile and 
Braidotti's nomad subject. 
I find transnational theory promising in the areas of ethics, politics, and theories 
ofthe self in accounting for how identities are lived and created within spaces that restrict 
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and determine as well as recover one's path to liberation. In this way, one's freedom is 
entangled within their commitments to their communities. While transnational selves 
seek to retain their distinctness, a corollary desire to develop connections in their 
fractured existence remains. This, I believe, becomes a promising theoretical resource to 
address the splintered nature of identity politics. By emphasizing a sense of place, a 
transnational framework highlights a social process that continually seeks meaningful 
connections between distinct communities. 
As I conclude this dissertation, I would like to point out future directions in which 
a transnational framework might address problems within itself. Thus, I engage in an 
immanent critique of transnational theory in the following discussion of Native identities. 
Opposed to defining diasporic or transnational identities by pointing out their essential 
features, Clifford seeks to "relationally position" diasporic identities amongst other types 
of identities. Two types of identities that are "caught up and defined against" diasporic 
identities include (l) "norms of the nation-state" and (2) "indigenous, and especially 
autochthonous, claims by 'tribal' peoples" (Clifford 1999, 250). In this dissertation, I 
have only addressed how transnational identities are conceived in relation to a fixed 
conception of the nation-state. I have argued how a fixed understanding of national 
identity is impossible given the growing transnational world that animates contemporary 
global life. I have shown how transnational influences have shaped and changed the 
identity of nation-states. However, I have not considered how my project of "world­
traveling" and "home-making" can be conceived within the "first claims" to the land that 
form the basis ofmany sovereignty claims among Indigenous tribes. 
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The tension of settlement claims between transnational identities and Native 
identities appears with great force in the context of Asian Americans in Hawai'i. Asian 
American and Pacific Island American identities have historically been elided together as 
recognized group identities in academic scholarship, such as the designation 
Asian/Pacific American (APA), Asian and Pacific Islander (API), and Asian and Pacific 
Islander American (APIA). The assumption here is that Asian American and Pacific 
Island identities share a history of exclusion within US dominant narratives of citizenship 
and national discourses of belonging. These groups formed as a way of creating 
coalitional communities in order to voice their shared political agendas (Nomura 2003, 
19). Both group identities have suffered the yoke of racism, sexism, and imperialism 
from US colonial ideologies and domestic and international policies. However, recent 
literature concerning Asian American identity issues has sought to recognize differences 
between the two ethnic groups. The importance of this demarcation is forcefully 
presented by Native Hawaiians, who argue that both groups have distinct political 
agendas and interests. While the Native Hawaiian seeks sovereignty and self­
determination, the Asian American immigrant seeks civil rights and participates in 
existing US constitutional procedures. The elision between Native Hawaiians and other 
Pacific Island American people with Asian American identity is a false association where 
the contradiction is exposed in their distinct political projects relating to sovereignty and 
civil rights. Moreover, any shared political identity, such as APA or API, has historically 
marginalized Pacific Islander voices and concerns (Nomura 2003,20). 
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Given the rise ofthis criticism, scholarship has responded in seeking out ways in 
which Asian American identities can address their own practices in their host country 
with the indigenous population, which historically preceded their arrival. In 1998, the 
editors of the anthology Q & A: Queer in Asian America recognized arguments about the 
peculiarities of eliding Asian and Pacific Islander identities together and have chosen to 
"not use the designation 'Asian Pacific Islander' (API)" (Eng & Hom 1998, 19). Rather, 
they encourage "further examination of the intersection of and interaction between Asian 
American and Pacific Islander contexts" (Eng & Hom 1998, 19). In 2000, Amerasia 
Journal sought to consider this issue in further detail and released a special edition on 
this subject. The editor of this edition, Candace Fujikane, calls for a reexamination of 
Asian American Studies objectives, which traditionally have been built on "local" 
narratives and immigrant perspectives. She argues in her introduction to this issue that 
Asian settlers in Hawai'i and on the continent must "hold ourselves accountable for our 
actions" (2000, xxi) and thus must understand the ethical implications of travel, even as 
immigrants who are products of US imperialism. 
Recently, some attention has been given towards seeking out ways in which 
Asian/Pacific Islander American can be theorized together. In the introduction to the 
anthology, Asian/Pacific Islander American Women: A Historical Anthology, Gail 
Nomura carefully elides these identities together without "suggesting that Asian 
Americans and Pacific Islander Americans are a single homogenous group" (2003, 20). 
The editors of this anthology seek to find new ways ofunderstanding the intersections of 
these relationships arid expand research and interpretive frameworks that make it possible 
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for building coalitions between ethnic groups. For Nomura, exposing the heterogeneity 
between and within Asian American and Pacific Islander American identities underscores 
the process of coalition building, a process that takes place at the "borderlands of 
interactions and separations" (2003, 20). 
I seek to continue the process of exploring the intersections ofAsian and Pacific 
Islander American relationships by highlighting not only the ethical commitments Asian 
Americans have with Pacific Islander concerns, but also the need for understanding the 
theoretical frameworks, which serve to demarcate, as well as to build, coalitions between 
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Island and Asian American identities. In attending to the 
transnational space between Asian American and Pacific Identities, I believe a sense of 
place, framed by notions of travel and horne, can serve as a viable political strategy to 
change the conception of the differences between Asian American and Native Hawaiian 
identities. Some of these concepts that constitute the basis of identity include the notion 
ofland as theorized by indigenous perspectives and the concept of horne as theorized by 
Asian Americans seeking coalitional pursuits in politics and Filipino conceptions of 
transnational identity formation. While I do not think I will provide answers in thinking 
about Asian and Pacific Islander American relationships, I hope to provide a theoretical 
outline of the ways in which Pacific Islander and Asian Americans identify themselves, 
underscoring their ontological similarities and differences. Once a clear picture is 
painted of the ways in which identities are constructed within these distinct groups, I 
would like to suggest a way of understanding how concepts such as the land and horne 
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cultivate a sense of place for individuals to be connected with larger ethnic and political 
communities of coalition. 
Pacific Island Identity: Identifications with Land and Ocean Geographies 
In an impassioned essay entitled "Settlers ofColor and "Immigrant" Hegemony" 
published in a special issue in Amerasia Journal, Haunani Kay Trask criticizes the 
dominant political Asian immigrant population in Hawai'i. She argues that Asian 
immigrants, namely the politically dominant Japanese Americans, claim Hawai'i as their 
home, while at the same time deny its indigenous history and continually benefit from 
Native Hawai'ian land dispossession initiated by US colonial powers. Trask calls for a 
distinction between immigrants and Native Hawaiians in order to recognize the distinct 
political positions of people of color whose histories are bound up with US colonial 
practices. Ultimately, Trask argues that all Asian immigrants are what she terms 
"colonial settlers"; i.e. "someone who benefits from stolen Native lands and the genocide 
so well documented against America's Native peoples" (2000, 20). 
Trask argues that the colonial settler ideology is rooted in the "local" identities of 
immigrants in Hawai'i. Part of this local identity submits to the immigrant tale where 
hard work and perseverance will earn political and economic power and success. It is 
important to note that this immigrant tale that gives rise to "local" identities in Hawai'i is 
influenced by domestic and American values. In other words, "local" identities see no 
difference between Native Hawaiians, Asian immigrants, and haole settlers. We can see 
this criticism in the context ofRoyce's notion of an unwise provincialism, which entails a 
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leveling tendency that mitigates the heterogeneity of a province. 35 According to the 
concept ofthe "local," difference is homogenized and consequently is broadened in a 
leveling way to include both Asian immigrants and Native Hawaiians. This leveling of 
difference between these two ethnic groups initially provided solidarity against the US 
racist and colonialist state, however, "local" identities have consequently masked the 
continued political and land dispossession ofNative Hawaiians as evidenced by the 
JACL (Japanese American Citizens' League) and political leaders such as Daniel Inouye 
(Trask: 7).36 
Rather than invoking a settler ideology employing "local" identities, Trask argues 
that Native Hawaiians were forcefully "included" under the paternalistic category of 
"wards" within the US hegemonic state (1993, 26-7). As wards ofthe state, Native 
Hawaiians were robbed of any agency or capacity for self-determination, especially 
recognizing their status as an indigenous people. According to Trask, the US 
Constitution is framed outside the concerns ofNative Hawaiians and thus does not 
constitute Native Hawaiian conceptions of self-identity (1993, 26). Ultimately, the 
forced inclusion ofNative Hawaiians within the political frameworks of the us 
Constitution obliterated the possibility for Native self-determination because this "settler 
document" sanctioned the colonial takeover ofNative lands. Native self-determination, 
therefore, cannot be founded within the frameworks of the us Constitution. us Civil 
35 Under a wise provincialism, Royce views provinces maintaining a sense of heterogeneity. He does not 
view provinces as rigid or fixed but constantly growing and changing because of new influences outside its 
borders. Because of the realities of migration, Royce is concerned with the dangers of the potential 
imperialism of newcomers. Thus, while Royce values heterogeneity in provinces, the danger is that 
newcomers would level all differences within the province and hence prevent its growth. 
36 According to Trask, JACL and Inouye embarked on a smear campaign against Mililani Trask, who 
criticized Inouye's interference in the US Federal reconciliation hearings for Hawaiians. 
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Rights is a strategy built within the perceived rights of the Constitution. Thus, Native 
Hawaiian interests are at odds with the arguments for civil rights among Asian American 
immigrants. 
Since the constitution does not offer Native Hawaiians a political footing to argue 
for their cause of sovereignty, Trask recommends the strategy of "cuItural nationalism" in 
order to facilitate efforts in decolonization. Nationalist efforts challenge hegemony as 
well as create a new way of thinking about Native Hawaiian self-identity, one that dis­
identifies with the US hegemonic state. First World visions of the Pacific archipelagos 
are often associated with images of fantasy and escape and thus, according to Trask, are 
indicative of a "state ofmind" rather than a sense of place and geography. The problem 
with "local" identities for Trask seems to be framed as a problem of rootlessness among 
Asian American immigrants. As a result of their commitment to a US political ideology 
and not to a specific place and geography, "local" identities fail in accounting for Native 
Hawaiian concerns. According to Trask, a failure to understand the geography and place 
ofHawai'i is also a failure in understanding the political motivations for Native 
Hawaiians to seek sovereignty. 
Land and place become important features in understanding Native Hawai'ian 
identity. According to Trask, Native Hawai'ian identity is based on a non-linear 
genealogy. The past, present, and future are interrelated for Native Hawaiians. Rather 
than the Western linear assumption of time suggesting a sense ofprogress towards an 
ideal of civilization, Native Hawaiians view the movement of time as moving towards a 
sense ofharrnony understood as familial. Trask writes, "The land is our mother, and we 
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are her children. If we care for our mother, she will care for us in return. The 
relationship is more than reciprocal; it is familial" (1996, 406). It is this relationship to 
the land, rather than to an abstract political document, that distinguishes the political 
agendas of Asian American immigrants and Native Hawaiians. Trask, moreover, 
identifies not only with the land but also with the sea, namely the Pacific Ocean. The 
ocean, in fact, displaces the "continental" political perspective and supplants it with that 
of "Islander eyes." Islander eyes, for Trask, include familial attachment to the land and 
sea. It is because of this familial relationship with the ocean and land that Pacific 
Islander politics become distinct from Asian American political objectives. ThePacific 
Ocean becomes a site of attachment and contestation in the context of nuclear military . 
projects in the Pacific. Trask argues: 
More the children of the sea than the land, Pacific Islanders know their survival as 
distinct peoples depends on the survival of the Pacific itself. The First World nations 
must still learn what Pacific Islanders have known for millennia: upon the survival of 
the Pacific depends the survival of the world (1993,53). 
The suggestion Trask is making here is that the ocean is a place that orients or orders our 
concern and care since it not only pervades the Pacific archipelagos, but also pervades 
continental or mainland life. How our relationships are ordered is dependent upon our 
relationship to the land and ocean, to a sense ofplace and geography. 
Other Pacific Island nations have also echoed this identification with the land and 
sea. In fact, Pacific Island resistance to the nuclear policies of the Pacific (Tahiti, French 
Polynesia, Fiji, Marshall Islands, and Guam) maintains a notion of identity that is linked 
to the land. In Daughters ofthe Pacific, Lijon Eknilang, a Native Pacific Islander, 
explains: 
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Many people don't really think that our tiny island of Rongelap is very important 
to us. But it is our home. Weare meant to be there. Our land is everything, our 
medicine, our food, our houses, our everyday supply (Ishtar 1994, 33). 
Opposed to Western democratic assumptions of property and ownership, which 
understand the landowner as having "individual rights" and is free to do whatever he or 
she pleases with their land, Eknilang suggests an alternative way of relating to the land. 
The land is what sustains and shelters the people. It is one's home. It is something that is 
shared, not owned. The sickness of the land is directly related to the sickness ofthe 
people. This integral relationship with the land offers an alternative relationship to the 
capitalistic individualistic frameworks ofunderstanding the land. The Western fear is 
that this claim to the land (and it is usually argued by Pacific Islanders in a natalistic 
sense, "we were meant to be here" language) would necessarily exclude all foreigners 
from living in that region. However, relating Trask's argument that a sense of place and 
geography must be cultivated, the invitation is to reconsider the relationship to the land as 
"capital" or "resources" to be used or even as a "state ofmind." The relationship that is 
called to be cultivated is not exclusivity, but a sense of flourishing that does not degrade 
the environment and culture.37 
Asian American Identity - A Process ofHome-making 
Lisa Lowe's influential study of Asian American identity in her book Immigrant 
Acts offers important insights towards understanding the legal and juridical practices that 
have largely defined Asian Americans through passages of various immigrant acts. 
37 In Daughters ofthe Pacific, narratives from Pacific Island nations indicate that tourism can be 
incorporated within a sense of place avoiding capitalistic structures and mass based, large hotel tourism. 
176 
These acts have defined notions of citizenship as well as a sense of belonging for many 
Asian immigrants. One interesting point about Lowe's notion of identity is that it is 
constantly changing, never fixed, and never essentialized. She argues that rather than 
conceptualizing Asian American identity, it would be more accurate to analyze Asian 
American practices. In fact identity and practice seem to refer to the same thing for 
Lowe. The benefit in understanding identity as a practice is that it leaves room for 
transformation and rejects a vertical or unchanging view of cultural identity distinct from 
history and context. 
Lowe provides a compelling argument as to how Asian American identity has 
been policed and regulated by US administrative and legal actions pertaining to 
immigration laws. How one understands citizenship becomes a racialized and gendered 
project, ultimately characterizing Asian American identity as foreign or alien to US 
culture. Lowe points out quite convincingly that Asian American identity, understood as 
alien, contradicts the discourses of assimilation in American culture. Focusing on race as 
socially constructed reveals it's precarious and shifting meanings in light of changing and 
conflicting immigration laws. 
I find it interesting that aspects in Asian American identity consider the original 
horne of the immigrant as a constitutive force in constructing identity. The transnational 
dimensions of Filipino Americans, for example, indicate that Filipinos were already 
defined within an American context in the form of colonization prior to them 
immigrating to the US. These interesting aspects of history are important since the 
immigrant, Lowe argues, challenges the US dominant position by remembering this 
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tainted and violent history of colonization. At the end of chapter 1, she makes a case for 
an alternative vision of community, which resists assimilation and nativist narratives. 
The immigrant, because of their transnational histories of colonial violence, is capable of 
horizontally creating community, rather than vertically assenting to a false ideal of 
multiculturalism, which unfortunately submits to an assimilationist discourse. The 
implication I want to draw here is that it seems that part of this horizontal relationship 
one has with the community is initiated by the material connections the immigrant 
maintains with their original homeland. Transnational elements in Asian American 
identity serve to guide one to develop strategies in maintaining a sense of community. 
This skill seems to be born out of one's split loyalties and commitments to two (often 
distant) places. It is this lived tension that seems to give rise to community building, 
rather than an abstract ideal of diversity. 38 
Since Asian American identity is predicated by different experiences of American 
colonization and exclusion as well as transnational connections unsettling the abstract 
universal vision of US nationalist discourse, Lowe argues that Asian American identity 
can be understood as one ofhybridity, heterogeneity, and multiplicity. The variety of 
experiences from many Asian Americans in relation to race, class, and gender has 
produced a conception of identity as one in process, rather than a fixed state. 
Understanding the multiple layers of social relationships surrounding Asian American 
identity allows for the possibility of conceiving agency within these differential power 
38 It is not surprising in Asian American Studies that there has been a "transnational turn" in articulating 
Asian American experience (See Okamura 2004). A domestic perspective denies the intemationallinkages 
that many migrants feel and experience in their host country. 
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relationships. Agency is best understood as a process of dis-identification, which negates 
the laws and immigrant acts determining one's citizenship and sense of belonging to the 
US and elevates this identity to one of resistance, participating in counter hegemonic 
practices that cannot be separated from one's subjugation. Thus, Lowe argues that 
women of color theorists and activists participate in an immanent critique of the US 
. 39hegemomc state. 
Lowe identifies certain Asian American practices as constituted by a historical 
amnesia ofUS hegemonic narratives, which forget the history of US colonization around 
the world. The counter hegemonic strategy is to underscore a remembrance of this US 
imperial history. Locating Asian American identity within the counter hegemonic 
strategy of remembrance highlights the transnational elements comprising Asian 
American as well as American identity formation. 
While Lowe offers a way ofviewing Asian American identity as one of resistance 
predicated on one's relationship of exclusion to us citizenship, based on the passage of 
immigrant acts, Yen Le Espiritu presents a view of Asian American identity as 
establishing a sense ofplace, consequently establishing a notion of agency, despite the 
"unwelcome practices" of the US dominant society. In Homebound, Espiritu offers an 
interesting perspective in thinking about the relationship between conceptions of the self 
39 Part of this imminent critique demonstrated by women of color activists and theorists emerge in Lowe's 
understanding of the role of testimony and narrative. Lowe argues, "This mode of reading and reception 
seeks to situate different cultural forms in relation to shared social and historical processes and to make 
active the dialectic that necessarily exists between those forms because of their common imbrication in 
those processes. It seeks to understand Asian American cultural production critically and broadly and to 
interpret the interconnections between testimony, personal narrative, oral history, literature, film, visual 
arts, and other cultural forms as sites through which subject, community, and struggle are signified and 
mediated" (1999,157). The point she makes indicates that agency resides in part through processes of 
mediation, which includes our capacity to receive and read women of color's testimonies of oppression and 
abuse. 
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and the dual concept of "home." On the one hand, home is a vision of the self ensconced 
within a collective identity, usually associated with loyalties and commitments to one's 
original home. On the other hand, home functions like a verb, emphasizing the processes 
in which home is constructed not only in the geographical sense, but also in articulating 
the desires, needs, and wants of transnational migrant experience. This aspect in 
Espiritu's work is important since it offers us a way ofunderstanding Asian American 
identity outside the narratives of the nation-state. 
Rather than thinking about Asian American identity, particularly Filipino 
American identity, as one of exclusion (Lowe 1999), Espiritu sees Filipino American 
identity constituted largely by what she terms as differential inclusion. Filipinos were 
understood as US nationals, however, not as citizens. They were allowed to enlist in the 
Navy or to work in the US as cheap labor, but they could not vote. Unlike other Asian 
immigrants, such as the Chinese, the US hostile takeover of the Philippines created an 
atmosphere in which Filipinos were not alien, but were, nonetheless, excluded from the 
benefits of US citizenship. Because of this history, Filipinos were already actively 
engaged in making the US a home for them to "return" to. Seeing how the processes of 
US colonization actually constitute this identity is important in understanding how 
Filipino Americans have envisioned the home-making process in America. 
The experience of Filipino immigrants has been described as transnational, not 
only because US empire building initiated this transnational link, but also because 
Filipino Americans seem persistently to "carry their home on their backs." To return 
home or to leave home can be a literal or physical act, as well as one that takes place in 
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one's imagination. Home functions like a geographical point of analysis insofar as a 
sense of place becomes an important feature in the process ofmaking a home. This 
becomes an interesting image given the complicated nature ofhome. Home can be 
exclusionary, especially if one is a Filipino daughter living in America with conservative 
Filipino parents or if one is gay. Nonetheless, as Espiritu argues, the notion ofhome is a 
site of tension and conflict between the desire for belonging (and not necessarily linked to 
origin) and the dangers that risk the consummation of this desire. It is interesting that 
Espiritu does not resolve this conflict but accepts this tension and seeks a curative path 
for one to "make a home" in relationship to the "departure from home." By doing this, 
she underscores a continuity between leaving and creating a new space, a space in 
between, for creative social relationships and communities to emerge. 
Land and Home: Cultivating a Sense of Community through a Sense of Place 
There are a few interesting points this analysis of Pacific Island and Asian 
American identities reveals. First, both Pacific Islanders and Asian Americans have a 
shared history of colonization in their places of origin, either in the Pacific Islands or in 
Asia. Second, both groups have experienced exclusion as well as differential inclusion 
within the US hegemonic state. Filipino Americans were allowed into the country as 
nationals, but not as citizens. Native Hawaiians were forcefully included as wards of the 
state. Both were denied a place of belonging within the US national narrative of 
citizenship. Third, and what I would like to focus on in this section, both held specific 
strategies for decolonization and the creation of counter hegemonic narratives. Both, I 
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argue, utilize a sense ofplace to reassert their specific group's cultural identity and se1f­
determination. Both invoke a sense ofplace that, on the one hand, has been taken away 
from them because of US colonial practices, and, on the other hand, recovers their agency 
and subjectivity by centering their commitments to a community, which guides their 
process of settlement. I would like to highlight these concepts and explore the various 
ways in which conceptions ofland and horne offer a sense ofplace in order to build 
meaningful communities of coalition among Pacific Islanders and Asian Americans. 
Situating this problem within the space between framed by notions of travel and 
horne offers some important resources in addressing the fractured nature of Asian 
American and Native Hawaiian coalitional politics. In Chapter 3, the space-between 
emerges between nation-states as a place in which our moral acts of care are fostered in 
order to envision the growth of a larger international community. This space between 
orients our capacity to care for distant others closer to horne. Identifying the 
transnational relationships that mark our social life as relationships of dependency can 
help in addressing the larger processes of globalization and transnationalism that 
condition the nature of settlement and travel. 
Asian Americans and Native Hawaiians have been subject to colonization, and the 
ways in which re-settlement occurs for both groups, while vastly different, nonetheless, 
overlap in meaningful ways. One notable way in which they overlap is in the process of 
yearning for a horne, either in terms of distance or historical era. The social aspects that 
ground one's culture are not close at hand. According to Trask, Asian Americans 
imagine the process of settlement as being tied to the US Constitution, whereas Native 
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Hawaiians imagine the process oftheir re-settlement in terms of sovereignty. While both 
groups may possess different methods ofmaking a home, it is important to keep in mind 
that the concept ofhome both groups operate under assumes a porous and flexible home. 
This flexibility in shifting the visions of each of their respective imagined homes might 
serve as a starting point in resolving the fractured political goals ofboth groups. 
Both Native Hawaiian and Asian American understandings of identity view their 
respective notions ofland and home as flexible. According to Trask, colonial thinking 
has made her a "captive" (1996, 407) and prevented her from interacting with the land. 
The land is an actor, a mother for Native Hawaiians, and the mother needs to be cared for 
in a familial sense. Native Hawai'ian land dispossession has obliterated this logic of 
place for Native Hawaiians. Asian immigrants who embody a "settler ideology," 
according to a logic of place, does not relate to the land and its inhabitants in a 
meaningful way. Rather, Asian immigrants view "their" place ordered within the US 
Constitution and not to the geography and actual location ofHawai'i. Their view of the 
land is bound up with notions of individualism and rights. 
Moreover, a way of thinking that cannot be flexible is problematic for Trask. 
This can be seen in Trask's criticism ofwhite feminism. She argues: 
Feminism and white feminists are out ofplace here, that is, out of geographic and 
cultural and historical place...Thus, justice for our Native people in the form of 
our own land base, cultural integrity, and government is generally perceived as an 
injustice to non-Natives, particularly white people who keep publicly asserting, in 
their own words, that 'Hawai'i is, after all, part of the United States' ...But here is 
precisely the deep-rooted problem. White American women are American, not 
Hawai'ian. White American feminist women are still American. Their loyalties 
are to the United States ofAmerica (1996,409-10). 
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Feminism's "fitness" to Hawai'i is ill begotten. In other words, white feminism does not 
work in Hawai'i because ofNative Hawaiian's specific links to the land. The land serves 
as an ordering relation that constitutes Native Hawaiian identity. Her criticisms ofUS 
American women is not exclusionary of all haole women (although her rhetorical 
statements that encourage haoles to go home seem to suggest otherwise), but should be 
read as a call to change one's relationship to the land from an abstract document of 
citizenship and belonging. If feminism is to employ strategies based on the constitution's 
notions of rights and equality, where their sense of place is a "state ofmind," then 
feminism is "out of place" or is not fit for the land and its inhabitants.4o If feminism is to 
"work" for Native Hawaiians, it must change its colonial logic ofplace to a more 
concrete and geographical sense ofplace, thus requiring feminism to support Native 
Hawaiian political stance on sovereignty. 
It might be argued that there is a land essentialism lurking in this notion of place. 
It has been argued by a number of theorists (Clifford 1999) that immigrant and Native 
narratives conflict with one another because of their different commitments to place; one 
is from that particular place, and the other is not. However, situating this dichotomy in 
terms of a logic of place, one might see how place functions as a mode of relation to a 
specific geographical location. As Scott Pratt argues in his analysis ofNative 
conceptions of land: 
40 Feminism might see Native Hawaiian relationship with the land as gendered, and this supports 
stereotypes of a weak femininity, such that women constantly need care, and also supports this historical 
elision between nature and women that is problematic for many ecofeminists. According to Trask's use of 
the logic of place, this sort of feminism does not belong for Native Hawaiian women since it does not 
portray genuinely their relationship with the land as a mother, which is grounded in their notions of kinship 
and ecological conceptions of nature as a healthy ecosystem. 
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the logic ofplace directs that relocation and other changes be carried out in a way 
that reestablishes suitability in response to the new land (or the new land 
inhabitants ofthe lands). The link between land and people is close, but it is also 
reciprocal and dynamic (2002, 157). 
One of the results of a logic ofplace might involve an "outsider" who becomes part of 
the land and community that inhabits herlhim. A logic of place is not exclusionary. In 
fact, other Pacific islanders have commented how their notion of identity is inclusive 
(Ishtar 1994); however, when utilizing a logic ofplace, one might see how this inclusion 
is viable only when taking into consideration the place one inhabits. 
Following this theme of inclusion, Espiritu's notion ofhome also functions within a logic 
of place. Home, for Espiritu, is built on the possibility that home is "carried" on the 
backs of Filipinos. The "transnational space," or space in between, is a process of 
establishing connections with places. Like Trask, who feels captive because of this 
obliteration of a logic ofplace, the immigrant also feels captive by the constraining 
modes of assimilationist narratives that obliterate this logic ofplace in relation to their 
homeland. The role of imagination among transnational Filipinos serves as a way of 
recovering their sense ofplace with their homeland. Native Hawaiians, according to 
Trask, have often been accused of remaining nostalgic in their yearning for the past 
(1996,413). US narratives have described the yearning of Filipinos for their homeland as 
a nostalgic experience as well. Trask argues that US narratives have assumed that the 
past (non-US location) is "strangely inferior" and "undeveloped." A logic ofplace 
challenges this criticism and provides an alternative way of understanding ourselves in 
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relation to a specific geographical location. The role of imagination in Espiritu's and 
Trask's sense serves as a way of recovering this sense of place. 
The process ofhomemaking is a difficult process for those who are forced to 
travel under conditions of imperialism and colonial economic forces. In fact, many 
respondents in Espiritu's research claim that they did not "fit" in this place or that they 
wanted to go home. America was not a place where they felt a sense ofplace or 
community. There was always a desire to "stay connected" with the homeland through 
transnational practices of balakbayan packages, remittances to the Philippines, telephone 
calls and travel back to the Philippines. However, one of the ways in which Filipino 
American families attempted to "make a home" in a hostile country involved community 
development built on shared histories and backgrounds from the Philippines. If the 
transnational Filipino yearns for home, then community is built upon this desire. 
Community associations representing different provinces and villages from the 
Philippines emerged in San Diego. What began as a group ofNavy Filipino wives 
reasserting their relationship to the Philippines through hosting social events, such as 
community picnics, Thanksgiving and holiday celebrations for Filipino Navy visitors, 
and celebrations featuring folk dances, has turned into a huge social organization 
determining much of Filipino American life in San Diego. The place of San Diego has 
transformed as well as its people. 
The homeland, the Philippines, can also change given the new place immigrants 
have moved to. Part ofthese changes occurs in the context of Filipino girls who live in 
the US. Modes of conduct, such as strict rules limiting Filipino girls' movement in order 
186 
to ensure her virginity and chastity, were seen from the perspective of the parent as 
resisting US culture, its "sinfulness," and its normalizing values of promiscuity. While 
some parents are critical of US social values, some parents learned to be less strict with 
their daughters due to the psychological turmoil involved for both the parents and 
children. Parents, in some of these cases, argue, "What can you do?" Adaptation to a 
place becomes a contested practice; however, it is their relation to a place that changes 
their visions of the homeland. 
Building Communities of Coalitions among Pacific Islanders and Asian Americans 
The promising element in both Asian American and Native Hawaiian sense of 
home and land can be understood in terms of the space between framed by concepts of 
travel and home. A transnational framework underscores the nature of the multicultural 
subject composed within relationships. A transnational understanding of relationships 
highlights how subjects are confined within relationships determined by power and 
hegemony. Nonetheless, a transnational framework underscores the possibility in which 
the subject restores a sense of agency. This sense of agency is tied to notions of travel, in 
the sense that one is displaced from their home, and to notions ofhome, in the sense that 
one yearns for a sense ofbelonging. This transnational framework can be understood as 
instances in which care operates to sustain relationships on an international scale and also 
as a possibility of changing the nature of domestic communities. The transnational 
framework offers a theoretical basis in understanding the space between as a resource for 
cultivating vital coalitional communities. 
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In the Native Hawaiian and Asian American case, both groups view their 
respective notions ofhome and land as flexible and open for transformation. This can 
serve as a starting point in envisioning connections between both groups. The ethical and 
political remapping of the boundaries between both groups is possible within a 
framework of identity that allows for the possibility of transformation. That both groups 
see their notions of identity as flexible, however, needs to be accompanied by what 
Reagon suggests in her notion of coalition: "throwing yourself into the next century" 
(1983). This entails that both groups must see their respective identities mutually formed 
in order to create new ways of coalescing with one another. The future requires a source 
of action that involves intelligent mappings of the boundaries between the two groups. 
While both groups necessarily attempt to transform the dominant culture in which they 
live, it is important to see how the various aspects of their respective identities might 
interpret their encounters with each other in a way that historicizes their collectivities 
through effort, rather than from a common experience of oppression. 
While a transnational framework may not provide specific answers to the question 
ofAsian American and Native Hawaiian conflicts of identity, it does highlight future 
directions in which coalitions can be constructed. Through the process ofworld-traveling 
and home-making, both groups may be able to view the common road of human 
experience as co-creators, fellow travelers, and home-makers, moving towards a future 
that encompasses both of their senses of belonging. 
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